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Abstract
Designing political institutions able to secure the conditions for cooperation
among persons who exhibit widely diverse perspectives, underpinned by different
structures of preferences and goals, constitutes, perhaps, the greatest challenge
of contemporary political theorising. F. A. Hayek’s theory of the spontaneous
order provides one key insight on what political institutions of complex societies
should look like: since only individuals know their structures of preferences,
goals and their relevant circumstances, theorists and planners, by virtue of their
inability to collect such dispersed knowledge, cannot design and devise and
devise fine-grained systems of rules aimed at defining people’s specific terms
of cooperation. In order to create the conditions for cooperation in complex
societies, Hayek suggests, we must design political institutions that define a large
protected sphere of actions, which equips individuals with the ability to shape
their specific terms of cooperation on the basis of their own local knowledge.
Hayek identifies such an institutional arrangement in the protection of Lockean
rights to life, liberty and property.
In this thesis, I attempt to show that an aptly modified version of Hayek’s
theory of the spontaneous order lends itself to a contractarian justification.
In particular, I aim to demonstrate that individuals, who are uncertain about
their future preferences and goals, have instrumental reasons to converge on
institutional arrangements that define a large protected sphere of action, which
allows them to define their specific terms of cooperation on the basis of local
knowledge which will unveil to them during their life paths. In fact, individuals’
uncertainty about their future structures of preferences and goals elicits the
emergence of preferences for flexibility, which make them abstract from their
current set of preferences and goals when facing a social contract bargaining
scenario, and invite them to choose institutional arrangements which leave the
door open for adaptation to changes in their future identities. Preferences for
flexibility, I aim to show, can solve much political disagreement stemming from
people’s seemingly incompatible structures of preferences and goals.
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Introduction
An individual Jesuit is to the utmost degree of abasement the
slave of his order though the order itself exists for the collective power
and importance of its members.
- John Stuart Mill, On Liberty
John Stuart Mill’s rich and multifaceted account of liberalism has largely
inspired my research during the Ph.D. In fact, although only a few references to
his writings will be appearing in the next chapters, the present work takes as its
constitutive aim that of responding to two main questions arising from the above
quoted passage. Namely, if social orders exist through and for their members,
why do we often observe evolutionary patterns leading to states of affairs in
which members of a certain association become mostly subjects of formal and
informal rules, rather than active shapers of their social environment? And, how
could we design our social orders in a way that would make them cooperative
enterprises from which everyone stands to gain?
If we follow Mill in maintaining that social orders exist or should exist pri-
marily for their members, we should also conclude that our search for the con-
stitutive aims of our communities cannot lie outside the domain of preferences,
interests and goals that we, qua members or would-be members of our commu-
nities, exhibit. In fact, these preferences, interests and goals cannot be merely
regarded as features one may plausibly ignore in delineating the terms of our
cooperation, as there is no other plausible standpoint from which to start our
political theorising.
If we follow this line of thought, communities exist, or should exist, precisely
to the extent that we, qua members of our communities, have instrumental
reasons to build, join them and comply with their rules, in that most of our
personal aims and enterprises depend upon cooperative schemes operating in
the background. As such, the cooperative schemes one attempts to design are
supposed to meaningfully respond to what we are and what we aim to achieve.
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Therefore, we should be worried about states of affairs in which adaptation
to these preferences, interests and goals is undermined. In particular, we should
be worried about the emergence of institutional arrangements which lack, at the
very outset, or lose, in due course, appeal from the standpoints of many fellow
members of our communities. Such a worry, I suggest, is two-fold. First, there
is a normative concern about social orders failing in attaining one of their main
constitutive aims, which is to advance our chances to successfully pursue our
life plans that provide meaning to our human endeavour on earth. Second, we
should be concerned with how such a failure could potentially undermine the
stability of our communities. In fact, members who fail to see their communities
as cooperative enterprises from which they stand to gain could fail to form
reasons to comply with their rules.
One striking example of the sort of phenomena Mill was concerned with is
offered by Elizabeth Anderson’s book Private Government :
Consider some facts about how employers today control their work-
ers. Walmart prohibits employees from exchanging casual remarks
while on duty, calling this ”time theft.” Apple inspects the personal
belongings of their retail workers, who lose up to a half-hour of un-
paid time every day as they wait in line to be searched. Tyson
prevents its poultry workers from using the bathroom. Some have
been forced to urinate on themselves, while their supervisors mock
them. About half of U.S. employees have been subject to suspi-
cionless drug screening by their employers. Millions are pressured
by their employers to support particular political causes or candi-
dates. If the U.S. government imposed such regulations on us, we
would rightly protest that our constitutional rights were being vi-
olated. But American workers have no such rights against their
bosses. Even speaking out against such constraints can get them
fired. So most keep silent. (Anderson, 2017 p. xix).
Anderson’s aim, in the book, is to explore the peculiarities of the labor mar-
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ket in a free market economy, and to spell out how its main constitutive features
differ from those of ordinary markets in which buyers and sellers walk away af-
ter the transaction is over. In particular, Anderson is concerned with the sort
of formal and informal hierarchies, partly arising from differences in bargaining
power between employers and employees, and with how such hierarchies could
likely generate states of affairs in which many of our fellow citizens silently and,
more or less, voluntarily become subject to schemes of rules from which they
have little to gain and much to object to.
Anderson’s worry is not merely highlighted by considerations of justice with
respect to workers’ conditions, but also driven by more mundane concerns about
stability. In fact, we could hardly expect our communities to be peaceful co-
operative enterprises when formal or informal distributions of rights among our
fellow citizens are such ’so as to systematically undermine the interests of identi-
fiable groups of people in serious or gratuitous ways’ (Anderson, 2017, p. xxii).
Examples of this sort are also frequently found at the political level, where
lack of institutional adaptation to citizens’ structure of preferences and goals
is somewhat systematic. For instance, consider the case of Piergiorgio Welby,
Italian poet and painter, who was diagnosed with muscular dystrophy when he
was only seventeen. In 1997, the progression of the disease was such that he had
to resort to mechanical ventilation, artificial feeding and a speech-synthesiser to
communicate. In 2006, he was able to send a video letter to the president of
the Italian Republic asking for the interruption of mechanical ventilation and
artificial feeding under sedation. However, in Italy, there was and still is no law
regulating assisted suicide such that it is hard to tell whether aiding someone
in such circumstances is against the law.
A poll made in 2006 revealed that the 64% of Italian voters were in favour of
some form of euthanasia,1 and such a tendency has substantially increased over
the past few years with supporters of euthanasia reaching the 74% in 2017.2 Yet,
despite a widespread consensus over the possibility of assisted suicide, forms of
1See Veltri (2006).
2Today (2017).
8
institutional recognition are found wanting. In this regard, in 2017, Fabiano
Antoniani, a former dj, victim of a terrible car accident, which left him blind
and tetraplegic, had to travel to Switzerland in order to have assisted suicide
performed on him. Interestingly, this was made possible by the help of an Italian
MP, who has been under investigation for the crime of instigation to suicide.3
Sometimes, lack of adaptation to people’s structure of preferences and goals
is driven by mechanisms widely studied in social psychology. Pluralistic igno-
rance, for instance, explains, in part, the persistence of a wide range of despi-
cable and sum-negative practices going on in many communities.4 In this re-
gard, Cristina Bicchieri’s important and large body of theoretical and empirical
work on social norms has shown that the persistence of norms of discrimination
against blacks, or of norms of revenge, or of norms sustaining practices such as
Female Genital Mutilation and corruption, is partly driven by mistaken beliefs
about other people’s normative attitudes on what we ought to do in certain
circumstances.5 For instance, a recent empirical work analysing the persistence
of corruption in Nigeria has shown that some of determinants of corruption can
be traced to people’s mistaken beliefs about other people’s normative beliefs on
the opportunity of bribing public officials within certain circumstances.6 Were
we able to express our intimate convictions about sensible cases, without the
fear of social sanctions, we would be also able to respond efficaciously to many
instances of lack of either formal or informal institutional adaptation.
Some other times, lack of adaptation and the persistence of despicable prac-
tices rests on path-dependence,7 and collective action problems which stand in
3The stories of Piergiorgio Welby and Fabiano Antoniani have been widely covered by
international media such as The New York Times. See, in particular Fisher (2006); Povoledo
(2017).
4One of the first formulations of the concept of pluralistic ignorance can be found in Miller
and McFarland (1987).
5See, in particular, Bicchieri (2005) which illustrates her general approach toward social
norms, and Bicchieri (2016), which tackles more empirical aspects and lays out diverse methods
to measure norms and detect pluralistic ignorance.
6Koni Hoffmann and Patel (2017).
7A large body of literature focuses on path-dependence as the key determinant of lack
of institutional change. Among others, North (1991) and (2012) provide analytic tools to
investigate the ways in which path-dependence influences the evolution of institutions.
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the way of converging on better states of affairs.8 Often, though, lack of adap-
tation is driven by nothing more than mere coercion. Political elites, whether
autocratic or democratically elected, are seldom either detached from or uncon-
cerned with citizens’ preferences and goals. In democratic contexts, in particu-
lar, such a detachment is often explained with reference to problems connected
to incentive-compatibility,9 or attributed to citizens’ rational ignorance,10 or to
the cartellisation of political parties,11 or to parties’ failure in conveying political
demands coming from our fellow citizens.12.
Other times, on the other hand, we simply disagree on what social and
political institutions should look like. Such disagreement, whether grounded
in different conceptions of the good or merely shaped by different interests,
transfers to the social and political arena and often generates states of affairs
that do not really resemble compromises between different standpoints, either
because our views about social institutions are non-compossible, or because
preference aggregation problems tend to create winners and losers.13
The present thesis constitutes an attempt to theorise about the cooperative
schemes of our communities by taking individual preferences and goals seriously.
In particular, it starts from the key assumption I have previously highlighted:
social orders can be regarded as meaningful cooperative enterprises only to the
extent that we, qua would-be members, have reasons to build, join them and
comply with their rules, and such reasons cannot but be grounded in what we
stand to gain from participating to them. In these terms, the search for insti-
tutional arrangements that could secure the conditions for cooperation consists
primarily in a search for systems of rules which members of the community,
8For instance, a recent a recent article by Christopher Coyne and Rachel Coyne (2014),
illustrates how the currently widespread phenomenon of Female Genital Mutilation could often
be plausibly explained in terms of sub-optimal strategic equilibrium.
9Public choice theory, especially through the important work of Stigler (1971), Peltzman
(1976) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962), emphasises how citizens struggle in controlling
political elites.
10See, for instance, Caplan (2011).
11See, in particular, Kitschelt (2000).
12Urbinati, among others, has largely shaped the research agenda on the failure of political
parties as a main determinant of the crisis of democracy; see, in particular, Urbinati (2014).
13This is what mostly emerges from the literature on social choice theory, which mostly
developed after Arrow (1950).
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with their own diverse standpoints, underpinned by different sets of interests,
preferences and goals, would abide by on the ground of their instrumental rea-
sons.
Crucially, the search for such an institutional framework cannot merely con-
cern and accommodate for widespread diversity in a static fashion; which is to
say that, although diversity and disagreement constitute permanent and plausi-
bly ineliminable features of our world, their character is subject to evolutionary
processes. In fact, our structure of goals and preferences is constantly subject
to change, and such a dynamic character is often driven by moral innovation,
which presents us with new and sometimes appealing ways of life, and by tech-
nological innovation, which enlarges the set of opportunities and aims we may
want to pursue.14
Such a dynamic character of our structure of preferences and goals, which I
take as another ineliminable fact of our human endeavour on earth, should make
us reflect on that agreements or convergence (whether actual or hypothetical)
on social institutions by no means resembles a one-shot game in which, once
and if the agreement is secured, we have finally responded to the ’first political
question’, to borrow Bernard Williams’ words.15 In fact, dynamic structures of
preferences and goals require modular changes to our terms of cooperation. As
such, platforms that proved helpful in allowing us to peacefully interact with one
another, with the prospect of mutual advantage, may not prove helpful when
circumstances change. In this regard, our search for institutional arrangements,
which are able to secure the conditions for cooperation, constitutes an endless
enterprise, whose indefinite character, I suggest, partly shapes the attractiveness
of political theorising.
I join many prominent authors in claiming that much political theorising has
been largely unconcerned with people’s actual structure of preferences and goals
14Ideally, technological innovation should drive toward the enlargement of our set of oppor-
tunities; yet, the challenges posed by climate change, for instance, seem to lead us toward the
opposite direction.
15Willams claims:”I identify the “first” political question in Hobbesian terms as the securing
of order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation. It is “first” because
solving it is the condition of solving, indeed posing, any others”. (Williams, 2005, p. 3).
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in laying out cooperative schemes we should live by. For instance, many theorists
who have mostly shaped the research agenda within the literature of political
philosophy in the past fifty years - of which John Rawls’ large and important
body of work before Political Liberalism,16 constitutes only the most extended
and persuasive instance - often, although not exclusively, theorise about co-
operative schemes and institutional arrangements by looking at what sort of
demands or normative requirements would arise under idealising assumptions
concerning individuals’ preferences and goals.
Such idealising assumptions are made explicit by reference to moral values
that individuals allegedly internalise, such as the value of moral equality of
persons, and which should importantly constrain our structures of preferences
and goals, thus facilitating our converge on a common set of institutions. Ryan
Muldoon, in his recent and inspiring book Social Contract Theory for a Diverse
World: Beyond Tolerance,17 borrows from Thomas Nagel the label of ’views
from nowhere’ in characterising these approaches, in that authors such as John
Rawls, Thomas Scanlon and, indeed, Thomas Nagel, develop accounts of justice
laying out terms of cooperation we would endorse if, and only if, we could
somehow abstract from our own actual circumstances, such as our conceptions
of the good life, our identities, our structures of preferences and goals, and
internalise values which would equip us with reasons to converge on certain
cooperative arrangements.18
The widespread diffusion of such an approach, I believe, partly explains the
revival of Political Realism and the emergence of Practice-Dependent theoris-
ing within the political philosophy literature.19 In fact, it is rather intuitive to
interpret the emphasis on the constitutive features of politics (e.g. people’s be-
liefs, preferences, goals, social practices, conventions, existing institutions, etc.),
16I mostly refer to Rawls’ works following the publication of Rawls (1958) and later included
in Rawls (1971).
17Muldoon (2016).
18I refer, in particular, to Rawls (1971), Scanlon (1998) and Nagel (1989).
19In particular, I refer to the recent and growing literature following the posthumous pub-
lication of Williams (2005). See, in particular, Galston (2010), Sangiovanni (2008), Rossi
and Sleat (2014). Practice-sensitive approaches, though, may also include Gaus (2010) and
Muldoon (2016).
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which realists and practice-dependent theorists take as supposed to play a cru-
cial role in defining our terms of cooperation, as a reaction to their discontent
with the pervasive negligence of the actual circumstances of politics in identify-
ing normative requirements that political orders should meet in order to qualify
as just or legitimate.20
The present work, in this respect, belongs to this particular line of thought,
in that it reacts to views from nowhere in attempting to delineate one way
of finding cooperative schemes, to which we may be willing to converge on,
without idealising assumptions that demand us to deliberate about political
institutions through lenses which are not intimately ours. Importantly, this is
not, in any way, an attempt to discredit the conceptual relevance of views from
nowhere. In fact, I can only admire the academic enterprises of these great
philosophers, and should be content with achieving the smallest part of what
they have accomplished in their intellectual endeavours. Nor I believe that
views from nowhere lack normative relevance under the current circumstances
of politics. In fact, I join John Maynard Keynes in making explicit my own
convictions about the fact that:
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when
they are right and when they are wrong are more powerful than
is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else.
(Keynes, 1936, p. 383).
Ideal or utopian theorising, on the one hand, and practice-sensitive theoris-
ing, on the other, have, I believe, quite different constitutive aims: the former
attempts to inspire us, qua members of our social communities, by spelling out a
number of values we should internalise in order to imagine and make intimately
20It is important to point out that realist and practice-dependent theorists offer widely dif-
ferent interpretations of the constitutive features of politics from which to start our theorising.
For instance, Sangiovanni (2008) distinguishes between two different approaches to practice-
dependency, cultural conventionalism and institutionalism, which reflect a commitment to two
distinct kinds of constitutive features (i.e. cultural conventionalists focus on beliefs, cultural
practices, etc.; institutionalists look at formal institutional arrangements taking place in a
particular community). Similarly, realists such as Sleat, would suggest that people’s prefer-
ences and beliefs, far from representing constitutive features of politics, are merely contingent
aspects of our political orders (see, in particular, Sleat, 2016).
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ours an attractive, though demanding, account of cooperation; the latter, per-
haps less nobly, aims at responding to one more pressing question, which is: how
are we to design our social institutions, given what we actually are?21 Surely,
there is much appeal in imagining perfect terms of cooperation in a world of
quasi-perfect persons, and the sort of perfectionism that is involved in such ideal
theorising should make us constantly strive for improving the kinds of persons
we are.22
At the same time, though, division of labor demands to those of us who are,
perhaps, less imaginative, to think about how to make a virtue out of necessity;
which is to imagine and theorise on the best cooperative schemes consistent with
the actual constitutive features of our world. In this respect, I strongly believe
that, while ideal theorising has much to say about the sort of persons we should
aim to be but less so with respect to how institutions should look like, here and
now, practice-sensitive approaches have much to tell us about how institutions
should look like, but less so with regard to the kinds of persons we should aim
to be.
This particular aspect, I believe, brings with it a number of implications on
the sort of assumptions one is allowed to make when theorising about political
institutions in the attempt to take individual preferences and goals seriously.
The most important of which is that we must take our world as it is, with its
scarcity of resources, its transaction costs, with our more or less pronounced
self-interest and our pervasive uncertainty about the sort of persons we will be
in our life paths. In fact, the present work attempts to take these elements as
its inevitable starting points.
However, one thing in which it indulges is in its reliance on the concept of
rationality, to which I will often resort in delineating my suggestions for thinking
about institutions from such a standpoint. In this regard, I am in need to spend
21By practice-sensitive theorising, I mostly refer to theories that take people’s beliefs and
values as their starting point. Once again, I have in mind Gaus (2010) and Muldoon (2016).
22On exemplarity, see in particular Ferrara (2008), which has profoundly shaped my ideas
about the relevance of ideal theorising. Alongside Ferrara, many other authors have influenced
my views on ideal theory, among those: Schmidtz (2011), Gaus (2016), Estlund (2014), Hamlin
and Stemplowska (2012), Simmons (2010).
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a few concise words about the sort of rationality I have in mind, as very little
will be said in the following pages. In particular, I wish to emphasise that the
present work should be read as mostly, though unconventionally, contributing
to the literature on rational choice theory concerning institutional arrangements
or social contract theory, where the concept of rationality is spelled out in terms
of a person’s capacity to form a certain life plan and choose the best available
means to pursue it, on the basis of one’s rational beliefs on how to achieve it.23
In particular, in delineating cooperative schemes and institutional arrange-
ments that I regard as appealing from various diverse standpoints, I will largely
rely on the assumption of persons’ rationality in looking at and evaluating them.
Such an assumption, though, when applied to social contract theorising, is, per-
haps, no less demanding than other assumptions concerning people’s internalisa-
tion of moral values, as it requires, on our part, an effort in thinking about social
institutions in an instrumentalist fashion, that is in judging their appropriate-
ness on the basis of how they advance our interests and facilitate the attainment
of our goals. In this regard, those of us who believe that the main constitutive
aim of social institutions is to realise an account of justice, which somehow ig-
nores the advancement of one’s life plans, will find the present work of little
interest. Yet, if we take individual preferences and goals seriously, the answer
to the question:’what should social institutions look like?’ must emerge from
our rational deliberation about which sets of institutions would best advance
our aims.
Perhaps, such an enterprise requires more than mere rationality. David
Gauthier, for instance, frames it in the language of morals when he asks:”What
theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show that all
the duties it recommends are truly endorsed in each individual’s reason?” (1986,
p. 1). In this regard, if social contract theory is a moral enterprise, or starts
from moral assumptions, it substantively differs from other approaches, in that
23Such a definition of rationality is rather conventional and shows no significant differences
from that of other authors belonging to the social contract tradition. For instance, Rawls
(1999) states that ”our decision is perfectly rational provided that we face up to our circum-
stances and do the best we can”, p. 349.
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it assigns normative relevance to people’s actual preferences and goals, and takes
as its main normative aim that of searching for institutional arrangements that
would foster our ability to cooperate as a means to pursue goals embedded in
our life plans.
Such a normative standpoint, I should emphasise, is by no means original.
We can, indeed, enlist many approaches within modern and contemporary po-
litical thought that assign to individual preferences and goals such a strong nor-
mative weight in defining our terms of cooperation. Chief among those, Thomas
Hobbes’ contractarian approach in laying out the structure of the Leviathan and
John Locke’s account of the emergence of Civil Government from the state of
nature (1689). I should also mention instrumentalist accounts of democracy
dating back to Mill (1861), and more recently developed by theorists such as
Robert Putnam (1994), David Estlund (2009) or Helene Landemore (2012);
theories of justice as mutual advantage such as David Gauthier’s (1986) or Rus-
sell Hardin’s (1988), de-idealised accounts of public reason such as Gerald Gaus
(2010), classical liberal theories which include also consequentialist justifications
of political institutions such as Robert Nozick’s Framework For Utopia (1974),24
Chandran Kukathas’ Liberal Archipelago (2003), Anthony De Jasay’s contrac-
tarianism (1989), James Buchanan’s constitutional liberty (1991), theories of
the spontaneous order such as Friedrich Hayek’s (2012) and Robert Sugden’s
(2004, 2018), and, especially, recent social contract theories such as Muldoon
(2016) and Moehler (2018). In fact, all these authors share, at least, a partially
instrumentalist view of social institutions, according to which one of the consti-
tutive aims of our communities is to advance individuals’ interests by creating
the conditions for cooperation. This is not to deny that we may endorse certain
institutional settings on different grounds, but merely to highlight that respon-
siveness and adaptation to preferences and goals do play a crucial normative
role when designing the institutions of our communities.25
24Clearly, Nozick’s main argument for the minimal state does not take a consequentialist
form. Yet, the framework for utopia, which he regards as an alternative justificatory framework
for the minimal state, contains consequentialist elements.
25For instance, democratic theorists often integrate instrumentalist justifications of demo-
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In the following pages, I shall be primarily concerned with Hayek’s work and,
in this respect, one main preliminary methodological remark is in order: this
thesis does not attempt to reconstruct the rich and interesting historical and
intellectual context surrounding Hayek’s endeavour in highlighting his important
contributions to political theory. In fact, the aim of this thesis is only minimally
historical. In this respect, to borrow Bernard Williams’ words, the present
work could be read as an instance of engaging with ’history of philosophy’ as
opposed to ’history of ideas’,26 where the former identifies attempts to reflect
on political and philosophical concepts in an abstract fashion, in an effort to
highlight their normative or explanatory force in different contexts, and the
latter refers to historical approaches to ideas with the aim of emphasising the
contextual elements that contributed to their emergence.
In fact, I’ll be focusing on one specific object of Hayek’s inquiry, that is
his theory of the spontaneous order, and on the epistemological premises that
underlie his approach, in an effort to propose certain amendments and offer
original insights on the problem of cooperation in a diverse and bounded world.
This, I should stress, is by no means a new methodology in political philosophy,
and many theorists have succeeded in rescuing and reformulating philosophical
concepts in an effort to explore and highlight their relevance in addressing issues
that are of pressing interest to the academic community.27
However, one main question immediately arises in the mind of the experi-
enced political philosopher, a question which I undoubtedly owe an answer to:
why the spontaneous order? After all, one might notice, Hayek’s intellectual
endeavour does not, at least explicitly, belong to the social contract tradition,
nor has he dealt with normative questions about the relevance of individual
preferences and goals in shaping social institutions, nor can he be regarded as
cratic decision making procedures with principled justifications based on the value of political
equality (e.g. Estlund 2009).
26See Williams (2002).
27The list is incredibly large, but I would like to mention a few works that had a relevant
impact during my personal and philosophical journey during the Ph.D.: G. A. Cohen’s Karl
Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence; Gerald Gaus’ The Order of Public Reason; Ken
Binmore’s Natural Justice; John Tomasi’s Free Market Fairness.
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major figure in contemporary political philosophy debates.
In this respect, there are three main reasons I wish to offer. First, Hayek’s
account of the spontaneous order constitutes, although not explicitly, an in-
stance of theorising around social contracts. In particular, I interpret the main
constitutive aim of the theory of spontaneous order as that of searching for
institutional arrangements which are able to create the conditions for fruitful
cooperation among fellow members of a community who exhibit diverse prefer-
ences, goals and aims. Such a formulation, I suggest, lends itself to contractarian
justifications, as the institutional arrangements Hayek attempts to design could,
ideally, be endorsed from a wide variety of standpoints.28 Moreover, the empha-
sis on institutional adaptation to changing circumstances, which is pervasive in
Hayek’s work,29 aptly responds to the purpose of thinking about social institu-
tions in a dynamic fashion, which is by imagining social institutions that can be
endorsed from widely different standpoints over time, in spite of the dynamic
character of the structures of preferences and goals exhibited by members of a
community.
Second, Hayek’s account of the spontaneous order is, perhaps, the most so-
phisticated inquiry into the search for cooperative social institutions, within
complex scenarios such as pluralistic societies. Throughout his large body of
works, Hayek tackles crucial issues concerning the impossibility of designing
from scratch, and in full details, meaningful systems of rules aiming at regulat-
ing our interactions in a cooperative manner, as theorists or planners are unable
to collect local knowledge dispersed among various members of our communi-
ties, and to act on the basis of it. In this respect, his inquiry into social orders
constitutes an attempt to theorise about institutional arrangements which are
able to create the conditions for cooperation without relying on central plan-
ning, and by using knowledge that is dispersed among fellow members of our
communities.
28A similar interpretation of Hayek’s theory of the spontaneous order has been provided by
Sugden (1993) and Lister (2013).
29Especially in Hayek’s earlier works on the distribution of knowledge in complex systems.
See, in particular, Hayek (1945).
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The great lesson we draw from Hayek is, I suggest, that if we wish to take in-
dividual preferences and goals seriously in designing institutional arrangements
of cooperative communities, we are to imagine systems of rules that leave in
the hands of individuals the ability to shape their specific terms of coopera-
tion. This particular aspect, I hope to show, has interesting implications on
social contract theorising, in that it invites us to converge or agree on a set of
institutions which do not lay out, ex-ante, our specific terms of cooperation.
Our agreement, indeed, should rather concern general sets of institutions which
define a protected sphere within which we are able to act in the pursuit of our
own goals, on the basis of our own local knowledge. Hayek envisages such an
institutional arrangement in the protection of the Lockean triad, which is in
the protection of rights to life, liberty and property. The underlying idea is
that such a protected sphere would allow individuals, exhibiting different and
dynamic structures of preferences and goals, to continuously negotiate their
specific terms of cooperation, on the basis of their local knowledge.
Third, theories of the spontaneous order, I suggest, equip us with great
tools for designing basic institutional arrangements that would foster our ability
to cooperate also at the meta-community level. This is the case of Robert
Nozick’s discussion on the Framework For Utopia, where, in proposing us the
minimal state as the institutional arrangement which best approximates Utopia,
he suggests that the protected sphere instantiated by the distribution of rights
underpinned by the minimal state, allows us to create the conditions for the
emergence of countless communities that would aptly respond to people’s diverse
structures of preferences and goals.30
All these elements persuaded me to start my investigation around social
contract theory through the lenses and with the tools of Hayek’s theory of the
spontaneous order, and, in many regards, the present work could be read as
an attempt to frame Hayek’s work in social contract terms, and analyse the
difficulties it faces and how it could be improved.
The idea of casting Hayek’s theory of the spontaneous order in social contract
30See Nozick (1974), ch. 10.
19
terms, I suggest, has two main merits. First, there is a question of authenticity of
interpretation. In fact, despite numerous attempts to characterise Hayek’s work
as ultimately, though unconventionally, belonging to the utilitarian tradition,31
I regard the theory of the spontaneous order as primarily concerned with how
institutions should distribute opportunities to members of a community in an
effort to foster cooperation from widely different standpoints. Perhaps, the final
aim of cooperation consists in maximising aggregate utility, but, if it is so, such
an aim is pursued by means of designing institutions that (nearly) all members
of a given community regard as satisfactory, such that they would continuously
find instrumental reasons to sustain and comply with the cooperative system of
rules.
Second, and most importantly, social contract theory would add another
layer of justification to Hayek’s political theorising. In particular, if the the-
ory of the spontaneous order can be sensibly framed in these terms, we would
succeed in making it appealing from a different and sound normative stand-
point. Although I do not address meta-ethical issues in the present work, I
wish to stress that I regard the enterprise of offering diverse justifications for a
given account of political authority, and its institutional declination, as a central
task of political theory.32 In particular, I find persuasive the idea according to
which if diverse normative standpoints resist reasonable philosophical scrutiny,
and their free-standing plausibility is ultimately affirmed, there is some value
in assessing political theories on their ability to soundly respond to intuitions
emerging from multiple normative standpoints.
Before I start with the present investigation, I wish to provide a brief sum-
mary of the present thesis in order to provide a general overview of its contents.
In this respect, in the first chapter, I will lay out my interpretation of Hayek’s ac-
count of the spontaneous order, in an effort to illustrate his contributions to the
research on cooperative institutions within complex social orders, and in order
to highlight the contractarian aim which lies in the background of his project.
31See, in particular, Gray (1982), Lukes (1997) and Johnston (1997).
32Such a consideration, I must emphasise, has been in some ways inspired by Johnatan
Dancy’s Ethics without Principles.
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In drawing such an interpretation, I will posit particular emphasis on one main
normative element that I find emerging from the idea of the spontaneous order,
which consists in the crucial relevance that institutional adaptation to people’s
preferences and goals should play in defining our cooperative schemes. In fact,
I look at spontaneity as a property that social orders possess in their actual
operations, and which consists in their ability to create the conditions for co-
operation by defining a protected sphere of action which allows members of the
community to shape their specific terms of cooperation in due course, according
to their dynamic structures of preferences and goals.
However, despite the various merits that I attribute to Hayek’s account of
the spontaneous order, I will attempt to show that we have reasons to be ul-
timately unsatisfied with his proposals concerning institutional arrangements.
In particular, I am unconvinced by the claim according to which the protection
of the Lockean triad would represent, sic et simpliciter, the best institutional
arrangement in allowing us to design cooperative schemes to which members of
a community continuously have reasons to abide by. In this respect, I shall offer
two main arguments which will be the object of the second and the third chapter.
First, such an institutional arrangement could potentially lead to distributions
of rights which may systematically prevent some members of our community
from shaping their terms of cooperation, according to their dynamic structures
of preferences and goals. This particular problem could lead to states of affairs in
which some members cease to see their communities as cooperative enterprises
from which they stand to gain, thus failing in meeting the main constitutive
aim of the theory, and undermining the stability of their communities. Second,
I shall attempt to show that a similar effect is brought about by informal institu-
tions such as social norms. In particular, certain social norms, by increasing the
costs for undertaking certain courses of action, may alter our preference ranking
over the available strategies, thus compromising our ability to shape our spe-
cific terms of cooperation in ways that meaningfully respond to our structures
of preferences and goals. When such alterations become systematic, some mem-
bers may cease to see their community as a cooperative enterprise from which
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they stand to gain, thus undermining its stability.
These particular problems give rise to two main desiderata that an amended
version of the theory of the spontaneous order should meet. First, while pre-
serving a protected sphere which would allow members of the community to
shape their specific terms of cooperation, distributions of rights should be de-
signed and devised so as to preserve a certain sufficientarian distribution of
what I shall refer as social-environment shaping rights. This broadly defined
set, includes all those rights whose exercise makes members of a community
continuously able to define their specific terms of cooperation according to their
dynamic structure of preferences and goals (e.g. economic rights, rights of ex-
pression). In this regard, the sufficientarian threshold that I envisage aims at
equipping every member with the ability to shape their terms of cooperation,
so as to preserve the instrumentalist character of their communities. In partic-
ular, such a sufficientarian threshold has as its main aim that of preventing the
emergence of states of affairs in which some members cease to see their com-
munity as an enterprise from which they stand to gain. Second, policies aimed
at dismantling or preventing the emergence of social norms, which would, in
turn, prevent some fellow members of the community from shaping their spe-
cific terms of cooperation in ways that meaningfully respond to their dynamic
structures of preferences and goals, should be devised.
These amendments, I suggest, should make us consider Hayek’s proposed
institutional arrangements as very appealing from a contractarian framework
of justification. In fact, if we are able to design cooperative schemes which
define a protected sphere that allows members of a community to continuously
shape their specific terms of cooperation, according to the dynamic structures of
preferences and goals, we are also able to secure compliance with a community’s
rules in an entirely instrumentalist fashion, thus fostering its stability.
However, one might object that there is much wishful thinking in claiming
that rational individuals, with their own life plans, preferences and goals would
converge on a unique set of institutions. After all, persons’ specific goals and
aims, within pluralistic societies, point toward widely different directions. In
22
light of the fact of pluralism, and consequent disagreement about institutional
arrangements, the possibility to secure an agreement on a unique set of institu-
tions would ultimately appear as chimeric. In this regard, in the fourth chapter,
I will attempt to offer one main argument which could partly respond to the
pervasive disagreement about political institutions, stemming from seemingly
incompatible preferences and goals. The argument rests on how one’s uncer-
tainty about future aims drives the emergence of preferences for flexibility when
facing one-way, long and wide-ranging choice scenarios such as decisions about
institutional arrangements.33 Particularly, I will attempt to show that people’s
uncertainty about future preferences and aims invites them to abstract from
their current sets of goals and to come to the social contract bargaining table
by considering a wider range of goals that they predict could come to be salient
in the future.
The core idea behind the concept of flexibility is that we have instrumental
reasons to choose institutional arrangements that would allow us to design our
lives in due course, according to preferences and aims we come to possess within
our entire life path. As such, institutional arrangements should not be tied to
narrow sets of preferences and goals that are salient to us when the bargaining
procedure takes place if, by tying our choice to such a set, we are prevented
from (or we increase the costs for) pursuing goals that will come to be salient
in the future. Preferences for flexibility, thus, emerge from the consideration
that, in light of our own uncertainty about future goals and aims, we have
reasons to keep the door for new opportunities constantly open, thus giving
up on the idea of defining our specific terms of cooperation ex ante. Such an
uncertainty, along with the desire to be able to shape our life according to goals
and aims we will come to possess during our life path, invites us to choose our
institutions by enlarging the set of specific goals we possess when the bargaining
procedure takes place, and to converge on general sets of institutions that leave
in our hands the possibility of defining our specific terms of cooperation at later
stages.
33The idea of preferences for flexibility is borrowed from Kreps (1979).
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The interesting implication of preferences for flexibility, within bargaining
scenarios, is that by enlarging bargainers’ sets of goals, they make more room
for an overlapping consensus over institutional arrangements, thus helping us in
achieving coordination among agents exhibiting seemingly incompatible prefer-
ences. Flexibility, though, cannot respond to all sorts of disagreement. In fact,
there may be situations in which agents’ larger sets of goals, elicited by pref-
erences for flexibility, are broadly non-compossible, such that no institutional
arrangement would be satisfactory from everyone’s standpoints. This persistent
disagreement clarifies that any political theorising that wishes to take diversity
seriously should be oriented toward a model of cooperation embodying multiple
social contracts underpinning diverse sets of political institutions, rather than
focusing on a unique set allegedly able to accommodate for everyone’s prefer-
ences and goals.
In this regard, the fifth chapter deals exactly with models of cooperation em-
bodying multiple communities, in an effort to find institutional arrangements,
at the meta-community level, that would help in creating the conditions for
the emergence of as many communities as possible, in order to the respond to
challenge posed by persistent disagreement. In particular, I analyse Nozick’s
account of the framework for utopia, where he attempts to justify the minimal
state as the meta-community institutional arrangement that best approximates
the possible-worlds model. In this chapter, I put Nozick’s theory under scrutiny
and attempt to show that the minimal state faces two main challenges in the
route to approximate the possible-worlds model: first, collective action problems
stand in the way of creating new communities; second, informal sanctions, un-
derpinned by social norms, may increase the costs for creating new cooperative
enterprises or joining already existing ones. Such challenges, I hope to show,
invite amendments to Nozick’s theory that seems to point toward institutional
arrangements, at the meta-community level, more demanding than the minimal
state.
I wish to conclude this introduction by highlighting that the focus on pref-
erences for flexibility is, in my mind, what ultimately shapes the originality of
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the present thesis and sets it apart from other relevant works tackling social
contract theory from the lenses of instrumental rationality. In fact, although
prominent authors such as Muldoon (2016), Sugden (2018), Moeheler (2018)
have explored the possibility of convergence on cooperative sets of rules from
a wide variety of diverse standpoints, their contributions either delineate social
contract scenarios in which agents, with radically different and rather defined
structure of preferences and goals, deliberate on sets of rules, in an effort to
show that diversity does not compromise the possibility of an agreement on the
ground of mutual advantage (Muldoon, 2016), or argue that convergence on a
common set of rules is possible even if agents seek to maximise their oppor-
tunities in the light of their current and defined structures of preferences and
goals (Sugden, 2018), or suggest that convergence is possible if agents exhibit
a forward-looking attitude, without fully delineating the instrumental grounds
for such an attitude (Moehler, 2018).
In this respect, the present work should be read as complementary to these
approaches. In particular, I attempt to provide two main contributions that
could potentially offer additional strength to these arguments: first, the un-
certainty surrounding agents’ future structures of preferences and goals fosters
the possibility convergence on a common set of institutions insofar as it brings
agents to consider a larger set of preferences and goals, including those they
may come to possess in the future, that creates more room for an overlapping
consensus; second, preferences for flexibility nicely capture, and analytically lay
out, the idea of forward-looking agents, that is of agents that care about their
continuous ability to shape their social environment according to preferences
and goals they come to possess.
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The Spontaneous Order as a Cooperative
Enterprise
Introduction
In the introduction, I offered three main reasons for narrowing down our object
of investigation to Hayek’s account of the spontaneous order. First, I have
claimed that Hayek’s theory can be plausibly seen as consistent with the main
constitutive aim of the present work, which is to theorise on cooperative schemes
and institutional settings by taking individual preferences and goals seriously;
second, I have suggested that Hayek’s investigation on the spontaneous order
constitutes, perhaps, the most sophisticated inquiry on cooperative institutions
within complex contexts such as pluralistic societies; third, I have argued that
Hayek’s theorising around institutional arrangements equips us with great tools
in thinking about cooperative institutions at the meta-community level.
The present chapter, in this regard, attempts to lay down a charitable de-
scription of Hayek’s account of the spontaneous order, in an effort to support
the first two claims. In particular, I shall attempt to show that Hayek’s inves-
tigation into the spontaneous order can plausibly be read as an inquiry toward
cooperation-enhancing institutional arrangements within complex social orders,
in which information is widely dispersed among fellow members of our commu-
nities, and where theorists and planners are largely unable to collect the relevant
knowledge in order to fruitfully respond to people’s preferences and goals, both
in a static and a dynamic fashion.34
The key assumption surrounding Hayek’s works, and one that is shared by
most social scientists and political philosophers, is that securing the conditions
for cooperation is the first real task of social orders. Cooperation, indeed, can
be regarded as a necessary hub-enterprise, operating in the background of our
34The present work only marginally deals with the reconstruction of Hayek’s thought, and
when it does, it confines the investigation to specific aspects that I find of philosophical inter-
est. In this regard, bibliographical references to more general and systematic investigations
into Hayek’s thought, and also providing some contexts to his intellectual endeavour, are in
order. Two main books, in particular, successfully embark in such an enterprise: Caldwell
(2004) and Ebenstein (2003).
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social interactions, which allows us to engage with most other sub-enterprises
that shape our life plans and provide meaning to our endeavour on earth.
The search for cooperative institutions operating in our social orders, though,
is by no means easy, as two main broad challenges stand in our way. First,
social orders are not parochial associations, which members create and join in
the pursuit of a shared aim. In fact, most of our ineradicable and rational
disagreement about what social institutions should be like is largely driven by
the fact that our life plans are diverse and often incompatible. Second, social
orders, unlike parochial associations, are complex in that they are populated by
many individuals exhibiting widely diverse structures of preferences and goals
encompassing various aspects of their lives. Such a complexity, I will attempt
to show, undermines our ability to design political institutions as if we could
somehow collect all the relevant information required in order to design social
institutions that will be found attractive from a wide variety of standpoints.
The challenge posed by disagreement, stemming from the fact of diversity
in our structures of preferences and goals, is one that many philosophers and
social scientists have taken seriously. Responses, I suggest, can be framed as
broadly falling in two main categories. First, there is an attempt to confine the
extent of our disagreement through accounts of reasonableness, which would
guide and simplify our search for cooperative institutions. For if we rule out
certain preferences and goals, and identify shared aims allegedly stemming from
certain facts about human nature, our intellectual endeavour in searching for
cooperative institutions is certainly made easier, as we can, in principle, start
building from that in designing fully-fledged and detailed cooperative schemes
and institutional arrangements.35 Second, there is an attempt to theorise about
cooperative social institutions by taking individuals preferences and goals as
they are, and try to design simple and abstract institutional arrangements that
would work as basic cooperative framework which could be allegedly endorsed
by a wide variety of standpoints.36
35This route, I believe, characterises contractualist accounts such as Rawls (1971) and
Scanlon (1998), but is also followed by authors such as Nagel (1986).
36This, I believe, is the route that contractarian theorists such as Gauthier (1986), Buchanan
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Hayek’s inquiry into the spontaneous order, I suggest, should be seen as
primarily contributing to this second approach. In particular, his proposal for
a basic institutional arrangement protecting a set of rights highlighted by the
Lockean triad - life, liberty and property - should be read as the result of an
investigation toward cooperative social institutions that members of our com-
munities, with widely diverse structures of preferences and goals, could plausi-
bly endorse. More specifically, I shall argue, such an institutional arrangement
would allegedly possess the merit of distributing certain rights whose exercise
allows us to shape our social environment in ways that make it adapt to our
structure of preferences and goals.
In fact, what emerges from Hayek’s investigation into the spontaneous order
is that the problem of cooperation within complex social orders cannot be dealt
with by attempting to collect all the relevant information required to design
fine-grained institutions, in an effort to respond to people’s structure of prefer-
ences and goals. Such an enterprise is ruled out by the constitutive complexity
of our communities and is bound to result in largely defective sets of institutions.
Instead, the main task of the theorist is to define a basic framework of rules that
would create the conditions for the emergence of cooperation-enhancing plat-
forms, where the exercise of one’s rights, in the widest range of circumstances,
would drive the evolution of social orders.
This is, I believe, the constitutive aim of the spontaneous order, and this
is, I suggest, what the idea of spontaneity amounts to: a feature of social or-
ders, ultimately depending on a basic framework of rules governing them, which
allows for the emergence of states of affairs, which are the product of decen-
tralised interactions, and which meaningfully respond to people’s structures of
preferences and goals.
In this chapter, I shall lay out this particular interpretation of the sponta-
neous order, also in an effort to dispel some possible doubts linked to alterna-
(1991), Binmore (2005), Gaus (2010), Muldoon (2016) and Mohler (2018) have followed.
Moore (1996) nicely captures the distinction between contractualism and contractarianism,
and frames it precisely as turning on the concept of reasonableness, which is crucial in con-
tractualist accounts and absent in contractarian theories.
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tive accounts of the spontaneous order, which allegedly deem as spontaneous
any order unintentionally arising from individuals’ interactions. These organic
accounts of the spontaneous order characterise spontaneity as an ineliminable
feature of our orders, in that our communities are always subject to intra-group
and inter-group evolutionary forces leading to the emergence of systems of rules
and states of affairs which differ from our initial positions. As such they are
useless in distinguishing between social orders according to their institutional
arrangements, for any system of rules is, ultimately, the product of unintentional
adaptation to evolutionary forces.
In this regard, organic accounts are either entirely descriptive, in that they
merely aim at spelling out how evolutionary forces affect our institutional ar-
rangements and, as a consequence, our communities, or normatively faulty, in
that their predictive claim, which would allegedly consist in suggesting that
evolutionary forces would necessarily drive our institutions toward cooperation-
enhancing arrangements, seems largely mistaken. This latter aspect, I believe,
has been convincingly tackled by authors such as De Jasay (1989), Sugden
(1993) and Gaus (2006), who have shown that institutional adaptation driven
by evolutionary forces does not imply our ability to solve problems connected to
cooperation, nor it necessarily implies a tendency toward cooperation enhancing
arrangements.
Importantly, this is not to deny that such an alternative and puzzling ac-
count of the spontaneous order actually emerges from Hayek’s account. In fact,
various references to Hayek’s work supporting this particular interpretation can
be provided, but merely to suggest that this is neither the most charitable way
to frame his important work, nor the best starting point in order to further
our investigation into the theory of the spontaneous order. In this regard, the
reader will notice that the aim of the present work is only minimally exegeti-
cal, as the main aim is to lay down an account of the spontaneous order that
is plausible, workable and of normative interest to those who wish to theorise
about cooperative institutional arrangements by taking preferences and goals
seriously.
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The chapter starts with a comparison between two ideal communities, Dore
and Bakewell. Both communities have as their main constitutive aim that of
designing institutional arrangements able to secure cooperation, given members’
structures of preferences and goals. What distinguishes them is their different
degree of complexity, which, I hope to show, demands different kinds of in-
stitutional arrangements. In particular, while Dore can be meaningfully ruled
by designing fine-grained systems of rules, Bakewell cannot, as its complexity
calls for an entirely different approach in designing its institutional framework.
Bakewell’s institutional arrangement, in other words, calls for spontaneity.
Building from such a comparison, I shall attempt to illustrate the idea of
the spontaneous order I have above sketched.
Dore vs Bakewell
Imagine you live in the very small community of Dore. A few hundreds hard-
working people inhabiting a beautiful and rich land. They manage to live well,
produce and consume everything they need, such that the town needs no inter-
actions whatsoever with the near and enormous Bakewell. There is not much to
do in Dore. Most fellow members of the community work until 6 pm, then go
to the one and only (though great) restaurant, The Old Vicarage, then home.
One school, one sport club and one mall. There are no significant changes in
demographic dynamics, as the population has always been stable with zero so-
cial mobility as new-born members tend to undertake the same career path of
their parents and seem to enjoy it.
You are unemployed, and permanently so, a very privileged position in Dore
reserved for the intellectuals. In fact, you spend your entire day thinking about
ways to improve the community. At some point of your intellectual endeavour,
you come to realise that, in order to have a better understanding of how to
improve the status quo, you could write a book which describes how is it to live
in Dore, and then subject each and every practice you have described to careful
scrutiny.
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Surprisingly, though, the book is taking much time to write, as you manage
to describe very many aspects in full details. This is because social interactions
and practices going on in Dore are quite simple and, as such, you are able to
provide quite an in-depth account of them.
The book is now over and Mr Forge, the mayor, who is committed to im-
proving the conditions for cooperation, by expanding the set of opportunities
of his fellow members of the community, wants to see you in order to know
whether you have gained great insights on to make Dore a better place to live.
You have a few policy proposals, but one big idea comes to your mind: wouldn’t
it be great to go to Bakewell for a long trip, check out how life is there, write
it down and see if there is anything you could plausibly implement in Dore?
Surely, Dore and Bakewell are quite different communities, but something can
still be learned. Therefore, you tell Mr Forge about your plan and successfully
apply for a grant that will generously cover for your expenses in Bakewell for
two years.
Bakewell is a beautiful, large and rich city, with many restaurants of any
kind, some of which you find bad, some other incredibly good. There is a
lot of technological innovation going on, and also moral innovation. People in
Bakewell like to experiment, their lives are adventurous in that they engage
with all sorts of enterprises. For instance, they play a wide variety of sports,
most of which are unknown to you, and change their job quite frequently as
new opportunities always come out from changes in technological constraints.
Moreover, people in Bakewell exhibit a rather dynamic structure of preferences
and goals, such that their life plans always change, and so does the range of
enterprises they engage with. They move up and down in the social scale quite
rapidly, and continuously update their knowledge through education, no matter
how old they are.
At some point, you seem to realise that if the book about Dore took six
months to write, two years may not be enough to describe everything that is
going on in Bakewell. Moreover, every time you manage to write a chapter, you
feel like it does not really describe how things are actually going in Bakewell,
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but merely how they used to go when you observed them.
Two years have passed, your grant is now over and so is your book, and,
perhaps unsurprisingly, it is quite different from what you expected. First, it is
shorter than the one on Dore; second, the books are different in kinds. The one
on Dore is incredibly long (and boring), as you were able to describe the lives
of your fellow citizens up to an incredible level of details, such that you can tell
what each is doing at particular times of the day. The book on Bakewell, on the
other hand, is a book about the main constitutive features of the community: its
main industries, technological innovation, religious practices, sports, etc. The
books are different because there was no way to account for everything that is
going on in Bakewell, in the same way you did for Dore.
Dore is a simple system: only a few hundreds fellow members, with very
repetitive interactions among them, little moral or technological innovations
and little experimentation. In Bakewell, on the other hand, people have with
very wide interests, it is the theatre of many innovations (even dumb ones) and
new ways of living are tried out. In this regard, if the books are different, it
is not merely a problem of time constraints: Bakewell was too complex to be
investigated that way. Its description called for a higher degree of generality
compared to the book on Dore.
Complexity
A system’s complexity is a function of the number of its elements, of the inter-
actions among them and of the interactions between elements and the environ-
ment.37 When elements and interactions increase, so does the overall complexity
of a given system. There is no fixed amount of elements or interactions to call
a system ’complex’, but there are some features that complex systems exhibit
and which allow us to distinguish them from simple ones, chief among those is
non-linearity.38
37For a general introduction to complexity see Mitchell (2009). See also: Ladyman, Lam-
bert, Wiesner (2012); Cotsaftis (2007); Kauffman (1993); Gell-Mann (1988).
38Ladyman, Lambert and Wiesner (2012), in particular, highlight seven specific features
characterising complex systems: nonlinearity, feedback, spontaneous order, lack of central
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Nonlinear systems are those in which the superposition principle does not
apply. This is to say that, when we introduce a certain stimulus to a given
system, the system is nonlinear if changes in outputs are not proportional to
the stimulus we have been introducing. More generally, we refer to nonlinearity
to define systems that are more than the mere sum of their parts.
To show the peculiarity of nonlinear systems let us turn, again, to Dore
and Bakewell. Particularly, imagine that we introduce a certain stimulus in
both systems (e.g. a certain technological innovation), how would they react?
Within simple systems, such as Dore, such a stimulus shall generate predictable
outcomes. For instance, we may reasonably suppose that a certain technolog-
ical innovation will facilitate the pursuit of certain ends, leaving almost intact
the other constitutive elements of the community. Complex systems such as
Bakewell, on the other hand, could react unpredictably, possibly affecting a
wide encompassing range of practices. In fact, the high number of elements
and interactions among them, shape the sensitivity of complex systems to small
changes introduced within them.
For instance, consider the invention of the washing machine, which Hans
Rosling, in a popular Ted Talk, compellingly claimed to be one of the major
technological innovation of the twentieth century.39 In simple systems, such as
Dore, we may suppose that its introduction would help in the pursuit of its
constitutive aim, washing the laundry, and buy some spare time to those who
are up to that particular task. This time can be fruitfully spent by engaging
with other sorts of enterprises going on in the community of Dore. However,
if these other enterprises are limited and stable, counterfactuals about what
would happen once the washing machine is introduced, would come down to a
few options. On the other hand, in complex societies such as Bakewell, such a
breakthrough innovation would presumably give rise to wide variety of enter-
control, emergence, hierarchical organisation and numerosity. However, some of them do not
seem either necessary or sufficient to establish the conditions for the complexity of a given
system; some others, on the other hand, seem implied by the concept of nonlinearity (e.g.
emergence).
39See, Rosling (2010). Actually, the invention of the washing machine dates back to 1767.
However its diffusion and widespread adoption remains a phenomenon of the twentieth century.
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prises, as the spare time gained through the use of the washing machine would
allow many people to engage with various existing activities and to come up
with new ones.
Complexity, thus, has crucial implications with regard to how we describe,
or attempt to make predictions about the evolution of complex systems. As
we have seen, describing Dore was easy, although time consuming; describing
Bakewell, on the other hand, was challenging in that it required the ability
to abstract from the specific elements of the system and to identify the main
constitutive features of the community, with the aim to provide meaningful
information to the readers. This sort of abstraction, though, more than a mere
author’s choice, is dictated by the impossibility of accounting for all the variables
in play. It is not just that we lack time to describe what is going on in Bakewell;
in fact, we also lack access to all the required information.
When we are asked to describe complex systems such as Bakewell, we may
attempt to act as foxes who know many little things, but we are likely better
off as the hedgehog who knows one or a few big things. In fact, if our ability to
collect all the relevant information is ultimately lacking, we will likely be doing
a better job by giving up on the project of laying down everything that happens
in Bakewell, and jump up to a higher degree of generality. For instance, if asked
to describe how people spend their vacations in Bakewell, we should probably
surrender on the idea of collecting information about each and every citizen’s
planned destinations, and account for general trends emerging from statistical
researches.
Hayek was among the earliest social scientists to provide an account of how
degrees of generality of our descriptions or explanations vary (or, better, should
vary) according to the degree of complexity of the objects we analyse. Quite
relevant to this particular point, is his distinction between fine-grained explana-
tions, which can be aptly provided in accounting for how a simple system works,
and explanations of the principle, which aptly suit our needs when dealing with
complex systems.40
40Much of Hayek’s contribution to complexity and degrees of explanation can be found in
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Essentially, the claim behind the distinction consists in that complex systems
do not lend themselves to detailed descriptions, but rather call for a different
level of abstraction, which allows us to say something accurate about how a
given system works without providing fine-grained information about its general
functioning.
Governing Complexity and the ’Organic’ Account of the
Spontaneous Order
Despite being incredibly boring, the book on Dore sold as well as that on
Bakewell. In fact, everyone was very excited to have their name on it. Mr
Forge is excited as well, and wants to see you in order to ask about the sorts
of policy proposals they could import from Bakewell. He knows that citizens of
Dore tend to be very conservative but is quite sure that there is something you
can suggest after having carefully studied the laws of Bakewell.
However, this is not the case. In fact, your stay in Bakewell taught you
another great lesson: complex and simple orders call for different kinds of rules.
in Hayek (1952); (1955) and (1964). The following quote may, perhaps, help in clarifying the
present argument:”The usual kind of explanation which we give, e.g., of the functioning of a
clockwork, will in our sense be merely an explanation of the principle. It will merely show
how the kind of phenomena which we call clockworks are produced: the manner in which a
pair of hands can be made to revolve at constant speeds, etc. In the same ’general’ way most
of us are familiar with the principles on which a steam engine, an atomic bomb, or certain
kind of simple organisms function, without therefore necessarily being able to give a sufciently
detailed explanation of any one of these objects so that we should be able to construct it or
precisely to predict its behaviour [...] Even where we are able to construct one of these objects,
say a clockwork, the knowledge of the principle involved will not be sufcient to predict more
than certain general aspects of its operation. We should never be able, for instance, before
we have built it, to predict precisely how fast it will move or precisely where its hands will
be at a particular moment of time”, Hayek (1952, p. 185). Hayek also pioneered the research
on degrees of explanation related to the complexity of human brain:”there is an absolute
limit to what the human brain can ever accomplish by way of explanation - a limit which is
determined by the nature of the instrument of explanation itself, and which is particularly
relevant to any attempt to explain particular mental processes. If our account of the process
of explanation is correct, it would appear that any apparatus or organism which is to perform
such operations must posses certain properties of the events which is to explain. If explanation
involves that kind of joint classification of many elements which we have described as ’model-
building’, the relation between the explaining agent and the explained object must satisfy
such formal relations as must exist between any apparatus of classification and the individual
objects which it classifies”, Hayek (1952, p. 185). A careful analysis to Hayek’s contribution
in the analysis of complex systems can be found in Weimer (1982); Marsh (2010); Gifford Jr.
(2007); Allen, Strathern and Baldwin (2007); Gick and Gick (2001); Agonito (1975); Dempsey
(1996); D’Amico and Boettke (2010); Horwitz (2008).
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Particularly, while Mr Forge can design and devise a fully-detailed set of rules,
on the basis of members’ structure of preferences and goals, which guides them,
at each and every step, in an effort to improve cooperation, the same is not true
for Bakewell.
During your time in Bakewell, you managed to interview the mayor, Miss
Bragazzi. She has been very open to you about their ideas of government.
Bakewell is a big city, and they cannot design and devise fully detailed sets of
rules on the basis of citizens’ preferences and goals; especially considering that
preferences and goals tend to vary quite a lot. Fully detailed sets of rules, guid-
ing members of the community at each and every step, call for a fine-grained
knowledge of the system to which they are meant to apply, but, unfortunately,
Bakewell does not really resemble a simple system. In this regard, small errors
in designing the detailed set of rules could make the system dramatically devi-
ate from our predictions, possibly undermining cooperation in such a complex
environment.
The difference between Dore and Bakewell lies mainly here. Mr Forge can
account for almost each and every variable and is, thus, able to design fine-
grained rules that tackle particular problems or aim at improving small aspects.
Miss Bragazzi, on the other hand, cannot. She is bound to higher degree of
generality when thinking about how to improve the status quo. She has to
identify general rules that would robustly facilitate cooperation among members
of the community exhibiting a wide and dynamic range of preferences and goals,
rather than trying to factor in all the possible variables in play in the attempt
to lay down fine-grained rules. Dore is governed as an organisation, whereas
Bakewell is ran as a spontaneous order. Although both Mr Forge and Miss
Bragazzi are committed to creating the conditions for fruitful cooperation for
the members of their communities, their strategy changes, as Dore and Bakewell
are different in kind.41
One main question arises about what sorts of rules should Miss Bragazzi
41Hayek highlights the distinction between orders and organisations in Hayek (2012) pp.
44-52.
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design and devise in complex orders such as Bakewell. In particular, how is Miss
Bragazzi to design the sort of institutional framework that makes Bakewell a
spontaneous order? If we follow Hayek’s account tightly, such a question may not
even make sense. Rules governing spontaneous orders, indeed, simply emerge
from complex evolutionary mechanisms, such that there seems to be no space
for human design or intervention. Gerald Gaus (2006), in particular, identifies
three main mechanisms that Hayek isolates as the main drivers of the evolution
of rules: group survival, group growth, and an endogenous mechanism that
captures individual non-random deviations from existing rules.42 The first two
mechanisms are based on the idea of an inter-group selection of rules:
Although the existence and preservation of the order of actions of
a group can be accounted for only from the rules of conduct which
individuals obey, these rules of conduct have developed because the
individuals have been living in groups whose structures have gradu-
ally changed. In other words, the properties of the individuals which
are significant for the existence and preservation of the group, and
through this also for the existence and preservation of the individuals
themselves, have been shaped by the selection of those individuals
from the individuals living in groups which at each stage of evolu-
tion of the group tended to act according to such rules as made the
group more efficient. (Hayek, 1967, p. 72).
And, again:
These rules of conduct have thus not developed as the recognized
conditions for the achievement of a known purpose, but have evolved
because the groups who practised them were more successful and dis-
placed others. They were rules which, given the kind of environment
in which man lived, secured that a greater number of the groups or
individuals practising them would survive. (Hayek, 2012, p. 19).
42Many other commentators have carefully analysed Hayek’s account of evolutionary mech-
anisms shaping the evolution of institutions. See, in particular, Vanberg (1986); Hodgson
(1991); Sugden (1993); Whitman (1998).
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There are then [in the social life of modern man] all the remains of
the traditions acquired in the successive types of social structures
through which he has passed - rules which he did not deliberately
choose but which have spread because some practices enhanced the
prosperity of certain groups and led to their expansion, perhaps
less by more rapid procreation than by the attraction of outsiders.
(Hayek, 2012, p. 492).
Most of the steps in the evolution of culture were made possible by
some individuals breaking some traditional rules and practising new
forms of conduct not because they understood them to be better,
but because the groups which acted on them prospered more than
others and grew. (Hayek, 2012, p. 493).
According to these two mechanisms, a process of imitation of more successful
groups shapes the evolution of rules. If, for instance, Peter and Kate’s group,
under the set of norms k, managed to survive or to achieve better outcomes
than Alf and Betty’s group did, under set z, the process of imitation will lead
Alf and Betty to shift towards k. Such a shift may not be the result of Alf and
Betty’s explicit will or awareness but rather emerge from a partially unintended
process of imitation.
The endogenous mechanism, on the other hand, works at the intra-group
level and is shaped by competition between individuals:
Now there is reason to think that Hayek’s account of social evolu-
tion is similar to this more complex picture. Hayek writes that a
person’s ”thinking and acting are governed by rules which have by
a process of selection been evolved in the society in which he lives.”
Understood thus, it looks now as if his project is to explain how
each rule (not the order of actions itself) evolved within the society.
That this project may rely not only to the rule’s ability to produce
a competitive order of actions, but the rule attractiveness to indi-
viduals, is suggested by Hayek’s remark that ”[t]he competition on
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which the process of selection rests must be understood in the widest
sense. It involves competition between organized and unorganized
groups no less than competition between individuals.” This stress
on individual competition and the evolution of rules suggests that,
instead of a competition between social orders, Hayek has in mind a
competition between individuals within a social order that leads to
the selection and evolution of rules. (Gaus, 2006, p. 244).
Specifically, Gaus has in mind an intra-group mechanism that is ultimately
shaped by nonrandom deviations from the existing set of rules. According to
it, rules that do not entirely satisfy Alf or Betty are more likely to be violated
and, thus, replaced with more efficient rules. For instance, if Betty expects to
be better off by following b than by complying with a, she will likely deviate;
and if such a deviation would also make Alf better off, then Alf would imitate
Betty and b will likely replace a.
Hayek’s organic account,43 though, seems to depict a ’might is right’ sce-
nario in which the evolution of rules toward cooperation enhancing directions is
spontaneously driven by evolutionary forces, and, therefore, where we are left
with very little to say about the rules governing the complex orders we inhabit.
Attempts to change our sets of rules may, indeed, be easily regarded as naive if
we attribute such an inherited wisdom to our current set of rules, and posit such
a faith in evolutionary forces guiding their transformation. To put it bluntly,
according to the organic account, any order would be spontaneous as long as
43The term organic is inherited from Carl Menger, who first provided an account of how
evolutionary mechanisms may drive institutions toward cooperation enhancing directions. In
1883, Menger offered a pioneering distinction between organic and pragmatic institutions.
Pragmatic identities institutions which are the result of the explicit will and design of individ-
uals, and organic refers to institutions which arise spontaneously and unintentionally through
decentralised individuals’ intentional actions. For instance, in his discussion on the origins of
money, Menger (1963) [1883], Book 3, Ch. 2) points out that the decline of barter can be
attributed to the difficulties in finding the ’exact match’ within direct exchanges, and to the
need of finding more marketable and divisible goods in order to carry out exchanges. Accord-
ing to Menger, thus, the emergence of money is the unintended result of individuals aiming
to solve their problems in carrying out their exchanges rather than the result of centralised
human design. Menger’s account of institutions constitutes a refinement of previous accounts
developed by the Scottish moral philosophers of the eighteen century such as Hume (1740),
Mandelville (1705), Ferguson (1767) and Smith (1776). For a careful analysis of the history
of the theory of the spontaneous order, see Cubeddu (1993).
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we do not interfere with the evolution of its rules, as any order is subject to
evolutionary forces driving the transformation of its set of rules, shaping the
conducts of its members.
Both mechanisms, however, fall prey to well known collective action prob-
lems. In fact, the process of imitation, which allegedly drives us to follow sets of
rules that led other groups to outperform ours, is by no means justifiable on in-
strumentalist grounds. Some sets of rules, indeed, may be optimal for the group
and yet detrimental to us, individually. When this happens, sets of rules that
would be beneficial to nearly everyone may not be adopted precisely because of
the temptation to free ride on other people’s efforts. On a similar fashion, non-
random deviations from a certain rule may simply constitutes Alf and Betty’s
best response to one another possible strategies whilst being overall detrimen-
tal to both of them. In other words, evolutionary mechanisms might make us
stuck within prisoner’s dilemma scenarios, thus making us unable to eventually
converge on sets of institutions underpinning better terms of cooperation.
In order to further illustrate how Hayek’s organic account of the spontaneous
order falls prey to collective action problems, consider the following example
offered by Cristina Bicchieri:
Until not long ago, a Sicilian man who ”dishonored” another man’s
daughter or sister had to make amends for the wrong by marrying
the woman or pay for his rashness with his own life. The objective
was to restore the family’s lost honor, but the social norms dictating
the ways in which this could be done were the only means available
to identify honor in those circumstances. One may think that some
form of monetary compensation would have worked equally well, if
not better, in the case in which a marriage was impossible. It would
have spared one, perhaps many, lives. But accepting a monetary
compensation was not revenge, and since nobody would have ever
accepted such an atonement, nobody would have ever thought of
offering it. Approving of the man who exacts revenge, calling him a
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”man of honor”, does not necessarily involve approval of the norm
as rational or efficient. Even if one thinks a norm unjust and use-
less, it may be difficult not to conform, since violation involves a
collective action problem: nobody wants to be the first to risk so-
cial disapproval by breaking the norm openly. (Bicchieri, 1990, pp.
838-39).
In this example, although norms of revenge are perceived as irrational or
inefficient, they still persist insofar as non-compliance bears the risk of social
disapproval for each member involved. Although shifting towards a different set
of norms, thus, abandoning norms of revenge, would provide a better framework
of cooperation, such norms still persist because complying with them constitutes
each member’s best response to each member’s possible courses of actions.
In this regard, Anthony De Jasay notices, there is no reason to suppose that
what drives the perpetuation of institutions, such as systems of rules, is other
than their fittingness to survive:
A health service which healed some people and made most others
dependent on doctors, hospitals, and drugs would certainly be fit
to survive; it would create demand for itself and establish the pre-
conditions of its own propagation. A prison system in which petty
criminals became hardened and unreformable, or asylums that made
the unhinged even madder, would likewise be self-perpetuating (De
Jasay, 1989, p. 77).
Essentially, Hayek might have failed to recognize that the features that allow
for the self-perpetuation of institutional settings may have little to do with their
ability to provide the conditions for cooperation, which in turn would enhance
group growth or group survival. In fact, in many cases, institutions can be self-
perpetuating notwithstanding their ineffectiveness in responding to our needs
as a group.
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A non-organic account of the Spontaneous Order
The organic account just sketched, I suggest, is not really an account of the
spontaneous order, but rather a description of how grand and spontaneous evo-
lutionary forces silently operate in the background of our social orders. In this
regard, both Dore and Bakewell, regardless of their different degrees of com-
plexity and of the kind of rules in play, are subject to them. For organisations
such as Dore too would be shaped by mechanisms of imitation and competition
that would drive members of the community to non-compliance with certain
rules, or to different interpretations of rules devised by Mr Forge, or to shifting
toward different sets of rules.
The evolutionary forces that Hayek describes, we might plausibly grant,
could shape our communities toward cooperation enhancing directions, in the
very long run; in the same ways in which Darwinian accounts of evolution
shape species’ adaptations to their environment. Hayek’s organic account, in
this regard, provides us with a rather analytic description of the mechanisms
that allegedly drive social orders’ evolution, but is inexplicably silent about how
to improve the conditions for cooperation.44
Moreover, the organic account of the spontaneous order is in sharp contrast
with many suggestions Hayek advances on how rules of cooperation, in com-
plex systems such as Bakewell, could be designed and devised. In fact, Hayek
consistently makes a number of claims concerning basic institutional arrange-
ments that would allow us to peacefully and fruitfully interact with one another.
Consider the following quotes:
The main features of all somewhat more advanced legal orders are
sufficiently similar to appear as mere elaborations of what David
Hume called the ”three fundamental laws of nature, that of the sta-
bility of possessions, of transference by consent, and of the perfor-
mance of promises. (Hayek, 1960, p. 158).
44I follow Gaus (2006) in interpreting Hayek’s description of evolutionary forces shaping our
institutions as distinct from Hayek’s account of the spontaneous order.
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Property, in the wide sense in which it is used to include not only
material things, but (as John Locke defined it) the ’life, liberty and
estates’ of every individual, is the only solution men have yet dis-
covered to the problem of reconciling individual freedom with the
absence of conflict. Life, liberty and property are an inseparable
trinity. There can be no law in the sense of universal rules of con-
duct which does not determine boundaries of the domains of freedom
by laying down rules that enable each to ascertain where he is free
to act. (Hayek, 2012, p. 102).
Here, Hayek clearly states his endorsement for institutional arrangements
that design a protected sphere for members of our social orders through a sys-
tem of rights that protects ’property in the wide sense’. Such an endorsement,
though, is not merely a matter of preferences, as institutional arrangements un-
derpinned by the Lockean triad, are claimed to be the ’only’ solution to secure
peaceful cooperation. In this regard, one might attempt to reconcile the organic
view and Hayek’s position by claiming that reasons for endorsing institutional
arrangements, underpinned by Lockean triad, stem precisely from the fact that
such an institutional arrangement is the product of evolutionary forces which
drive us toward cooperation-enhancing directions. So formulated, the Lockean
triad would be regarded as a plausible candidate institutional arrangement be-
cause it resisted to evolutionary forces which allegedly shape our system of rules
toward cooperation-enhancing directions.
Such an attempt, though, would mistakenly characterise Hayek’s position,
as he provides an apriori argument in favour of such institutional arrangements.
An argument that does not rest on backward-looking explanations concerning
the inherited wisdom of systems of rules, but rather looks analytically at how
they could advance our ability to cooperate.
In order to introduce such an apriori argument, let us dig deeper into the
Dore vs Bakewell analysis. Dore, we have assumed, is a simple system. There,
the mayor is able to devise rules of conduct that enhance cooperation, by col-
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lecting the relevant information about members of the community’s preferences
and goals. Such rules may plausibly take the form of fine-grained commands
directed toward specific members of the community, such as do x under circum-
stances y. For instance, we may suppose that Mr Forge, after collecting all the
relevant preferences of some members of the community, comes to realise about
their desire to socialise during dinners, and, as such, issues a fine-grained rule
which allows these members to coordinate on a fixed time to meet at the Old
Vicarage. Since the mayor knows all the relevant circumstances, each relevant
member is happy about the rule, as it would cut transaction costs implied by
decentralised coordination.
Fine-grained rules, though, cannot meaningfully be implemented in Bakewell
as Miss Bragazzi is largely unable to collect all the relevant information (pref-
erences toward restaurants, working hours, etc). Moreover, citizens of Bakewell
exhibit a wide range of incompatible circumstances, preferences and goals, such
that coordination on such small detailed enterprises would perhaps be impos-
sible. For instance, we may suppose that there is no single menu able to ac-
commodate for the wide variety of preferences exhibited by citizens of Bakewell,
or that given the flexibility of working hours, there is no way to coordinate on
a time of the day that would suit everyone’s needs, or that many members of
Dore do not really exhibit such a pronounced preference for socialisation that
would convince them to dine together.
Cooperation, in Bakewell, works at a higher degree of generality and fine-
grained rules aiming at specific purposes would not to the job. In Bakewell,
Hayek would plausibly suggest, we must rely on a basic framework of rules
that allows for coordination in a context where knowledge is widely dispersed
among members of the community, and where there cannot be any planner able
to collect it and cut transaction costs by issuing fine-grained rules that would
enhance our ability to cooperate in each and every enterprise we wish to engage
with.
Hayek aptly frames the distinction between rules that meaningfully apply to
simple and complex orders as respectively thesis and nomos. Thesis defines fine-
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grained rules aiming at specific purposes, whereas nomos identifies general and
abstract rule aiming at general purposes. Simple orders governed through fine-
grained rules take the form of organisations (or taxis), whereas complex orders
governed by general and abstract rules are spontaneous orders (or kosmos).
Thesis and nomos are not interchangeable, nor they can be mixed. In fact,
simple orders, such as Dore, can be meaningfully ruled as organisations, as Mr
Forge is able to collect all the relevant information required in order to issue fine-
grained rules aimed at improving specific instances of cooperation.45 Complex
orders such as Bakewell, on the other hand, call for nomos as we are unable to
factor in all the relevant variables in order to devise rules that would achieve
specific purposes:
We shall see that it is impossible, not only to replace the spontaneous
order by organization and at the same time to utilize as much of the
dispersed knowledge of all its members as possible, but also to im-
prove or correct this order by interfering in it by direct commands.
Such a combination of spontaneous order and organization it can
never be rational to adopt. While it is sensible to supplement the
commands determining an organization by subsidiary rules, and to
use organizations as elements of a spontaneous order, it can never be
advantageous to supplement the rules governing a spontaneous or-
der by isolated and subsidiary commands concerning those activities
where the actions are guided by the general rules of conduct. This is
the gist of the argument against ’interventionism’ or ’intervention’
in the market order. The reason why such isolated commands re-
quiring specific actions by members of the spontaneous order can
never improve but must disrupt that order is that they will refer
to a part of a system of interdependent actions determined by in-
formation and guided by purposes known only to the several acting
45Simple orders can be also ruled as spontaneous orders, but transaction costs implied by
decentralised coordination would suggest that cooperation is better enhanced by fine-grained
rules.
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persons but not to the directing authority. (Hayek, 2012, p. 49).
In this regard, Hayek notices, any attempt to issue fine-grained rules aimed
at improving specific terms of cooperation, within complex orders, would likely
fail in its aim and alter the overall order of actions that makes cooperation
possible. Nomos, on the other hand, has as its main task that of creating the
conditions for cooperation by defining a system of general rules that is able to
use knowledge widely dispersed among individuals. Knowledge that a planner
would not be able to collect.
Perhaps, the best example to illustrate this particular aspect is provided by
the market. In Dore, for instance, resources can be aptly distributed without
relying on property rights. Everyone, we might assume, owns everything and
Mr Forge is entitled to make distributive decisions. In fact, he knows how much
members of the community need, consume and produce, and is able to guide
distribution of resources through fine-grained rules. In Bakewell, on the other
hand, this is not the case. Miss Bragazzi is unable to collect all the relevant
knowledge, and even if she could collect it, it would be extremely hard to design
and devise rules that aptly respond to such knowledge. This particular inability
gives rise to a need for a system of general rules that helps us coordinating in
contexts where transaction costs cannot be eliminated in a centralised fashion.
Property rights, in particular, are up to this task. For they allow us, through
the price system, to convey relevant information concerning individual prefer-
ences, reserve prices, people’s needs, etc. Such information guides agents’ de-
cisions about what to produce and how much, without resorting to omniscient
planners. For instance, when I buy an iPad for 800£, I communicate, through
the price system, that I like the product and that the value of having an iPad
exceeds, given my use case, the 800£ I have spent. Aggregate information
concerning people’s preferences and reserve prices, conveyed through the price
system, shape Apple’s decisions about how many iPads should be produced,
but also provide crucial guidance to other market players about what sorts of
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products would encounter people’s needs and preferences.46
What property rights do, I suggest, is to activate the filtering device of
consent. In fact, by allowing us to consent to particular transactions, they allow
us to shape agents’ economic decisions on the basis of information we convey
through the price system. In fact, my 800£ spent on the iPad tell other agents
something about my utility function and shape their decisions about what to
produce and how much, thus helping in achieving coordination. Moreover, the
filtering device of consent allows us to achieve dynamic coordination, that is
coordination in contexts where structures of preferences are largely subject to
change. In fact, economic decisions, through the price system, continuously
convey information about our structure of preferences, thus making economic
agents continuously adapt to changes. Hayek nicely captures this aspect in The
Use of Knowledge in Society :
If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of
rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time
and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must
be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who
know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immedi-
ately available to meet them. We cannot expect that this problem
will be solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central
board which, after integrating all knowledge, issues its orders. We
must solve it by some form of decentralization. But this answers only
part of our problem. We need decentralization because only thus can
we insure that the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time
and place will be promptly used. But the ”man on the spot” can-
not decide solely on the basis of his limited but intimate knowledge
of the facts of his immediate surroundings. There still remains the
46See Hayek (2012):”In the market order each is made by the visible gain to himself to serve
needs which to him are invisible, and in order to do so to avail himself of to him unknown
particular circumstances which put him in the position to satisfy these needs at a small cost
as possible in terms of other things which it is possible to produce instead”, p. 276. Hayek
highlights the crucial coordinating role played by the price systems in various other works,
especially (1952) and (1935).
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problem of communicating to him such further information as he
needs to fit his decisions into the whole pattern of changes of the
larger economic system. (Hayek, 1945, p. 524-525).
Fundamentally, in a system in which the knowledge of the relevant
facts is dispersed among many people, prices can act to coordinate
the separate actions of different people in the same way as subjective
values help the individual to coordinate the parts of his plan. [...]
The most significant fact about this system is the economy with
which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to
know in order to be able to take the right action. (Hayek, 1945, pp.
526-527).
Crucially, though, general rules able to create the conditions for the emer-
gence of a spontaneous order such as the market, do not require complex evo-
lutionary mechanisms in order to emerge; for our ability to provide general
explanations (or explanations of the principle) of how complex systems work,
also transfers to our ability to design and devise general rules that would create
the conditions for spontaneous orders to emerge. Nomos, thus, does not need to
arise organically but may also be the product of human design. The complexity
of a system, indeed, does not prevent us from understanding its general func-
tioning, nor to grasp and devise general rules that would improve its efficiency.
What is prevented is our ability to form a detailed understanding of how the
complex system works (e.g. to account for each and every element, for their
specific interactions, etc.), and to design and devise fine-grained rules aimed at
changing specific interactions of its elements.47
For instance, we are able to assess the merits of property rights in enhancing
our ability to cooperate, but we are unable to make predictions about specific
distributions brought about by the market order, because such distributions
47In this regard, we should be reading Hayek’s critique of legislation not as aimed at dis-
missing any attempt to interfere with the overall order of actions organically arising from
evolutionary forces, but rather as a critique toward attempts to achieve specific purposes
through the design of fine-grained rules. For further investigation on Hayek’s critique to
legislation, see Posner (2003); Baumgarth (1978) and Kuznicki (2011).
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arise as the unintended result of countless transactions carried out by agents
who act on the basis of their own local knowledge. In this regard, general rules
aimed at defining property rights, in ways that would create the conditions for
the emergence of a market order, can be plausibly designed and devised, whereas
fine-grained rules aimed at bringing about specific distributions cannot, as they
go beyond our intellectual ability to factor in all the relevant variables in play.
Therefore, the attribute of spontaneous cannot rest on how nomos emerges,
as rules defining property rights may indifferently arise from complex evolution-
ary mechanisms or be the result of a human design. The attribute of sponta-
neous, I suggest, refers to a particular feature of complex orders in their actual
operations. Particularly, it concerns orders’ ability to be continuously shaped
by decentralised actions of their members, who act on the basis of their local
knowledge. In this regard, the market is an instance of spontaneous orders pre-
cisely because, through the filtering device of consent, we are able to shape its
particular elements (i. e. economic actors’ decisions) in ways that make them
adapt to our structure of preferences and goals, and without resorting to an ideal
central planner to which we would have to convey all the relevant information
and on the basis of which distributive decisions would be taken.
The idea of spontaneity I have just highlighted can be also exported to do-
mains which do not strictly concern economic actions. In fact, Hayek’s account
of the spontaneous order is supposed to tell us something interesting about
fruitful cooperation besides the market order.
In particular, institutional arrangements underpinned by the Lockean triad,
which Hayek envisages as the basic institutional setting of the spontaneous
order, have to secure the largest protected sphere for individuals to act in the
pursuit of their ends, on the basis of their local knowledge. The rationale for
securing such a protected sphere lies precisely in that only specific individuals
know the particular circumstances, preferences and goals shaping their decisions
and, as such, decentralised decision-making would equip them with the ability
to shape their terms of cooperation in ways that would enhance the chances to
satisfy their own ends.
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Perhaps, rights of expressions constitute the best example in order to clarify
this particular aspect. A right to free speech, for instance, defines a protected
sphere for performative utterances. When I promise to my supervisor to write
a chapter by the end of the week, I do so on the grounds of local knowledge
which shapes my beliefs about the time required to complete the chapter. Such
an utterance, though, is also performative in that it intentionally creates a
particular situation: if my supervisors can rely on my promise, she will be able
to organise her schedule accordingly. Through performative utterances, based
on our local knowledge of specific circumstances, thus, we shape our terms
of cooperation in ways that allegedly respond to our preferences and goals.48
Examples concerning the right to free speech, though, may simply concern non-
performative normative utterances. For instance, when my supervisor, on the
basis of her own local knowledge, emails me about how bad the chapter is, her
normative utterance is aimed at making me redraft it by following guidelines
that would meet the standard she has in mind. Even descriptive utterances, I
suggest, could play a similar role, although indirectly. For instance, when I speak
to Italian colleagues about how is it to live in the UK academic environment,
I convey information, based on my local knowledge, which shape their beliefs
about particular features and that could, in turn, shape their future careers’
decisions.
Rights of free movement, perhaps, constitute another pregnant example. In
fact, choices about where to live are normally shaped by our own local knowledge
of the relevant circumstances (other than economic ones). For instance, one’s
choice to move to the UK can be motivated by a variety of reasons (e.g. one’s
professional aspirations, sentimental engagement, etc.), whose relevance is made
explicit only to those who actually possess them. As such, defining a protected
sphere which allows individuals to filter the relevant options, would enhance
their ability to shape their social environment according to their structure of
preferences.
48Austin (1962) provides the first analytic account of performative utterances clarifying the
ways in speech may generate changes in our social world.
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Attempts to reduce such a protected sphere or to interfere with it through
fine-grained rules would, in Hayek’s mind, undermine our ability to create the
conditions for cooperation. In fact, by limiting the ways in which individuals
are able to act on the basis of their local knowledge, we also limit their ability
to shape their terms of cooperations in ways they would find convenient; and
by issuing fine-grained rules aimed at producing specific distributive outcomes,
we alter the overall order of actions that makes cooperation possible.
Certainty and Spontaneity
Hayek’s arguments against thesis are not exhausted by his considerations around
complexity and the impossibility of achieving specific purposes through central
planning, but also concern the idea of certainty. In this regard, we may say,
without overstating its importance, that certainty is at the very core of the
enterprise of the spontaneous order. In fact, it is not by accident that the
definition of order Hayek provides is ultimately parasitic on that of certainty:
[Order is] A state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of
various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our
acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form
correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations
which have a good chance of proving correct. (Hayek, 2012, p. 35)
Hayek’s emphasis on the importance of forming correct expectations about
what surrounds us suggests that spontaneous orders must secure a basic thresh-
old of certainty which allows individuals to meaningfully interact with one an-
other. For if such a threshold is not met, our ability to pursue our own goals is
severely undermined. We may think, for instance, about the role that certainty
plays in fulfilling daily tasks such as buying food, watching a soccer game or
going out for a date. All these enterprises require not only joint efforts, but also
the expectations that such efforts will be performed (e.g. I would not go out to
buy food if I do not expect the grocery store to be open; I would not turn on
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the TV if I do not expect Juventus to be playing, and I would not go out on a
date if I do not expect my date to show up).
Certainty related to such detailed tasks, though, cannot be secured through
institutional arrangements. In fact, rules aimed at improving our terms of co-
operation in such specific instances would require fine-grained interventions,
which are precluded in the phase of institutional design. Institutional arrange-
ments, then, are supposed to create the conditions for the emergence of certainty,
through the design of general rules that would limit our sphere of action.
Here, one may observe, lies a rather crucial trade-off between maximising
certainty, through general rules, and the ability of an order to be shaped by
the decentralised actions of individuals who act on the basis of their own local
knowledge. In fact, general rules aimed at maximising certainty would presum-
ably be oriented toward restricting the boundaries of one’s actions in the pursuit
of one’s goals, for such restrictions would plausibly enhance our ability to form
correct expectations on what is going on around us. For instance, property
rights pose constraints on what we may legitimately do with certain objects,
thus increasing our certainty about what other members of the community may
legitimately do; similarly, rules imposing opening times to local shops would
allow us to form clear cut expectations on the basis of which we set up our
schedule. Reducing the protected sphere of individual action, indeed, would
dramatically reduce counterfactuals about what we can legitimately expect, im-
proving our acquaintance with the overall order of actions.
In this regard, if one takes certainty as a feature of our orders which has
to be maximised, our orders would dramatically depart from the definition of
spontaneity I have laid out. For maximising certainty requires rules reducing
as much as possible individuals’ range of actions, which, in turn, undermines
our ability to shape our social environment in ways that make it adapt to our
structure of preferences and goals. Hayek, thus, cannot be committed to the
claim that the main task of spontaneous orders is primarily that of maximising
certainty, for spontaneous orders and orders where certainty is maximised are
very different, and perhaps opposite, things.
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In this regard, I suggest, Hayek’s stress on the relevance of certainty is
meant to pinpoint that his proposed institutional arrangement gives rise to
an overall order of actions in which individuals are able to form broadly correct
expectations on what is going on around them, while still allowing for adaptation
through decentralised actions of individuals who act in the pursuit of their own
goals on the basis of their own knowledge. Hence, the institutional arrangements
underpinned by Lockean triad must be seen as pursuing two different aims: on
the one hand, it has to define the boundaries of our protected sphere of action
in order to secure a basic threshold of certainty, which would allow us to form
meaningfully correct expectations on what surrounds us; on the other, it has to
create the conditions for spontaneity by defining the largest protected sphere
for individuals to pursue their own goals on the basis of their own knowledge.
Furthermore, Hayek’s emphasis on certainty should be sees as instrumental
to his critique to fine-grained rules interfering with the spontaneous order of
actions. For if institutional arrangements underpinned by the Lockean triad
allow us to form broadly correct expectations on many instances of the order
we inhabit, fine-grained rules, by altering the overall order, can lead to states
of affairs in which our expectations are systematically disappointed.
The discussion on certainty allows us to respond to one main critique ad-
vanced by Joseph Raz against Hayek’s reliance on the requirements of generality
and abstractness of the law as a way to secure the conditions for the emergence
and the preservation of a spontaneous order. In particular, Raz’s critique is
centered on Hayek’s emphasis on the relevance of the rule of law expressed by
the following quote:
Stripped of all technicalities this means that government in all its
actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the author-
ity will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan
one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge. (Hayek, 1944,
p. 112)
53
In contrast, Raz argues that adherence to the requirements of generality
and abstractness, which partly shape the concept of the rule of law, do not
tell us anything substantive about how a particular order will look like. For
general and abstract laws could, in principle, do many despicable things such as
to institutionalise wrongful discrimination or to dramatically restrict individual
freedom:
The law can violate people’s dignity in many way s. Observing the
rule of law by no means guarantees that such violations do not occur.
But it is clear that deliberate disregard for the rule of law violates
human dignity. It is the business of law to guide human action by
affecting people’s options. The law may , for example, institute
slavery without violating the rule of law. But deliberate violation of
the rule of law violates human dignity. (Raz, 1979, p. 221).
Raz’s argument is certainly correct, but substantially misunderstands the
extent to which Hayek relies on the adherence to the rule of law in laying out
his account of the spontaneous order. In fact, Hayek’s proposed requirements
of generality and abstractness are merely meant to highlight two main things:
first, that we are ultimately unable to design and devise fine-grained rules aimed
at improving our specific terms of cooperation, in ways that would meaningfully
respond to individuals’ structures of preferences and goals; second, that if we
attempt to design and devise fine-grained rules we may alter our ability to form
correct expectations on what surrounds us.
Hence, Hayek is certainly not committed to claim that the requirements of
generality and abstractness of rules are to be regarded as sufficient in order to
secure the conditions for the emergence of a spontaneous order.49
In this regard, it may be useful to pinpoint how Hayek’s arguments differently
apply to distinct aspects. First, the knowledge problem is supposed to highlight
our inability to design fine-grained rules that would meaningfully improve our
49A critique similar to Raz’s has been developed by Gray (1981). For further investigation
on Hayek’s account of the rule of law, see Baumgarth (1978).
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terms of cooperation by responding to our particular circumstances. Thus, any
meaningful attempt to design cooperative rules must possess the requirements
of abstractness and generality.
Second, the requirements of generality and abstractness are also important
in securing a basic threshold of certainty, for fine-grained rules would unpre-
dictably interfere with the overall order of actions and would yield the risk of
disappointing our expectations.
Third, the knowledge problem demands us to design general and abstract
rules which defines the largest protected sphere under which individuals can act
in pursuit of their own ends, on the basis of their own knowledge, in an effort
to create the conditions for the emergence of terms of cooperation that would
meaningfully respond to their structure of preferences and goals.
Hayek’s Utilitarianism
One question that is often debated among commentators of Hayek’s work, and
which is particularly relevant in assessing the normative standing of the theory
of the spontaneous order, concerns its standard of justification. In particular,
one may wonder whether Hayek’s endorsement of the institutional arrangements
underpinned by the Lockean triad is ultimately driven by the utilitarian aim of
maximising the overall aggregate wealth.50 In fact, Hayek’s emphasis on the
need for a protected sphere that would allegedly allow individuals to pursue
their own ends on the basis of their own local knowledge seems to imply a
preference-satisfaction utilitarian account.
Hayek’s position, in this particular regard, is puzzling as his work is pervaded
by harsh criticisms toward the utilitarian tradition:
The trouble with the whole utilitarian approach is that, as a theory
50Some commentators suggest that Hayek is quite incoherent with respect to the main
constitutive aim of the spontaneous order. In particular Gray (1982), Lukes (1997, p. 74),
and Johnston (1997, p. 613), suggest that Hayek sees as the main scope of social institutions
that of maximising aggregate preferences in a utilitarian fashion. Sugden (1986) and Andrew
Lister (2013), on the other hand, read Hayek’s approach as ultimately concerned with how
institutions should distribute opportunities to members of our communities, in an effort to
foster our ability to cooperate from widely different standpoints.
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professing to account for a phenomenon which consists of a body of
rules, it completely eliminates the factor which makes rules neces-
sary, namely our ignorance. It has indeed always amazed me how
serious and intelligent men, as the utilitarians undoubtedly were,
could have failed to take seriously this crucial fact of our necessary
ignorance of most of the particular facts, and could have proposed
a theory which presupposes a knowledge of the particular effects of
our individual actions when in fact the whole existence of the phe-
nomenon they set out to explain, namely of a system of rules of con-
duct, was due to the impossibility of such knowledge. It would seem
that they never grasped the significance of rules as an adaptation to
this inescapable ignorance of most of the particular circumstances
which determine the effects of our actions, and thus disregarded the
whole rationale of the phenomenon of rule-guided action.[...] Man
has developed rules of conduct not because he knows but because
he does not know what all the consequences of a particular action
will be. And the most characteristic feature of morals and law as
we know them is therefore that they consist of rules to be obeyed
irrespective of the known effects of the particular action. How we
should wish men to behave who were omniscient and could foresee
all the consequences of their actions is without interest to us. Indeed
there would be no need for rules if men knew everything-and strict
act-utilitarianism of course must lead to the rejection of all rules.
(Hayek, 2012, p. 187).
Hayek’s critique toward utilitarians rests, once again, on the knowledge prob-
lem. In particular, Hayek would claim, against act utilitarians, that we are
ultimately unable to perform calculations about which course of actions would
bring about the state of affairs in which aggregate utility is maximised, and,
against rule utilitarians, that individuals are unable to perform calculations in
order to devise a fine-grained system of rules aimed at bringing about the state
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of affairs in which aggregate utility is maximised.
Hayek’s arguments against utilitarian calculations are certainly pertinent
but mistakenly assume that utilitarian standards of rightness and decision pro-
cedures, aimed at maximising utility, are the very same thing. Such a distinction
can be aptly formulated in terms of questions to which these two different enter-
prises respond. In particular, standards of rightness are supposed to answer to
’what makes an action right?’, whereas decision procedures answer to ’how am I
to deliberate about which course of action I should follow?’51 Hayek’s critique,
in this regard, would meaningfully apply to utilitarian theories purporting im-
plausible calculations about which course of action would bring about states of
affairs in which utility is maximised, or to rule-utilitarian theories which transfer
calculations to which set of rules we should devise, but utilitarian theories are
not committed to decision procedures in which such calculations are to be per-
formed. In this regard, one may find morally compelling a utilitarian standard
of rightness without necessarily being committed to implausible calculations in
maximising aggregate utility.
Hayek’s position, I suggest, can be aptly framed as utilitarian, in terms of
standards of rightness, and as a simil-contractiarian in terms of the decision
procedure which leads to the choice of institutional arrangements that would
maximise utility. Such an unconventional position clearly emerges from the
following passage:
We may of course aim at the ’greatest happiness of the greatest
number’ if we do not delude ourselves that we can determine the
sum of this happiness by some calculation, or that there is a known
aggregate of results at any one time. What the rules, and the order
they serve, can do is no more than to increase the opportunities for
unknown people. If we do the best we can to increase the oppor-
tunities for any unknown person picked at random, we will achieve
the most we can, but certainly not because we have any idea of the
51Distinctions between utilitarian standards of rightness and decision procedures can be
found in Brink (1986), Railton (1984), Stark (1997).
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sum of utility of pleasure which we have produced. (Hayek, 2012, p.
190).
Here, Hayek clearly states that the constitutive aim of the spontaneous order
is that of increasing opportunities for unknown people, through the design of
general rules that would allow them to pursue their own goals on the basis of
their own knowledge. Such an institutional arrangement may possibly bring
about a state of affairs in which aggregate utility is maximised, but if it will, it
would not be on the basis of an implausible calculation that should bring us to
devise certain sets of rules, as such calculation is precluded to the human mind.
This peculiar constitutive aim emerging from the decision procedure Hayek
has in mind, and which leads to design institutional arrangements underpinned
by the Lockean triad, suggests that Hayek’s theory of the spontaneous order
could plausibly lend itself to contractarian standards of justification. In fact,
by ultimately leaving in the hands of individuals the opportunity to shape their
specific terms of cooperation, spontaneous orders could be plausibly endorsed
from a wide variety of standpoints. Moreover, by empowering individuals in
shaping their terms of cooperation according to their structure of preferences
and goals, we allegedly secure that they continuously have reasons to cooper-
ate, as the spontaneous order would adapt and respond to their structure of
preferences.
These two aspects, I believe, shape the attractiveness of the theory of the
spontaneous order, as it becomes appealing from various standpoints. In fact,
individuals exhibiting widely diverse goals would be able to shape their spe-
cific instances of cooperation, through decentralised actions, thus shaping their
social environment in ways that would make their communities as cooperative
enterprises from which they stand to gain.
Conclusion
Concluding, let us summarise the main points we have tackled in this chapter.
First, through the Dore vs Bakwell analysis, we have laid out Hayek’s knowledge
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problem which planners face within complex orders such as Bakewell. In partic-
ular, we have illustrated how the complexity of orders prevents us from forming
a fine-grained understanding of their specific elements and, in turn, to design
and devise fine-grained rules which would meaningfully improve our terms of
cooperation within specific circumstances. Complex orders, in this regard, call
for a higher degree of generality in designing institutional arrangements that
would enhance our opportunities to cooperate.
Second, we have shown that, in Hayek’s mind, institutional arrangements
underpinned by the Lockean triad meaningfully serve our purpose to improve
our terms of cooperation. In fact, they are able to secure a basic threshold of
certainty, while defining a protected sphere which allows individuals to act in
pursuit of their ends, on the basis of their local knowledge. Such a protected
sphere enhances our terms of cooperation because individuals are able to shape,
through their decentralised actions, specific instances of cooperation.
Third, we have seen that the definition of spontaneity cannot meaningfully
rest on how institutional settings of a given order have arisen, for arrangements
creating the conditions for the emergence of a spontaneous order could indiffer-
ently arise through complex evolutionary mechanisms or as the result of human
design. In this regard, the definition of spontaneity can be aptly framed as a
feature which orders possess in their actual operations, and which consists in
an order’s ability to be continuously shaped by the decentralised actions of its
members.
Fourth, we have illustrated that, although the theory of the spontaneous
order could be plausibly regarded as ultimately justified in a utilitarian stan-
dard of rightness, its decision procedure points to a contractarian justificatory
framework. In fact, the constitutive aim of the spontaneous order is that of
increasing opportunities for unknown members of the order, through designing
and devising institutional arrangements that ultimately leave in their hands the
power to shape their specific terms of cooperation.
These four aspects are meant to set the stage for the critiques I shall ad-
vance in the next two chapters, where I will attempt to show that institutional
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arrangements underpinned by the Lockean triad are ultimately insufficient in
making sure that all members of a spontaneous order are continuously able to
shape their terms of cooperation, in ways that would meaningfully respond to
their structures of preferences and goals. This particular problem may lead to
states of affairs in which some members of the community would cease to find
their community as a cooperative enterprise from which they stand to gain,
undermining the instrumentalist character of Hayek’s theory.
This particular problem, I will attempt to show, may emerge as a result of
two main challenges: first, large-scale consequences of small-scale transactions,
allowed by the Lockean triad, may generate distributions of rights which prevent
some members of the community from shaping their social environment in ways
that meaningfully respond to their structure of preferences and goals; second,
social norms, which increase the costs for undertaking certain courses of actions
that would allow members of the community to shape our social environment,
may undermine their ability to shape their terms of cooperation in ways that
they would find satisfactory.
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The Spontaneous Order and Its Instrumentalist
Character: A Critique
Introduction
In the first chapter, I have defined spontaneity as a feature which orders possess
in their actual operations, and which ultimately consists in their ability to be
shaped by the decentralised actions of individuals, who act in the pursuit of
their own goals, on the basis of their own local knowledge. This particular
feature allows to those who take part in the overall order of actions to shape
their specific terms of cooperation in ways that meaningfully respond to their
particular circumstances, preferences and goals.
Hayek, we have seen, broadly identifies in the Lockean triad the institutional
arrangement which creates the conditions for the emergence and preservation
of a spontaneous order. In fact, the protection of property rights in the ’wide’
sense is supposed to fulfill two main distinctive tasks: on the one hand, general
rules aimed at defining the boundaries of our legitimate actions are supposed
to secure a basic threshold of certainty, which allows members of a given order
to form broadly correct expectations on what surrounds them; on the other, it
secures a large protected sphere for individual to act in the pursuit of their goals,
on the basis of their own knowledge. The second task, in particular, is what
grants to orders their status of spontaneous. In fact, the more we enlarge the
sphere of individual actions, the more we allegedly allow for orders’ adaptation
to the structure of preferences and goals that specific members of our community
exhibit.
What emerges from Hayek’s account of the spontaneous order is, I sug-
gest, a link between the structure of rights instantiated by the institutional
arrangements purported by the Lockean triad, and our ability to use knowledge
dispersed among members of a given community. In fact, rights assigned by
such an institutional arrangement are supposed to define a set of token acts
which allegedly allow members of a community to shape their specific terms of
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cooperation on the basis of their own knowledge. In fact, by exercising specific
instances of our rights, through token acts permitted by such an institutional
arrangements, we are able to convey information which shapes our social envi-
ronment, thus defining our specific terms of cooperation.
This interpretation of theory of spontaneous order, I suggest, brings with
it one main appealing aspect, which consists in its dynamic instrumentalist
character. In particular, if individuals are able to define their specific terms
of cooperation, through their decentralised actions, protected by the Lockean
triad, it should follow that they possess the ability to continuously shape their
community as an enterprise from which they stand to gain.
In this chapter, I shall present the Lockean account of the spontaneous order
in greater depth and offer a critique. Such a critique aims at showing that the
institutional arrangement upheld by the Lockean account defines merely an
initial distribution of rights that can be unintentionally altered through fully
voluntary interactions. Such alterations, in turn, may bring about derivative
distributions of rights under which members of the community are prevented
from shaping their specific terms of cooperation. When this is the case, they
may cease to see their community as a cooperative enterprise from which they
stand to gain, and form instrumental reasons to break their compliance with
its rules, thus threatening its stability. As such, the spontaneous order fails in
achieving its main constitutive aim, which is to secure the general conditions
for cooperation.
This chapter sets out one main desideratum that plausible candidate insti-
tutional arrangements, aimed at creating the conditions for the emergence and
preservation of a spontaneous order, must meet. Such a desideratum consists in
defining a basic protected sphere of individual actions which cannot be altered
through voluntary transactions, and which would grant to members of the com-
munity the continuous ability to shape their social environment in ways that
would meaningfully respond to their structure of preferences and goals. For if
such a protected sphere is not secured, some members may cease to see their
community as a cooperative enterprise from which they stand to gain, thus un-
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dermining its instrumentalist character and, in turn, its stability. Furthermore,
this chapter paves the way for a similar critique, which will be the object of the
next chapter. Such a critique will be centered on the role that social norms play
in restricting the set of courses of actions which are available to us. In particu-
lar, by limiting our sphere of actions, social norms may prevent members of the
community from shaping their specific terms of cooperation in ways that mean-
ingfully respond to their structure of preferences and goals, thus undermining
the instrumentalist character of a spontaneous order.
The chapter is organised as follows: within the first part I analyse the Lock-
ean account, in the attempt to show, in greater depth, how the institutional
arrangements Hayek envisages would serve the purpose of enhancing our decen-
tralised ability to shape our specific terms of cooperation; within the second part
I outline how such institutional arrangements might lend itself to be sustained
in an instrumentalist fashion; within the third and final part I offer a critique
to the Lockean account according to which the initial distribution of rights can
be unintentionally altered in ways that undermine members’ reasons to comply
with the rules of their community.
The Lockean Account
In the first chapter, I have spelled out an organic interpretation of the spon-
taneous order which situates the concept of spontaneity in the origin of insti-
tutional arrangements governing our communities. In particular, we have a
seen that Hayek lays out a number of complex evolutionary mechanisms which
allegedly guide our institutions toward cooperation-enhancing directions.
If one takes seriously the organic account, and draws its implicit conclusions,
planners and theorists are left with very little to say on how to design and
devise institutional arrangements that would ultimately improve our terms of
cooperation. In fact, government agencies would be bound to codify and enforce
systems of rules brought about by such evolutionary mechanisms.
Such an organic interpretation of Hayek’s account of the spontaneous order
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is, I suggested, in two main respects implausible. First, it falls prey to well
known collective action problems which ultimately undermine its validity. Sec-
ond, it is not consistent with Hayek’s analysis of complex orders. In fact, in
the previous chapter I attempted to show that the complexity of a particular
system does not prevent the theorist from forming a general explanation of how
it works, nor one is prevented from grasping, designing and devising systems
of rules that would improve an order’s functioning. What Hayek’s analysis of
complex systems rules out is merely our ability to form a fully detailed under-
standing of how a complex system works and to design and devise fine-grained
rules that would improve its functioning within specific instances.
If we transfer Hayek’s analysis of complex systems to social orders, we may
plausibly conclude that theorists or planners are not prevented from designing
and devising general rules aimed at creating the conditions for the emergence of
improved terms of cooperation, by securing a protected sphere which allegedly
allows for the use of knowledge dispersed among members of a given community.
What is ruled out, indeed, is merely theorists or planners’ ability to design and
devise fine-grained rules aimed at improving our specific terms of cooperation.
Therefore, if evolutionary mechanisms select, due to collective action prob-
lems, systems of rules which are somehow inadequate to create the conditions
for cooperation, theorists or planners are not prevented from designing better
systems. In this regard, Hayek’s endorsement of institutional arrangements un-
derpinned by Lockean triad should be read as an attempt to theorise on systems
of rules through the lenses of our ability to form a general understanding of how
complex social orders work and might be improved, without necessarily relying
on complex evolutionary mechanisms which allegedly grant to spontaneously
emerging institutions the status of being fit to make us cooperate.
In this regard, I suggested that a plausible interpretation of Hayek’s intu-
itions on how evolutionary mechanisms shape our institutions toward coopera-
tion enhancing directions, would consist in confining Hayek’s claim to long term
evolutionary processes silently operating in the backgrounds of our social orders.
As such, the fact that particular systems of rules emerged at specific times and
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spaces, does not tell us anything substantive about institutions’ ability to make
us cooperate, as evolutionary mechanisms may, in due process, select systems
of rules which make us stuck in non-cooperative scenarios.
These particular aspects, I believe, respond to two main critiques advanced
against Hayek’s theory of the spontaneous order, which rest on two mistaken
understandings of Hayek’s account. The first consists in claiming that Hayek
leaves no space for institutional design, as government agencies are bound to
codify institutions that have spontaneously emerged.52 The second, on the
other hand, claims that if Hayek leaves space for institutional design, he does
so by only posing the constraints of generality and abstractness of rules, but
such constraints do not tell us anything substantive about the social orders we
inhabit, for different general and abstract rules may give rise to very diverse
orders.53
To the first objection, we may aptly respond that Hayek’s analysis of evolu-
tionary mechanisms, which allegedly shape our institutions toward cooperation
enhancing directions, is not meant to bind us to uncritically accept systems
of rules spontaneously emerging through individual interactions and undergo-
ing complex evolutionary mechanisms. In fact, Hayek equips us with tools to
analyse complex social orders, and to design and devise systems of general and
abstract rules which would create the conditions for the emergence of coopera-
tion.54
To the second objection, on the other hand, we may reply that Hayek’s
requirements of generality and abstractness of rules do not exhaust the desider-
52See Hodgson (1994).
53See, in particular, Raz (1976), Hamowy (1971) and Gray (1981).
54On this particular aspect my view is similar to Gerald Gaus: ”It is sometimes claimed that
Hayek’s thought is, at bottom, contradictory: he insists on our ignorance of social processes
but, out of his analysis of ignorance, he generates prescriptions about what we should do. If
we know enough to say why socialism won’t work, then we must have good enough insights
into the economic order to intervene to promote social goals. This, though, is wrong. As we
have seen, Hayek believes that we can know quite a lot about the principles on which complex
orders operate, and this theoretical knowledge allows us to say that some system states cannot
be achieved and that some ways of organizing social cooperation are more efficient than others;
we also know that we are unable to predict the course of, or control, the complex order itself.
Thus, the analysis of complexity provides sound reasons against planning — seeking to control
the emergent order. There is nothing contradictory about a mix of knowledge of principle and
ignorance of what is a good plan or optimal policy”. (Gaus, 2006 pp. 252-53).
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ata in our search for cooperative institutions. What these requirements do,
I suggest, is merely to prevent us from designing fine-grained rules aimed at
improving specific instances of our cooperation, or at achieving particular dis-
tributions of rights. In fact, we have seen that such an attempt is ruled out by
Hayek’s considerations on complexity on two main grounds: first, fine-grained
rules aimed at specific purposes are likely to fail in their aims; second, fine-
grained rules would alter the overall order of actions which allows members of
the community to form meaningful expectations on what surrounds them.
Generality and abstractness, thus, are needed in order to secure a basic
threshold of certainty and to rule out the possibility of achieving specific pur-
poses through fine-grained rules. However, by no means such requirements are
supposed to represent sufficient conditions for a spontaneous order to emerge or
to be preserved.
Many critiques advanced to Hayek’s account of the spontaneous order, I
argue, rest on a mistaken interpretation on the definition of spontaneity. In
particular, critics tend to tie the very idea of spontaneity either to the origin
of institutions, thus inferring that Hayek’s account demands us to stick with
spontaneously evolved institutions, or to the outcomes that such institutions
would bring about, which commentators identify in the maximisation of ag-
gregate utility, thus objecting that unspecified general and abstract rules are
insufficient in securing that we succeed in our utilitarian aim.
However, I suggest, the concept of spontaneity embeds, first and foremost,
a procedural desideratum in looking for institutions that would indirectly bring
about on overall maximisation of aggregate utility, and which concerns the aim
of designing and devising systems of rules that would allow us to overcome the
knowledge problem. In particular, Hayek’s search for institutional arrangements
is, on the one hand, constrained by the requirement of certainty, which binds us
to define institutional arrangements in a very general and abstract fashion, and,
on the other hand, driven by the aim of designing systems of rules that would
allow individuals to shape, through their decentralised actions in the pursuit of
their own goals and on the basis of their local knowledge, their specific terms of
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cooperation.
Spontaneity, thus, refers to a feature that social orders possess in their actual
operations, and which consists in their ability to be continuously shaped by the
decentralised actions of members of a community.
In particular, we may pinpoint the main features of the Lockean account of
the spontaneous order as follows:
(1) A spontaneous order secures a protected sphere of action, defined
by the Lockean triad, which allows individuals to act in the pursuit
of their own goals, on the basis of their local knowledge.
(2) Individual actions, protected by the Lockean triad, allow indi-
viduals to shape their specific terms of cooperation in ways that
meaningfully respond to their structures of preferences and goals.
(3) The protected sphere, thus, allows for the use of knowledge dis-
persed among members of the community. In fact, specific terms of
cooperation are not designed and devised ex-ante, but rather shaped
by individual actions.
(4) The protected sphere also secures a basic threshold of certainty
which allows individuals to form broadly correct expectations on the
order of actions surrounding them.
In this regard, critics such as Raz are certainly right in claiming that Hayek’s
emphasis on the importance of the requirements of generality and abstractness,
cannot secure the conditions for the emergence of a spontaneous order, but
mistaken in their assumption that these desiderata exhaust the orienting tools
that Hayek provides us in searching for the institutions of the spontaneous order.
The search for such institutions, indeed, is driven by the need to define a
protected sphere that would, on the one hand, allow members of a community
to act in the pursuit of their own goals, on the basis of their local knowledge;
and, on the other hand, to secure a basic threshold of certainty that would
allow members of a community to form broadly correct expectations on what
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surrounds them.
As we have seen, Hayek identifies such an institutional arrangement in the
protection of the Lockean triad. However, Hayek is never particularly clear in
laying out how he arrives at this conclusion, as he addresses the issue by merely
claiming that distributions of rights implied by the Lockean triad would, on
the one hand, ’determine boundaries of the domains of freedom by laying down
rules that enable each to ascertain where he is free to act’ (Hayek, 2012 p. 102),
and, on the other, create the best conditions for the members of a community
to pursue their own ends:
The thesis of this book is that a condition of liberty in which all are
allowed to use their knowledge for their purposes, restrained only
by rules of just conduct of universal application, is likely to produce
for the best conditions for achieving their aims; and that such a
system is likely to be achieved and maintained only if all authority,
including that of the majority of the people, is limited in the exercise
of coercive power by general principles to which the community has
committed itself. (Hayek, 2012, p. 53).
In The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek briefly lays out a definition of freedom,
which he spells out as ’that condition of man in which coercion of some by
others is reduced as much as possible in society’ (Hayek, 1960, p. 11). Such a
general definition reveals two main features: first, Hayek frames the concept of
freedom in purely negative terms; second, he restricts the domain of coercion
to a relational concept which takes place among individuals and not between
individuals and objects.
However, we would over-construe Hayek’s thinking by arguing that the dis-
tribution of rights implied by the Lockean triad is arrived at by calculating
which sets of rights would minimise coercion by other agents. In fact, Hayek’s
primary aim is not to reduce coercion per se, but rather to define a protected
sphere of action, which would grant to individuals the best conditions for the
pursuit of their own goals.
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Such a protected sphere is allegedly made possible by institutional arrange-
ments that assign to members of the community a set of claim rights to life,
liberty and property. In fact, the underlying thought is that our liberty rights
to act within the boundaries of the Lockean triad, alongside with the correlative
duties not to interfere with our actions, would secure a large range of actions
which, in turn, would create the best conditions for the pursuit of our own
goals. For instance, claim rights to property should not be seen as emerging
from a complex calculation which involves counterfactuals about states of affairs
in which coercion by others is minimised, but rather as emerging from Hayek’s
considerations on how the boundaries established by property rights would al-
low for the emergence of cooperation-enhancing platforms such as the market,
which, in turn, would grant us the possibility of shaping through our actions,
our specific terms of cooperation.
In fact, I maintain that what makes these rights crucial in Hayek’s account
is not that their distribution minimises coercion, but rather their peculiar role
in defining an unspecified set of actions through which we are able to shape our
social environment in ways that meaningfully respond to our particular circum-
stances, preferences and goals. These include our ability to act in the pursuit
of our own goals on the basis of our own knowledge, to convey information
through the price system, to communicate our terms of cooperation through
performative utterances, etc.
In particular, I suggest, we may aptly look at the set of rights underpinned
by the Lockean triad as social environment shaping rights, in that they define
a protected sphere for social environment shaping token actions which equip us
with the ability to continuously renegotiate our terms of cooperation, according
to our structure of preferences and goals. This peculiar way of looking at the
Lockean triad, I suggest, should make us reflect on that Hayek does not merely
value the fact that such rights are formally distributed and protected, but also
that we have the ability to exercise them. For our continuous exercise of such
rights is what ultimately drives the evolution of a spontaneous order and what
makes us able to continuously shape our terms of cooperation in ways that
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meaningfully respond to our own circumstances. In fact, if we are prevented
from shaping our specific terms of cooperation through the exercise of these
rights, we may ultimately cease to see our community as an enterprise from
which we stand to gain and form reasons not to comply with its rules, thus
undermining its stability.
The Instrumentalist Character
Hayek, thus, conceives claim rights to life, liberty and property as purely in-
strumental. However, we have seen that the instrumentality of rights cannot
be interpreted in a strict utilitarian sense, as what drives Hayek’s search for
institutional arrangement is not a fine-grained complex calculation from which
he supposedly arrives at a set of rules that would lead to the maximisation of
aggregate wealth. Such calculations, indeed, are precluded to human planners.
Lockean rights, indeed, are selected because they ’increase opportunities
for unknown people’ (Hayek 2012, p. 190), by handing to members of the
community the ability to shape their specific terms of cooperation, on the basis
of their own particular circumstances. This particular condition that obtains
through Lockean rights is, I suggest, precisely what the idea of the spontaneous
order amounts to: a state of affairs in which members of the community are
continuously able to define their specific terms of cooperation, through token
actions protected by the set of rights underpinned by the Lockean triad.
This formulation, I suggest, has one great source of appeal: namely, by hand-
ing to members of the community the ability to shape their specific terms of
cooperation, it allegedly makes community as enterprises from which all mem-
bers stand to gain, lending the Lockean account of the spontaneous order to be
sustained in an instrumentalist fashion.
In fact, by reserving us a protected sphere under which we can act in the
pursuit of our own goals, and on the basis of our own local knowledge, and by
allowing us to shape our specific terms of cooperation, we are allegedly able to
shape our social environment in ways that meaningfully respond to our structure
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of preferences and goals, thus having an incentive to continuously take part in
the cooperative venture.
This source of appeal is precluded to institutional arrangements that either
attempt define in fine-grained details our terms of cooperation, or which would
restrict our set of social environment shaping rights. In fact, the former would
fail in achieving the aim of improving our terms of cooperation in ways that
meaningfully responds to our structure of preferences, as planners are unable
to collect all the relevant knowledge. The latter, on the other hand, would
prevent us from shaping our specific terms of cooperation on the basis of our
local knowledge, thus binding us to either accept or reject a cooperative scheme.
As an instance of the former, we may imagine institutional arrangements
which, for example, aim at distributing material resources on the basis of our
own needs and preferences, without the need of property rights. Such an attempt
would not merely fall prey to objections concerning scarcity of resources, but
would also fail in its constitutive aim, due to planners’ inability to correct all
the relevant knowledge, even under relaxed assumptions concerning scarcity.
As an instance of the latter, on the other hand, we may imagine institutional
arrangements that, for example, restrict freedom movement, or that pose severe
limits to freedom of speech, or that make markets for certain goods illegal. Such
restrictions, indeed, would limit members of the community in the pursuit of
their own goals, on the basis of their own knowledge, and would also prevent
them from shaping their social environment in ways that meaningfully respond
to their structure of preferences.
Moreover, if we take at face-value Hayek’s claim according to which such a
distribution of rights would likely bring about states of affairs in which aggregate
utility would be maximised, the appeal of the theory would double. In fact,
institutional arrangements underpinned by the Lockean triad would, on the one
hand, allegedly equip each and every member with reasons to comply with the
community’s rules, while bringing about a state of affairs in which aggregate
utility is likely to be maximised, and without the need of inculcating utilitarian
standards of rightness to members of the community, who may lack reasons for
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acting in ways that would allegedly maximise the overall aggregate utility.
Notice that I am not alone in interpreting Hayek’s account of the spontaneous
order as purporting a set of institutions to which members of the community
have instrumental reasons to comply with. In fact, Sugden (1993), suggests that
Hayek’s theory of the spontaneous order can be aptly framed as purporting a set
of rules which members of a community continuously choose to follow precisely
because they benefit from taking part to the cooperative venture:
We cannot know in advance that a particular spontaneous order will
benefit a particular individual. This leaves us with the criterion that
a social institution has value to the extent that it tends to assist each
individual in the pursuit of his or her ends, whatever those ends may
be. This is Hayek’s criterion of general welfare.
This criterion can be expressed very naturally in contractarian terms,
by imagining that the structure of rules that govern a society had to
be agreed by all individuals. In considering alternative sets of rules,
each individual’s concern is with her ability to achieve her own ends:
she will approve a set of rules to the extent that it tends to assist
her in the pursuit of her ends. Thus, a set of rules which is rec-
ommended by Hayek’s criterion of general welfare is also one which,
when expressed as the terms of a possible social contract, everyone
can agree on. (Sugden, 1993, p. 413).
Despite Sugden’s claim according to which Hayek’s formulation of the spon-
taneous order could framed in contractarian terms, he does not really have in
mind a contractarian bargaining scenario in which agents converge on Hayek’s
proposed set of rules. Sugden rather imagines a different sort of contractar-
ianism which does not entail convergence on a set of rules from an external
standpoint, such as the state of nature, as it only entails an agreement that
takes place from within the spontaneous order:
Thus the question is not, ”Is this society one that we would have
chosen in some state of nature?” Rather, it is:”Given where we are,
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can we agree to continue to live by these existing rules; or, if not,
can we agree to any changes?” (Sugden, 1993, p. 421).
What Sugden seems to suggest is that Hayek’s theory might not be justified
in a full-blown contractarian fashion, as bargainers who are in the state of
nature, might be driven by considerations that lead them to prefer different
institutional arrangements. However, those who are already in the spontaneous
order continuously form reasons to comply with its rules, as their participation
to the cooperative venture equips them with the ability to shape their specific
terms of cooperation.
Essentially, Sugden claims that compliance with Hayek’s account of the spon-
taneous order is obtained in an instrumentalist fashion, in that all members, who
find themselves already in the spontaneous order, have reasons to comply with
its rules because playing cooperatively would enhance their chances to satisfy
their own goals.
This particular feature embeds another crucial aspect which consists in the
ability of a spontaneous order to secure compliance with its rules even in dynamic
fashion. In fact, by defining a protected sphere of action which allows members
of the community to continuously shape their terms of cooperation, through
their decentralised actions, the spontaneous order is supposed to continuously
enhance members of the community’s chances to pursue their own goals. As
such, compliance with the rule of a spontaneous order is supposed to secure
dynamic stability, as everyone has a dynamic incentive to participate to the
cooperative venture.
A Critique
The instrumentalist character of the theory of the spontaneous order provides
much appeal to the theory. In fact, on the one hand, institutional arrangements
underpinned by the Lockean triad would continuously generate incentives for
members of the community to comply with the rules of a spontaneous order, thus
securing stability, and, on the other, compliance with such a set of rules would
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allegedly bring about states of affairs in which aggregate utility is maximised.
The instrumentalist character, we have seen, is due to two main and strictly
connected features that define the very idea of spontaneity: first, the institu-
tional arrangements underpinned by the Lockean account of the spontaneous
order are allegedly able to create the best conditions for all members of the
community to pursue their own goals, on the basis of their own local knowl-
edge; second, members of the community are continuously able to shape their
terms of cooperation in ways that meaningfully respond to their structures of
preferences and goals. In Hayek’s mind, we have seen, these particular features
obtain by defining a protected sphere of actions through the Lockean triad.
In what follows, I will attempt to move a critique to the Lockean account of
the spontaneous order, which impinges precisely in its alleged ability to sustain
dynamic compliance with its rules in an instrumentalist fashion. In fact, I
will suggest, individual transactions taking place within a spontaneous order
may alter the distribution of rights in ways that systematically prevent some
members of the community from pursuing their own goals on the basis of their
own knowledge, and from shaping their specific terms of cooperation in ways
that meaningfully respond to their structure of preferences and goals.
The argument, in a nutshell, works as follows:
(1) The Lockean account of the spontaneous order entails a distri-
bution of rights to life, liberty and property.
(2) Such a distribution of right is chosen on the ground that it defines
a protected sphere of actions which creates the best conditions for
members of the community to pursue their own goals on the basis
of their own knowledge, by allowing them to shape their terms of
cooperation.
(3) Such an institutional arrangement allegedly equips members of
the community with instrumental reasons to comply with the rules
of the spontaneous order, thus securing stability.
(4) Members of the community can alter the distribution of rights
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underpinned by the Lockean account through consent.
(5) Derivative distributions of rights arising from individual trans-
actions may bring about states of affairs in which in some members
of the community are prevented from pursuing their own goals on
the basis of their own knowledge and from shaping their terms of
cooperation in ways that meaningfully respond to their structure of
preferences.
(6) Derivative distributions of rights may, in turn, undermine the
instrumentalist character of the spontaneous order, as some members
may cease to see their community as an enterprise from which they
stand gain, thus failing to form instrumental reasons to comply with
its rules, and undermining its stability.
Since we have already dealt with (1), (2) and (3), we may aptly start with
(4), which, in its simplest formulation, claims that members of a community
are allowed to change the distribution of rights underpinned by the Lockean
account through consent.
Clearly, the ability to change the distribution of rights cannot meaningfully
refer to scenarios in which members of the community voluntarily converge on a
new system rules (e. g. a scenario in which property rights are left unassigned),
as this would stand in contrast with (3). In fact, if members of the commu-
nity are said to have instrumental reasons to comply with the set of rules of a
spontaneous order, it would not make sense to seek convergence on a different
set. Alterations, in this regard, are to be seen as the large-scale consequences
of individual transactions in which one sells and buys portions of rights.
For instance, consider the case of the market. Previously, we have seen that
the greatest virtue that Hayek ascribes to market processes consists in their
ability to collect, through the price-system, information that helps coordination
between sellers and buyers, and which aptly signals to entrepreneurs which
products members of the community are in the market for. This particular
effect obtains because members of the community, by transacting, convey crucial
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information about their preferences and reserve prices. The ability to convey
such information, on the one hand, allows members of the community to shape
their specific terms of cooperation, and, on the other, allegedly creates the best
conditions for the pursuit of their own goals on the basis of their own local
knowledge. In order to illustrate this particular aspect, we may resort to James
Buchanan’s illustration of how market processes allow us to produce changes in
the environment that would ideally respond to our demands:
Each dollar vote in the market becomes ”positively effective” to the
individual, not only in providing him with a unit of the chosen com-
modity or service, but also in generating changes in the economic en-
vironment. In either of these senses a dollar vote is never overruled;
the individual is never placed in the position of being a member of
a dissenting minority. (Buchanan, 1954, pp. 334-343).
Buchanan rightly suggests that ’dollar voting’ is distinct from political voting
systems in which votes spent on dissenting minorities are ultimately overruled,
in that they fail to produce meaningful responses to our structure of preferences
and goals. In fact, all dollars spent on the market enter the price-system thus
generating changes in the economic environment which allegedly respond to
the information we convey. However, unlike political voting, dollar voting may
place members of the community in very unequal positions in transacting. And
such unequal positions define, in turn, members’ ability to shape their terms of
cooperation in ways that meaningfully respond to their structure of preferences
and goals. In fact, members of the community, who find themselves in a relative
power position as a result of market distributions, can generate changes to the
economic environment that are more responsive to their structure of preferences
and goals.
Such differences in bargaining power may generate states of affairs in which
some members of the community are prevented from bringing about any signif-
icant change in the economic environment that would meaningfully respond to
their preferences (5). This particular problem could potentially undermine the
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instrumentalist character of the community, as some members may cease to see
their community as an enterprise from which they stand to gain (6).
Hayek answers to this particular problem both in The Road to Serfdom and
in Law, Legislation and Liberty by arguing in favor of a unified minimum which
would insure members of the community against misfortune:
There is no reason why in a society which has reached the general
level of wealth which ours has attained should not be guaranteed to
all without endangering general freedom. There are difficult ques-
tions about the precise standard which should thus be assured...
but there can be no doubt that some minimum of food, shelter,
and clothing, sufficient to preserve health and the capacity to work,
can be assured to everybody. Indeed, for a considerable part of the
population of England this sort of security has long been achieved.
Nor is there any reason why the state should not assist [...] indi-
viduals in providing for those common hazards of life against which,
because of their uncertainty, few individuals can make adequate pro-
vision. Where, as in the case of sickness and accident, neither the
desire to avoid such calamities nor the efforts to overcome their con-
sequences are as a rule weakened by the provision of assistance –
where, in short, we deal with genuinely insurable risks – the case for
the state’s helping to organize a comprehensive system of social in-
surance is very strong. [And] there is no incompatibility in principle
between the state’s providing greater security in this way and the
preservation of individual freedom. Wherever communal action can
mitigate disasters against which the individual can neither attempt
to guard himself nor make the provision for the consequences, such
communal action should undoubtedly be taken. (Hayek, 1944, p.
147-148).
There is no reason why in a free society government should not assure
to all, protection against severe deprivation in the form of an assured
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minimum income, or a floor below which nobody need to descend.
To enter into such an insurance against extreme misfortune may well
be in the interest of all; or it may be felt to be a clear moral duty of
all to assist, within the organised community, those who cannot help
themselves. So long as such a uniform minimum income is provided
outside the market to all those who, for any reason, are unable to
earn in the market an adequate maintenance, this need not lead to
a restriction of freedom, or conflict with the Rule of Law. (Hayek,
1976, p. 87).
The sort of proviso that Hayek sets on distributions of rights emerging from
market processes, though, does not seem to rest on the desideratum of securing
the instrumentalist character of our communities. In fact, he frames the idea
of providing a unified minimum ultimately as a social insurance against the
uncertainties of life, rather than as a mechanism devoted to make sure that
our social orders remain a cooperative enterprise. This, I believe, drives him
to underestimate the role that inequalities unintentionally arising from market
processes could play in bringing about states of affairs in which one cease to see
her social order as a cooperative enterprise from which she stands to gain.
In fact, if one takes seriously the claim according to which rights are in-
strumental to the preservation of the spontaneous order, redistributive actions
should take place not merely as a safety net on the grounds of the uncertainties
of life, but also in order to secure that members of the community are still able
to shape their specific terms of cooperation in ways that meaningfully respond
to their structure of preferences and goals.
Moreover, inequalities in bargaining power, unintentionally arising through
market transactions, may also shape our decisions to accept terms of cooperation
that would make us alienate other rights. In this regard, Elizabeth Anderson
offers an example which I have already quoted in the introduction:
Consider some facts about how employers today control their work-
ers. Walmart prohibits employees from exchanging casual remarks
78
while on duty, calling this ”time theft.” Apple inspects the personal
belongings of their retail workers, who lose up to a half-hour of un-
paid time every day as they wait in line to be searched. Tyson
prevents its poultry workers from using the bathroom. Some have
been forced to urinate on themselves, while their supervisors mock
them. About half of U.S. employees have been subject to suspi-
cionless drug screening by their employers. Millions are pressured
by their employers to support particular political causes or candi-
dates. If the U.S. government imposed such regulations on us, we
would rightly protest that our constitutional rights were being vi-
olated. But American workers have no such rights against their
bosses. Even speaking out against such constraints can get them
fired. So most keep silent. (Anderson, 2017 p. xix).
Here, Anderson pregnantly expresses her worries about how inequalities
could undermine our ability to shape our terms of cooperation in the labor
market. In fact, differences in bargaining power may place employers in an
incredibly privileged position, which allows them to entirely determine the con-
ducts that employees are to follow.
The worry, here, is not merely that largely unequal positions in bargaining
power shape one’s decision to give up on rights, thus bringing about a state of
affairs which most of us would find intuitively despicable. But rather that, by
giving up on specific instances of their rights, employees increasingly lose their
ability to shape their terms of cooperation in ways that meaningfully respond to
their structure of preferences. And this yields the risk of bringing about states
of affairs in which the stability of a community is threatened, as some members
cease to see it as a cooperative enterprise from which they stand to gain.
There are other examples that strongly suggest that we should be worrying
about derivative distributions of rights emerging from market transactions. Es-
pecially transaction concerning social environment shaping rights, such as rights
to freedom of expression.
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For instance, consider the case of contracts of silence or non-disclosure agree-
ments. Suppose, for instance, that I had a very bad experience at Bob’s restau-
rant. In fact, the food was bad, and the service even worse. Bob is very much
concerned about my experience, as he worries that I could write a bad review
on tripadvisor. As such, he proposes me a contract of silence: I sell my right to
write a review in exchange for some other goods.
By selling my silence, I restrict the set of social environment shaping actions
that fall within my right to freedom of expression. Clearly, selling my right
to write a review about Bob’s restaurant does not undermine my ability to
convey signals that would allow me to shape my terms of cooperation, broadly
understood. Such an ability, indeed, is a function of the set of all specific actions
that possess this particular character.
This, however, far from being consolatory, is a source of worry. In fact, if I
do not perceive a specific instance of selling my right to freedom of expression
as problematic in terms of the overall impact on my ability to shape the social
environment, I also fail to grasp that, by selling many specific instances of
this particular right, I largely restrict my ability to perform social environment
shaping actions, to the point that I could find myself unable to shape my specific
terms of cooperation.
In this regard, large-scale unintended consequences of small scale transac-
tions concerning one’s right to freedom of expression, may bring about a state
of affairs in which contracts of silence are somewhat pervasive: they concern the
relationship between employers and employees, prenuptial agreements, contro-
versies between customers and manufacturers, the relationship between patients
and doctors, etc.55
55Garfield (1997) provides an extensive list of cases in which contract of silence have now
become the norm. He also suggests to deny the enforcement of many instances of these con-
tracts, as they allegedly threaten public access to information:”My thesis is that contracts of
silence threaten public access to information and, therefore, warrant careful judicial regula-
tion. While recognizing that parties may voluntarily enter into contracts of silence, and that
parties may receive separate compensation for their commitments to silence, I nevertheless
recommend that courts deny enforcement to these contracts when the public interest in access
to the suppressed information outweighs any legitimate interest in contract enforcement”, p.
266.
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Someone may object that if I do not perceive specific instances of selling my
right to free speech as problematic in terms of the overall ability to convey in-
formation and making the social environment adapt to my preference structure,
this is the result of irrationality. As such, the argument I have been offering
is defective insofar as it claims that only agents with cognitive limitations in
the tractability of the decision problem may be affected by this sort of conse-
quences.56
However, our inability to shape the social environment does not merely come
from our defective evaluation of the impact of specific instances of selling one’s
right of expression. In fact, the ability to shape the social environment in ways
that make it adapt to our preference structure partly depends on other people’s
transactions that are fully rational. In fact, our ability to shape our terms of
cooperation, through social environment shaping actions, is also a function of
other people’s rights. For instance, if Alf systematically buys other people’s
specific instances of their right to free speech, his ability to shape his terms of
cooperation may annihilate mine, whether or not I decide to sell him any right
(e. g. the case of paid protesters).
As such, distributions of rights preventing some members of the community
from shaping their specific terms of cooperation, or from pursuing their own
goals on the basis of their own knowledge, may be brought about by transactions
over which they have no control.
Hence, we should conclude that the Lockean triad, on its own, is unable to
secure dynamic compliance in an instrumentalist fashion from all members of
the community. In fact, inequalities arising from individual transactions may
bring about states of affairs in which only some members of the community
maintain the ability to pursue their own goals and to shape their specific terms
of cooperation. When this obtains, some members of the community may cease
to see their community as a cooperative enterprise from which they stand to
56Notice that such an objection rest on an overly demanding account of rationality. In fact,
it is utterly demanding to suppose that members of a community would be able to assess the
impact that small-scale transactions, in which one sells her silence, would have in undermining
one’s ability to shape her terms of cooperation.
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gain, thus undermining its stability.
Derivative distributions of rights and the Instrumentalist
Character
One thing that I wish to emphasise is that our concern with inequality is not
principled. In fact, if we take seriously the claim according to which the price
system is the best device we have at our hands to convey decentralised infor-
mation which would bring changes to the economic environment in ways that
meaningfully respond to our structure of preferences, we are bound to accept
that inequalities are an inevitable outcome of market distributions.
Markets for social environment shaping rights, such as rights to freedom
of expression, are by no means an exception, in that the very act of selling
one’s right constitutes a way to shape one’s social environment. In fact, I may
not care about performing certain social environment shaping actions, as I do
not care about bringing about certain changes in my social environment in
some particular aspects, and rather be willing to trade particular instances of a
certain right in exchange for instances of some other rights, which would allow
me to generate changes in other aspects of the social world.57 Therefore, to
pose constraints on one’s ability to trade off rights would, in itself, bring about
a state of affairs in which one’s ability to shape her specific terms of cooperation,
in ways that meaningfully respond to her structure of preferences, is restricted.
Inequalities emerging from such transaction, thus, are a price we must willingly
pay if we care about preserving the spontaneous orders.
However, the preservation of a spontaneous order calls also for limitations
to our right to consent to transactions, or for redistributive actions aimed at
mitigating inequalities in the distribution of rights unintentionally emerging
from individual transactions, as they may lead to states of affairs in which some
members of the community are prevented from shaping their specific terms of
cooperation, thus undermining the instrumentalist character of our institutional
57On how selling rights would constitute an instance of shaping one’s environment, see
Muldoon (2016), Sen (1970), Gibbard (1974) and Basu (1984).
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arrangements.
Our concern, thus, is not toward inequalities per se, nor it is grounded in
republican conceptions of freedom underpinned by the concept of independence
or non-domination.58 Rather, it stems from considerations that implicitly follow
from Hayek’s account of the spontaneous order and which consist in preserving
an order’s ability to continuously adapt to members of the community’s struc-
ture of preferences and goals, through their ability to shape their specific terms
of cooperation.
In this regard, the problem of Hayek’s account of the spontaneous order
lies in that the distribution of rights underpinned by the Lockean triad may, in
origin, succeed in granting us the ability to equip us with the best conditions to
pursue our own goals on the basis of our own knowledge, but may fail to maintain
its instrumentalist character in its actual operations, as derivative distributions
may compromise our ability to shape our specific terms of cooperation, thus
bringing about states of affairs in which some members of the community fail to
see their community as a cooperative enterprise from which they stand to gain.
This main problem might be encapsulated by Nozick’s claim according to
which ’liberty upsets patterns’(Nozick, 1974, p. 160-164). In fact, the system of
rules Hayek envisages as the institutional arrangement of the spontaneous order,
are chosen precisely on the ground that they establish distributive patterns
that allegedly shape our reasons to continuously comply with the rules of our
communities.
Therefore, if derivative distribution of rights fail in shaping our reasons to
comply, it follows that Hayek’s theory calls for amendments to the system of
rules he envisages. Such amendments may be aptly framed either as limitations
to our right to consent to individual transactions, or as redistributive actions
aimed at restoring members’ of the community’s ability to shape their specific
terms of cooperation.
58See, in particular, Pettit (2012) and List and Valentini (2016).
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The Asymmetry Objection
A plausible objection to the amendment I have just proposed may insist on that
by suggesting that derivative distributions of rights, emerging from the Lockean
triad, may compromise the instrumentalist character of a certain community and
that, as such, agents have instrumental reasons to incorporate the amendment,
I do not show that political institutions could be designed and devised so as
to prevent these evolutionary patterns. In fact, one may plausibly point out
that Hayek’s epistemological premises, as illustrated in the first chapter, imply
the impossibility of designing fine-grained institutional arrangements in order
to achieve certain desired outcomes.
Such an objection, I believe, has some important merits in that it highlights
a potential asymmetry in my discussion about political institutions from an
Hayekian standpoint. In fact, it may seem that if, on the one hand, I argument
in favour of the institutions of the spontaneous order precisely on the ground
of their ability in allowing cooperation through decentralised decision-making,
without the need for fine-grained institutions that would require an omniscient
planner, on the other, I suggest that such fine-grained rules are ultimately re-
quired in order to make the theory to work. In particular, it might seem that I
suggest that, although a centralised political authority is ultimately unable to
create the conditions for cooperation through fine-grained rules, I do imply this
ability when introducing the amendment.59
In this respect, I wish to offer one main counter-argument. In particular,
I wish to suggest that the proposed amendment does not require fine-grained
institutional design in order to prevent evolutionary patterns that would com-
promise the instrumentalist character of a given community because it does not
aim at achieving specific outcomes. In fact, complex problems can be addressed
in both complicated and simple ways, and while complicated solutions require
fine-grained knowledge, simple ones do not.60
In order to illustrate this particular point, let me propose the following
59I wish to thank Mark Pennington and Edward Hall for pointing out this particular aspect.
60On this particular aspect see Epstein (1997).
84
example. Suppose that Betty manages a tennis club and wishes to develop
a system of rules that would allow members to make efficient use of the two
available tennis pitches. Assume also that Betty is unable to collect the relevant
and dispersed knowledge about members’ preferences and needs, and that, as
such, she cannot come up with a detailed set of rules that would optimally
allocate each time slot to specific members. Hence, she decides to set up a
booking system that functions on a first-come and first-served basis. Essentially,
members can log on to the booking system and reserve the time slots that match
their needs.
However, Betty soon realizes that some members tend to book time slots
during rush hours for a long time span. In particular, these members reserve
well in advance both tennis pitches from 9 am to 8 pm every weekend. As a
result, many other members who, due to other commitments, can only play
during those hours never manage to book a tennis pitch. Hence, they threaten
to end their subscription and join a different tennis club. Assume also, for the
sake of the argument, that if these members quit, Betty would be unable to
fund the maintenance of the tennis’ pitches due to the lack of revenues coming
from subscriptions.
In this scenario, Betty is faced with the necessity of designing and devising
a new system of rules that would keep these members into the club by allowing
them to reserve a sufficient number of time slots per month. However, there are
various ways of approaching this problem. For instance, Betty could attempt to
collect preferences and needs of neglected members and reserve them a certain
set of specific time slots on the basis of these preferences and needs. This
attempt would be aimed at generating specific outcomes on the basis of fully
detailed knowledge that she aims to gather from individual members. However,
if obtaining such knowledge is ultimately impossible, perhaps because neglected
members cannot tell in advance what their schedule will look like in the coming
week, Betty’s efforts in assigning specific slots on the basis of neglected members’
preferences and needs are likely to fail.
A second approach, though, could prove feasible. For instance, Betty could
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prevent the ’abusing’ members from booking the tennis pitches too in advance,
or reserve both tennis pitches to neglected members one weekend per month.
In fact, Betty knows that these members are willing to play on weekends, but is
ultimately unable to assign specific time slots as she cannot collect the required
fine-grained information. Hence, by reserving the tennis pitches one weekend
per month to neglected members, she allows them to determine which specific
slots would suit their needs without the need for collecting fine-grained and
dispersed knowledge.
These two approaches are different in the degree of knowledge required by
Betty. In fact, while the first assumes Betty’s ability to collect neglected mem-
bers’ preferences and needs in a fully detailed fashion, the second requires only
a general knowledge of members’ needs. However, such a difference in degree
also shapes a difference in kind when analysed from a diverse perspective. In
particular, while in the first scenario Betty aims at laying out in full details
the members’ terms of cooperation, by assigning each slot in a fully detailed
fashion, in the second scenario she designs a general framework of rules that
partly leaves in the members’ hands the possibility to shape the allocation of
time slots.
In this respect, the amendment that proposes to prevent transactions or to
redistribute rights, in an effort to prevent derivative distributions that would
compromise the instrumentalist character of a given cooperative enterprise,
should be read in the latter fashion. Essentially, I do not aim to propose that
centralised political authorities are able to design and devise fine-grained in-
stitutions able to achieve specific outcomes on the basis local and dispersed
knowledge. Rather, I suggest that a general set of rules that leaves in the hands
of fellow members of a community the possibility to shape their terms of cooper-
ation, and maintain the community’s instrumentalist character, can be designed
and devised.
In this respect, I wish to stress, there is no significant difference, from an
Hayekian standpoint, in claiming that we can plausibly design and devise a sys-
tem of rules (such as the bundle of rights embedded in the Lockean triad) that
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allows members of a community to shape their terms of cooperation according
to their structure of preferences and goals, and suggesting that derivative dis-
tributions of rights that would compromise the instrumentalist character of a
community can be prevented by redistributing rights or preventing certain kinds
of transactions. In fact, both efforts do not require fine-grained knowledge of
members of the community’s preferences and goals, nor they aim at achieving
specific outcomes.
The idea of a redistribution of rights, indeed, is different from designing fine-
grained institutions aimed at shaping terms of cooperation in a fully detailed
fashion, on the basis of knowledge that a planner cannot plausibly collect. And
such a difference lies precisely in that the aim of such a redistributive policy is
not specific, in that it does not aim at generating specific outcomes. Rather, it
seeks to allocate rights in a way that leaves in the hands of the fellow members
of a community the possibility to shape their social environment according to
their structures of preferences.
Conclusion
Concluding, let us summarise some of the aspects I have been tackling within
this chapter. First, I have attempted to illustrate one peculiar feature of the
spontaneous order, which consists in its instrumentalist character. Particularly,
I have been trying to support Hayek’s claim according to which the Lockean
triad, by virtue of allowing for adaptations to members of the community’s
structures of preferences and goals, equips members of the community with
instrumental reasons to be part of the cooperative venture.
Second, I have offered an objection to the Hayekian formulation of the spon-
taneous order that tackles its alleged ability to keep its instrumentalist character
over time. Particularly, I have been trying to show that the Lockean triad merely
defines an initial distribution of rights which allegedly possesses an instrumen-
talist character, but may be unable to secure compliance in an instrumentalist
fashion once the initial distribution is altered through individual transactions.
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In fact, derivative distributions of rights may prevent some members of the com-
munity from shaping their specific terms of cooperation, such that they would
have no interest in continuing to comply with its rules.
The next chapter, on the other hand, shall be devoted to show that our
worry about the difficulties in sustaining compliance in an instrumentalist fash-
ion should not be limited to formal institutional settings. In fact, informal
institutions such as social norms and conventions may undermine the instru-
mentalist character of our communities even when formal institutions are able
to equip individuals with the ability to continuously shape their terms of coop-
eration.
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Social Norms and The Instrumentalist
Character of The Spontaneous Order
Introduction
In the second chapter, I offered a critique of the Lockean account of the spon-
taneous order which tackles its instrumentalist character. Particularly, I have
attempted to show that derivative distributions of rights, unintentionally emerg-
ing from individual transactions may prevent some members of the community
from shaping their specific terms of cooperation. When this obtains, members
may fail to see their community as an enterprise from which they stand to gain,
thus undermining the community’s instrumentalist character and its stability.
This particular problem relevantly affects the appeal of the theory, as it un-
dermines its constitutive aim, which is that of creating the best conditions for
members of the community to pursue their own goals, on the basis of their own
knowledge, and to shape their specific terms of cooperation.
If the critique is successful, I have claimed, it posits a desideratum on Hayek’s
account of the spontaneous order. In fact, it demands to limit members’ right to
trade off goods and rights, or it requires to redistribute rights when derivative
distributions prevent some members of the community from shaping their spe-
cific terms of cooperation in ways that meaningfully respond to their structure
of preferences and goals.
In this chapter, I shall offer a similar critique. This time, though, I will
not be concerned with distribution of rights arising from individual voluntary
transactions involving goods and rights, but rather with how social norms affect
members of the community’s exercise of rights that equip them with the ability
to shape their social environment. In fact - I shall attempt to show - social norms
may prevent members of the community from exercising their social environment
shaping rights even under formal distributions of rights that allegedly grant
them the ability to do so. This particular problem may lead to states of affairs
in which some members of the community are prevented from making their
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social environment adapt to their changing structures of preferences and goals,
thus undermining the instrumentalist character of our communities.
Social norms are a particular kind of informal institutions unintentionally
emerging from countless individual interactions (Hayek 1973, Schelling 1978,
Brennan et al 2013) and sustained through informal sanctions (Bicchieri 2006,
Brennan et al 2013). These two key features distinguish them from formal rules,
such as those enforced by constitutions or laws. In fact, unlike formal laws, social
norms are not the result of the will or design of a legislator, as they normally
emerge as an equilibrium of strategic interactions (Bicchieri 2006, Ullmann-
Margalit 1977, Lewis 1969, Sugden 1986, Young 1993). In addition, and unlike
formal rules, social norms are not enforced through the threat of force. In fact,
compliance is sustained through informal and decentralised sanctions which, by
assumption, exclude the threat or the use of force toward those who fail to
comply. Their weak coerciveness, I suggest, may be aptly captured by the fact
that, unlike formal rules, social norms do not prevent members from undertaking
certain courses of actions but merely increase the costs for doing so.
Such a distinction, however, should not lead us to underestimate their power
in shaping our social environment. Their role, indeed, is even more pervasive
than that of formal rules. In fact, social norms do not merely regulate non-public
behaviours, by which I identify conducts that are unsuited to be regulated by the
law, but also affect our set of opportunities in ways that define the substantive
contents of rights and may shape our compliance with formal rules.
Analogously to the second chapter, my main aim is to show that norms can
alter the exercise of some of our rights up to the point that some members
are prevented from shaping their specific terms of cooperation in ways that
meaningfully respond to their structure of preferences. When this is the case,
once again, communities lose their instrumentalist character and are thus bound
to instability.
If successful, such a critique posits a further desideratum to any candidate
amended formulation of the theory of the spontaneous order, which is that of
preventing the emergence of social norms that would constitute a threat to the
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exercise of social environment shaping rights, or to dismantle already existing
norms that affect the exercise of these rights.
The chapter is organised as follows: within the first section, I outline how
norms shape our communities; within the second section, I deal with the iden-
tification of social norms in the attempt to distinguish them from descriptive
norms; within the third section, I analyse social norms’ status in terms in terms
of coerciveness, in order to distinguish them from formal rules; within the fourth
section, I offer a social norms based critique to Hayek’s account of the sponta-
neous order.
Three Ways in which Social Norms shape our Communities
Consider the case of Carla, a promising Ph.D. in orthodontics with a brilliant
academic career ahead of her. She lives in Caltanissetta (Siciliy), where she has
also started a private dental practice. Her social life is permeated with social
events, and fully enriched by her friends whose company she enjoys very much.
Carla has recently started dating Mario - an entrepreneur - and they seem to
get along quite well. Mario, though, does not belong to Carla’s social circle and
can hardly aspire to be welcomed among Carla’s friends. In fact, entrepreneurs,
in Caltanissetta, do not enjoy a good reputation and are often labeled as ’money-
driven merchants’. Carla’s friends, on the other hand, are all academics. Their
lives are devoted to unveiling the mysteries of science, or to unravel the deep
meanings of life, in order to make the world a better place. Sure, they take
some spare time from their intellectual endeavours, and they mostly devote it
to appreciate the marvels of poetry.
Carla has a crush on Mario, but is ultimately unwilling to introduce him
to her social circle. In fact, she is afraid of informal sanctions which would
follow. Mario is a hard working guy, who minds his business, and Carla’s friends
would ultimately find him as unsuited to sustain profound conversations on the
meaning of life. After all, he is a money-driven merchant. How could he possibly
understand what they are up to?
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Carla is torn by the situation, but ultimately realises that Mario is not the
right guy. She would have too much to lose in carrying on with the relationship
and, perhaps, marrying him. Her friends would not understand, and she would
end up by being excluded from the social circle that has fully shaped her joyful
life so far. Perhaps, she will consider dating Alberto. In fact, her friends would
be delighted to have him on board for their weekly reading group on Derrida.
Alberto, indeed, is a highly regarded and widely published Professor of Philos-
ophy at the prestigious University of Caltanissetta, and would perfectly qualify
as the sort of partner Carla should aim.
In Carla’s story, we are presented with a bundle of social norms which af-
fect non-public behaviours. In particular, they affect a private sphere that is
intuitively unsuited to be governed by the law: either because formal regulation
would lack effectiveness, or because it would require invading one’s privacy up to
an unacceptable extent, or because it would violate one’s individual autonomy.
In fact, within a liberal framework, marriage choices, alongside a wide range
of other important choices that provide meaning to our lives (e. g. career’s
paths, education, parental, etc.), usually fall within a protected sphere which is
supposedly impenetrable by formal rules.
Yet, social norms importantly shape these choices, or, at least, alter the
payoffs of our choice scenarios. In Carla’s social circle, for instance, we may
suppose that a norm prescribing not to date money-driven merchants is in play.
Although Carla may exhibit a preference for continuing her relationship with
Mario, her desire to fit in, alongside the fear of sanctions yielded by deviations
from the norm, shape her preference ranking over the available courses of ac-
tions, and, in turn, shape her decision to break up. Were the norm not in play,
perhaps Carla would have acted differently.
The impact of social norms, though, is not restricted to the domain of private
behaviours. In fact, they also shape the substantive contents of specific rights
underpinned by formal rules, such as the right to freedom of expression. In
order illustrate this, let me offer two examples.
In 2013, Guido Barilla, chairman of a popular brand of pasta, said, during
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a radio interview, that he would never approve a script for one of Barilla’s
commercials which pictures a gay family as the main protagonist. Barilla poorly
justified his statement by resorting to the idea of the traditional family as the
bedrock of the society he wishes to live in.
The immediate reaction on the media was of obvious disdain with many
celebrities proposing boycotts. Barilla’s competitors also brilliantly took ad-
vantage of his gaffe in the attempt to gain the market share of those who used
to be loyal Barilla customers and who understandably felt profoundly offended
by Barilla’s words. Garofalo, for instance, introduced the following catchphrase
on their pasta packaging:”It doesn’t really matter with whom you cook it, it
just needs to be al dente”. Thus, it comes by no surprise that, after a couple of
months, Barilla ended up producing their first gay-friendly commercial.61
A similar story had as main protagonists the worldwide famous fashion de-
signers Domenico Dolce and Stefano Gabbana. In an interview for the Italian
magazine Panorama from January 2015, Mr Dolce told the interviewer: ”You
are born to a mother and a father, or at least that’s how it should be. I call
children of chemistry, synthetic children. Rented uterus, semen chosen from
a catalog”. The interview prompted Elton John to launch the hashtag #boy-
cottDolceGabbana and the successful boycotting campaign induced the fashion
designers to release an apologising statement.62
Barilla and Dolce and Gabbana’s stories provide an example of how social
norms interact with specific rights, underpinned by formal institutional arrange-
ments. In particular, they illustrate how social norms may shape our preference
ranking over courses of actions which are formally protected by individual rights,
and which should ideally be insulated from external constraints. In fact, under
liberal institutional arrangements, the right to free speech is not merely asserted
but also protected through formal provisions (e.g. the first amendment in the
US or object of article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, according to which ’Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
61On Barilla’s story see Davies (2013).
62For an exhaustive summary of Dolce and Gabbana’s story, see Ember (2015).
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expression;63 this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers’). Yet, norms do affect our freedom of speech to a large
extent. In fact, informal sanctions, such as discrimination by customers who felt
offended by Barilla and Dolce and Gabbana’s words, or the expectation of such
sanctions, increase the costs for expressing one’s sincere opinions about delicate
matters.64
A third instance of how social norms affect our communities concerns their
role in shaping our compliance with formal rules which forbid or require cer-
tain specific conducts. For instance, consider the case of laws requiring to wear
helmets on motorcycles. In many Naples’ neighborhoods is not uncommon to
get informally sanctioned if one complies. Plausible explanations might resort
to ’bully’ attitudes, although some recent documentaries point to the fact that
helmets often identify members of criminal organisations, such as the Camorra,
who use them in order to protect their identity while committing criminal ac-
tivities. What is sure, though, is that informal sanctions strongly undermine
citizens of Naples’ compliance with the rule.
On the other hand, there are many cases in which norms sustain our com-
pliance with formal laws. For instance, Cialdini et al (1990, 1991 and 1998)
provide interesting insights on how social norms enhance our compliance with
rules aimed at reducing littering, and Posner (2000) shows how social norms
profoundly affect our choices with respect to tax compliance.
On a more general level, we may think about broader attitudes generating
macro social norms concerning law-abidingness. In the south of Italy, for in-
stance, a popular joke aptly pictures traffic signs as no more than a prudential
advice. In fact, it is not uncommon to be mocked when stopping at the red
light, as those who do are deemed as either narrow-minded, stupid or cowards.
In other communities, on the other hand, non-compliance with formal rules is
perceived as outrageous, even though compliance may appear as bringing about
63General Assembly of the United Nations (1948) pp. 4–5.
64Basu (1998) and Fiss (1985) precisely focus their attention on how norms affect rights to
freedom of expression.
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overall sub-optimal states of affairs.
Identifying Social Norms
Brennan et al (2013) classify theories of social norms into two main categories.
On the one hand, we have reductive accounts, which identify norms as well-
established social practices; on the other, we have accounts introducing norma-
tive elements.
The reductive approach can be illustrated by the following example. Suppose
Betty, Mary and Alf enjoy meeting every Friday after work at the university pub
and to update each other about their ongoing research. There are no scheduled
meetings but merely an empirical expectation that everyone will show up, on
that particular time of the week, at that particular place. Empirical expecta-
tions merely represent expectations about the likelihood that a certain event will
occur, and are shaped by the observation of regularities in their respective be-
haviours. In fact, Betty, Mary and Alf’s expectations do not entail any ought on
their reciprocal behaviours, nor there are sanctions associated with defections.
However, defections, by changing their empirical expectations, may undermine
the norm. In fact, if Betty, Mary and Alf lack independent reasons to go to
the university pub on Fridays, repeated defections may lead to abandoning the
practice.
Norms of this sort are aptly captured by David Lewis’ account of conven-
tions (1969), which defines the conditions for the identification of norms in the
following form:
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when
they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only
if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, in almost
any instance of S among members of P,
(1) almost everyone conforms to R;
(2) almost everyone expects almost everyone else to conform to R;
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(3) almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regard-
ing all possible combinations of actions;
(4) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to R, on
condition that almost everyone conform to R;
(5) almost everyone would prefer that any one more conform to R’,
on condition that almost everyone conform to R’,
where R’ is some possible regularity in the behavior of members of
P in S, such that almost no one in almost any instance of S among
members of P could conform both to R’ and to R. (Lewis, 1969, p.
78).
In fact, Betty, Mary and Alf (1) normally go to the University pub on Fri-
days after work, (2) exhibit empirical expectations about the fact that (almost)
everyone will show up, (3) are happy to meet at the University pub, as it is
close to their workplace (4) are willing to go to the pub provided that (almost)
everyone will, (5) prefer that any one shows up, provided that (almost) everyone
does.
Lewis’ account, thus, explains norms in terms of salient solutions to pure
coordination games, where players’ preferences are perfectly aligned. In fact,
Betty, Mary and Alf already exhibit a preference for meeting and catching up
about their research, and the observation of regularities in their respective be-
haviours indicates that going to the university pub after work on Fridays would
satisfy their preference. Therefore, ’go to the university pub on Friday nights
after work’ constitutes a rule that provides a salient solution to their shared
preference for coordination.
Therefore, Bicchieri notices, Lewis’ conditions capture scenarios in which
our conformity with a particular norm is always dictated by straightforward
self-interest:
We conform because such norms make life easier for us, because
we want to ’fit in’ or do the right thing – as when we adopt a new
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fashion – or simply because they provide evidence of what is likely to
be effective, adaptive behavior, as when we bought Internet stocks
because many people we know were buying them and were doing
well. Often there are good prudential or informational reasons to
”do as the Romans do.” Conformity to a descriptive norm may be
motivated by a desire to imitate others’ behavior in uncertain or
ambiguous situations (Bicchieri, 2005, p. 34).
Often, though, scenarios to which norms apply do not resemble situations in
which agents’ preferences are perfectly aligned, but rather where mixed motives
come into play. In Carla’s story, for instance, she is torn between two non-
compossible aims: on the one hand, she exhibits a desire to fit in and to avoid
incurring in informal sanctions; on the other, she has a preference for dating
Mario.
In Carla’s scenario Lewis’ (3) does not obtain, as Carla exhibits preferences
which are unaligned to those shared by members of her social circle. In this
regard, the norm prescribing not to date the money-driven merchant shapes an
impure coordination game, as Carla’s compliance comes at the cost of giving up
on her aim to continue dating Mario.
Lewis’ conditions, we may observe, are unable to account for Carla’s sce-
nario, as they cannot not explain how compliance with the norm taking place in
Carla’s scenario is sustained, given the clash of preferences between Carla and
members of her social circle. In this regard, Lewis’ conditions merely account
for descriptive norms, that is for norms that highlight a solution that perfectly
accommodates for all players’ preferences over the available courses of actions.
These norms do not entail any sacrifice in complying with them, as they merely
highlight to players a way to solve their struggle in coordinating.
Mixed motives scenarios, indeed, require normative elements in order to
explain compliance with norms. In particular they require us to lay out what
drives agents’ compliance with norms in choice scenarios where agents exhibit
unaligned aims.
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One plausible solution is offered by rational choice models, according to
which our behaviours are ultimately shaped by the sanctions yielded by non
compliance with norms (Rommetveit 1955, Axelrod 1986, Coleman 1990). The
normative element is precisely captured by sanctions, whose expectation invites
members of a community to comply with certain norms even when compliance
comes at the cost of sacrificing one’s other aims. Such an approach explains
our behaviours as the result of a payoff-maximising strategy in which agents
deliberate on which course of actions they should undertake by factoring in
the expected costs yielded by sanctions. Rational choice models, thus, would
explain Carla’s choice as emerging from a deliberation procedure that weighs
the benefits of dating Mario and the costs of expected sanctions coming from
her social circle.
However, Bicchieri (1990, 1997, 2006) points out that even rational choice
models offer us a rather incomplete approach to norms’ compliance. In fact,
these models are unable to explain the persistence of norms that are not up-
held by sanctions. In order to illustrate Bicchieri’s argument we may aptly
frame Carla’s scenario as a situation in which non-compliance with the norm
prescribing not to marry the money-driven merchant does not yield sanctions.
Under such circumstances, Bicchieri would claim, compliance can still obtain
but rational choice models are ultimately unable to explain why.
In this regard, Bicchieri suggests that our compliance with norms, in mixed
motives scenarios, is partly shaped by a preference for conformity developed by
members of a community who learn to act cooperatively. In particular, such
a preference would give rise to a meta-norm inviting compliance with specific
norms, in specific circumstances. Let us analyse her formulation:
Let R be a behavioral rule for situations of type S, where S can be
represented as a mixed-motive game. We say that R is a social norm
in a population P if there exists a sufficiently large subset Pcf ⊂ P
such that, for each individual i ∈ Pcf :
Contingency: i knows that a rule R exists and applies to situations
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of type S;
Conditional preference: i prefers to conform to R in situations of
type S on the condition that:
(a) Empirical expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset
of P conforms to R in situations of type S;
and either
(b) Normative expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset
of P expects i to conform to R in situations of type S; or
(b’) Normative expectations with sanctions: i believes that a suffi-
ciently large subset of P expects i to conform to R in situations of
type S, prefers i to conform, and may sanction behavior.
A social norm R is followed by population P if there exists a suffi-
ciently large subset Pf ⊂ Pcf such that, for each individual i ∈ Pf ,
conditions 2(a) and either 2(b) or 2(b’) are met for i and, as a re-
sult, i prefers to conform to R in situations of type S. (Bicchieri 2006,
p.11)
The meta-norm is captured by one’s conditional preference to conform, pro-
vided certain conditions obtain. In fact, if members of the community internalise
the preference for conformity, they also develop a default position which explains
their compliance with norms even under the absence of sanctions, and in the
presence of mixed motives. In this regard, Carla’s compliance with the norm
may obtain even under the absence of sanctions, as her preference for conformity
could, in principle, account for her decision.
Bicchieri’s requirements for the emergence of a conditional preference for
conformity add an important element to Lewis’ account, in the form of nor-
mative expectations or normative expectations yielding sanctions. Normative
expectations, indeed, capture the oughts that were missing in Lewis’ account
and which allow us to explain compliance in mixed motive scenarios.
In order to illustrate this particular aspect, let us analyse Carla’s story under
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Bicchieri’s conditions. Carla, we assumed, has a preference for dating Mario.
However, she also exhibits a preference for conformity which is driven by empiri-
cal and normative expectations: empirical expectations constitute beliefs about
the behaviours of her friends, whereas normative expectations entail second or-
der beliefs about how one ought to behave. In particular, in our scenario, Carla
believes that everyone complies with the norm and believes that her friends
believe that she ought to conform with the norm, and may sanction deviations.
Empirical expectations alone are unable to explain Carla’s decision to break
up with Mario. In fact, the mere fact of believing that others undertake a
particular course of actions, per se, does not provide a reason for conformity, as
it does not entail normative attitudes on one’s behaviour. However, if empirical
expectations are accompanied by second order beliefs about how one should
behave, they can explain conformity even in the absence of sanctions. In fact,
when normative expectations obtain, Carla’s reasons to conform to the norm is
shaped by the desire not to disappoint other people’s normative attitudes, even
in the absence of sanctions.
In this regard, one may wonder to what extent Bicchieri’s conditional prefer-
ence for conformity brings any explanatory value to the identification of norms
that is not already embedded in the concept of normative expectations. In
particular, one may suggest that normative expectations, even in the absence
of informal sanctions, already yield some sort of psychological penalties in the
form of disappointing other people’s normative attitudes, which alone would
explain one’s compliance with a specific norm. In fact, in Carla’s scenario, her
compliance with the norm might simply be explained in terms of her desire not
to disappoint her friends’ normative attitudes, without resorting to conditional
preferences for conformity.
Such an inclusive definition of sanctions would allow us to get rid of Bic-
chieri’s conditional preference for conformity, while still allowing us to explain
compliance with norms in mixed motives contexts where non-psychological sanc-
tions do not follow our deviations from the norm. This is, indeed, the route
followed by Brennan et al (2013) in laying out their requirements for the iden-
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tification of norms. According to their account, indeed, a particular normative
principle P is a norm within group G if and only if:
(i) A significant proportion of the members of G have P-corresponding
normative attitudes; and
(ii) A significant proportion of the members of G know that a sig-
nificant proportion of the members of G have P-corresponding nor-
mative attitudes. (Brennan et al., 2013, p. 29).
Such a definition excludes from the relevant conditions the unwarranted
requirement of agents’ conditional preference for conformity and merely points
to common knowledge about the existence of normative attitudes toward certain
behaviours. Moreover, differently from Bicchieri, Brennan et al also exclude
empirical expectations from their list of necessary conditions. In fact, they
suggest, norms may still exist even when we are unable to observe widespread
compliance:
The Moldovans: Virtually all Moldovans judge that one mustn’t uri-
nate in public swimming pools, are disposed to disapprove of any-
one who does so, and are disposed to regard such attitudes as per-
fectly justified. Moreover, that Moldovans generally feel this way
about urinating in public swimming pools is a matter of common
knowledge among Moldovans. Despite this, and unbeknownst to the
Moldovan public, urinating in swimming pools in Moldova is in fact
widespread. Everyone does it regularly. To be sure, no one fesses up
to the fact. Indeed, they do everything they can to hide it. On the
rare occasions that they discover that someone else has done it, they
are outraged. When they do it themselves, they feel guilty (though
perhaps also a certain frisson of guilty pleasure). They have no
idea, and would be appalled to discover, that everyone is behaving
in exactly the same way. (Brennan et al., 2013, p. 20).
The example is meant to suggest that, despite widespread non-compliance
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with the norm ’do not urinate in public swimming pool’, a norm still exists
insofar as Moldovans do everything to hide their non-compliance on the ground
of their fear of sanctions yielded by corresponding normative attitudes. How-
ever, one may notice, the example does not really rule out Bicchieri’s condition
of empirical expectations, but merely suggests that a norm can exist despite
agents’ empirical expectations being mistaken.65
In fact, Moldovans would hardly form second order beliefs about other peo-
ple’s normative attitudes against the act of urinating in public swimming pools,
in the absence of empirical expectations. Moreover, under circumstances in
which non-compliance can be easily unveiled, empirical expectations, in order
to emerge, must be consistent with actual practices. In fact, we could hardly
form empirical expectations which stand in sharp contrast with other people’s
observable conducts. Therefore, we must conclude that empirical expectations
are a necessary condition for the identification of a norm. In fact, they are
required in order to form widespread second order beliefs about other people’s
normative attitudes toward a particular behaviours, and, in turn, to shape the
credibility of the threat posed by sanctions associated with deviations from the
norm.
In this regard, I wish to propose a set of conditions for the identification of
norms that draws both from Bicchieri (2006) and Brennan et al (2013). Ac-
cording to the proposed formulation:
A normative principle R is a social norm in situation type S, in a
population P, when:
(1) a significant part of P has empirical expectations: a large part
of P believes that a large part of P will conform to R in situation
type S.
(2) A significant proportion of P knows that a significant proportion
of P have R-corresponding normative attitudes and are willing to
65This particular situation obtains only under the condition that gaining access to other
people’s conducts is impossible or particularly costly, thus resembling a particular case of
pluralistic ignorance. See Miller, Dale, and McFarland (1987).
102
sanction deviations in situation type S (where sanction may identify
both psychological and other kinds of informal punishment).
Such a formulation, I suggest, aptly responds to the intuitions I have outlined
above. First, it gets rid Bicchieri’s unwarranted condition of conditional prefer-
ence for conformity, as norms’ compliance can be simply explained in terms of
sanctions. Second, we maintain Bicchieri’s condition concerning empirical ex-
pectations, which are needed in order to form second order beliefs about other
people’s normative attitudes. Third, we merge Bicchieri’s (b) and (b’) and
Brennan et al (i) and (ii) into (2).
Social Norms and Coercion
With (1) and (2) outlined, we can move on to investigating how social norms
affect our behaviours. In order to do so, let us turn back to the examples that
I offered within the first section. In Carla’s story, the existence of a norm N
prescribing not to date a money-driven merchant requires that:
(1) A large proportion of the members of Carla’s social circle have
empirical expectations that others will conform to N and,
(2) A large proportion of the members of Carla’s social circle knows
that a large proportion of the members of Carla’s social circle has
N-corresponding normative attitudes and is willing to sanction de-
viations.
How does the existence of N affect Carla’s behaviour? Within the first sec-
tion, I proposed that the best way to capture the effects of norms is to consider
how the costs of sanctions alter our ranking over the available courses of actions.
In fact, in Carla’s example, we may explain her behaviour as ultimately shaped
by a deliberation procedure which weighs her preference for dating Mario and
the costs of sanctions (including psychological ones) associated with deviation
from N. Normative expectations, indeed, by virtue of increasing the costs for
continuing to date Mario, alter her preference ranking over the available courses
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of actions and shape her decision to break up. In fact, were the norm not in
play, she would have had reasons to follow a different path.
In Barilla and Dolce and Gabbana’s examples, there are further interesting
elements to consider. In fact, their controversial speeches indicate that they ei-
ther lacked normative expectations or underestimated the intensity of sanctions
associated with deviations. The boycotting campaign following their interviews,
indeed, makes them reconsider their previous actions and converge on a course
of action that is not subject to sanctions.66
Analogously, social norms shaping our compliance with formal rules alter
our preference ranking over the available courses of actions by increasing the
costs for undertaking certain courses of actions. In fact, turning back to the
example concerning laws requiring to wear helmets on motorcycles: agents have
a preference for complying that is shaped by the existence of a formal rule, and
that is out-weighted by the expectations of sanctions associated with deviation
from the social norm proscribing to wear helmets.
In this regard, it may be useful to assess social norms in terms of their
coerciveness, in an effort to distinguish them from formal rules. Such an assess-
ment crucially turns on the definition of coercion that we employ. Hence, let us
consider two classical definitions offered by Hans Kelsen and J. R. Lucas:
As a coercive order, the law is distinguished from other social orders.
The decisive criterion is the element of force — that means that the
act prescribed by the order as a consequence of socially detrimental
facts ought to be executed even against the will of the individual
and, if he resists, by physical force. (Kelsen, 1967 [1934], p. 34).
[W]e are concerned with the enforcement of decisions: we are consid-
ering the conditions under which decisions will be carried out regard-
66Clearly, one may suggest that the boycotting campaign makes them reconsider and update
their beliefs, such that Barilla’s decision to produce a gay friendly commercial, and Dolce and
Gabbana’s apologising statement may be the result of a cognitive process which involves the
internalisation of different moral values. This is, indeed, perfectly plausible. However, my
goal here is to highlight how norms alter our preference rankings on the available courses of
actions, without making people internalise the normative attitudes implicit in the social norm.
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less of the recalcitrance of the bloody minded. We therefore define
force in terms of bloody-mindedness, of what happens irrespective
of how recalcitrant a man is, of what happens to him willy-nilly.
Force, then, we say, is being used against a man, if in his private ex-
perience or in his environment either something is being done which
he does not want to be done but which he is unable to prevent in
spite of all his efforts, or he is being prevented, in spite of all his
efforts, from doing something which he wants to do, and which he
otherwise could have done by himself alone. A man is being coerced
when either force is being used against him or his behaviour is being
determined by the threat of force. (Lucas, 1966, p. 57).
In the above quoted passages, Kelsen and Lucas propose us two formulations
that identify as the main distinctive element of coercion the threat or use of force
toward the coercee. According to these definitions, social norms cannot be said
to be coercive as they lack such a distinctive element. In fact, informal sanctions,
by assumption, do not entail the use of physical force in order to secure agents’
compliance with norms.
However, although such a definition is able to capture the distinction between
formal and informal rules, it fails in accommodating our intuitions about the
distinction between descriptive and social norms. In fact, if sanctions were not
in any way coercive, we would hardly explain why people would conform to
conducts they would otherwise consider as sub-optimal. In this regard, more
recent accounts of coercion have focused on conditional threats that may not
include the use of force or violence to compel one to perform a certain action,
thus allowing us to explain compliance with social norms. Nozick’s account, in
particular, has been largely influential, and sets out the minimal conditions for
coercion as follows:
1. P aims to keep Q from choosing to perform action A;
2. P communicates a claim to Q;
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3. P’s claim indicates that if Q performs A, then P will bring about
some consequence that would make Q’s A-ing less desirable to Q
than Q’s not A-ing;
4. P’s claim is credible to Q;
5. Q does not do A;
6. Part of Q’s reason for not doing A is to lessen the likelihood that
P will bring about the consequence announced in (3). (Nozick, 1969,
pp. 441-445).
If we reconsider our examples under the light of Nozick’s account of coercion,
social norms seem to fall under the same category of formal rules. For instance,
in Carla’s story:
(1) Members of Carla’s social circle have normative attitudes toward
N;
(2) Carla knows that a large proportion of the members of her social
circle shares these attitudes;
(3) Members of Carla’s social circle are willing to sanction deviations
from N, increasing Carla’s costs for undertaking her preferred course
of actions;
(4) Carla believes that sanctions will take place if she does not con-
form;
(5) Carla decides to break up with Mario;
(6) Part of Carla’s reasons for not continuing to date Mario is to
avoid sanctions from members of her social circle.
Nozick, indeed, by failing to distinguish between different kinds of conse-
quences one may bring about in securing agents’ compliance, also fails in ac-
commodating our intuitions about the distinction between formal and informal
rules, which precisely rests on the threat of the use of physical force.
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Moreover, condition (5) by tying coercion to cases of successful coercion,
also ties coercion to one’s subjective assessment of the relevance of the threats
posited by coercers, bringing us to implausible conclusions. In order to illustrate
this, let us consider two scenarios:
Carla’s friends would only trivially sanction Carla’s decision to con-
tinue dating Mario (e. g. Carla would not be invited to the next
meeting of the reading group on Derrida). Yet, Carla perceives the
costs of the sanction as too high and breaks up with Mario.
Carla’s friend would strongly sanction Carla’s decision to continue
dating Mario (e. g. they would destroy her reputation). Yet, Carla
is in love with Mario and decides to continue dating him.
Oddly enough, Nozick would conclude that coercion takes place in the first,
but not in the second scenario. Further developments of Nozick’s account of
coercion, indeed, distinguish between coercion and coerciveness.67 According to
such accounts, unsuccessful attempts to coerce do not rule out the coerciveness
of a particular scenario, which rests on the existence of conditional threats that
coercers intend to bring about if the coercee performs a certain action.
However, these accounts of coercion are still unable to accommodate for
the distinction between formal and informal rules, as they do not distinguish
between threats involving the use of force, and those merely involving informal
sanctions. In this regard, and restricted to the purpose of the present work,
we may offer a distinction between strongly and weakly coercive rules, where
’strongly’ identifies rules enforced through the threat or use of force, and ’weakly’
identifies rules sustained by the threat of informal sanctions, thus excluding the
use of force. At the same time, we may keep the distinction between coercion
and coerciveness in order to avoid tying the definition of coercion merely to
cases of successful coercion. As a result, we obtain the following taxonomy:
67See, in particular, Carr (1988) and Lamond (2000).
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Such an account, indeed, although unable to distinguish between social
norms yielding sanctions of different intensity, has two crucial advantages. On
the one hand, it accommodates our intuitions concerning the distinction between
formal rules, such as laws and constitutions, and informal rules such as social
norms. On the other, it allows us to explain compliance with weakly coercive
rules, such as social norms, thus accommodating for the distinction between de-
scriptive norms, which we comply with merely on the basis of self-interest, and
social norms, which require the threat of sanctions in order to secure agents’
compliance.
Social Norms and The Spontaneous Order
Social norms, by virtue of being weakly coercive, shape our behaviour without
penetrating the protected sphere that liberal institutions design for us. In fact, it
would be weird to claim that, in Carla’s story, informal sanctions associated with
deviation from the norm prescribing not to marry a money-driven merchant,
would violate Carla’s rights, such that her friends should be formally coerced
into refraining from sanctioning her. Analogously, it would be too demanding to
suggest that Barilla’s and Dolce and Gabbana’s customers should be coerced into
refraining from boycotting, on the ground that the boycott would undermine
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Barilla’s and Dolce and Gabbana’s right to politely express their own opinions
on delicate matters.
In fact, coercion toward sanctioners brings with it three main drawbacks:
first, there is a problem of efficacy, in that behaviours of this kind are hard to
identify, and compliance with laws forbidding them is even harder to secure;
second, there is a concern about people’s privacy as the identification of this
sort of behaviours may require interference with one’s private life; third, there
is a concern about individual autonomy, as one may point out that, for how
undesirable these attitudes and sanctions are, citizens of a free society should
be allowed to hold on to them.68
Yet, social norms do regulate our behaviours and shape many decisions which
profoundly affect our lives. This particular fact, I suggest, has important im-
plications with respect to Hayek’s account of the spontaneous order. This is
because Hayek considers the protected sphere defined by institutional arrange-
ments underpinned by the Lockean triad as instrumental in order to create the
best conditions for all members of the community to pursue their own goals, on
the basis of their own knowledge. In particular, he considers members of the
community’s ability to act within the boundaries of the Lockean triad as con-
ducive to their ability to continuously shape their specific terms of cooperation,
through their exercise of social environment shaping rights.
However, I suggest, social norms may undermine Hayek’s claim, leading to
states of affairs in which the instrumentalist character of our communities, and,
in turn, their stability is threatened. The argument may be summarised as
follows:
(1) The Lockean account of the spontaneous order entails a distri-
bution of rights to life, liberty and property.
(2) Such a distribution of right is chosen on the ground that it defines
a protected sphere of actions which creates the best conditions for
68Bartlett and Gulati (2016) specifically tackles informal discrimination by customers and
offers a rather interesting discussion concerning how governments may reasonable deal with
informal sanctions stemming from normative attitudes.
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members of the community to pursue their own goals on the basis of
their own knowledge, and allows them to shape their specific terms
of cooperation.
(3) Such an institutional arrangement allegedly equips members of
the community with instrumental reasons to comply with the rules
of the spontaneous order, thus securing stability.
(4) Social norms may prevent some members of the community from
shaping their specific terms of cooperation in ways that meaningfully
responds to their structure of preferences and goals.
(5) Social norms may, in turn, bring about states of affairs in which
some members of the community cease to see their community as
an enterprise from which they stand to gain, thus undermining its
instrumental character and, in turn, its stability.
Since we have dealt with (1), (2) and (3) in the previous chapters, we may
aptly start with (4). Social norms, we have seen, increase the costs for pursuing
certain courses of actions, which fall in our protected sphere, and may, in turn,
alter our preference ranking over the available courses of actions. In Carla’s sce-
nario, for instance, informal sanctions associated with deviation from the norm
’do not date the money-driven merchant’, make her refrain from continuing dat-
ing Mario, which she would have done in the absence of the norm. Analogously,
in Barilla’s and Dolce and Gabbana’s stories, informal sanctions associated with
their deviation from a norm proscribing controversial speech on delicate matters,
make them ex-post converge on conducts which are sanction-free.
This peculiar ability of norms brings with it crucial implications when sanc-
tions affect members of the community’s social environment shaping rights. In
fact, these rights allegedly serve the purpose of defining a protected set of ac-
tions, through which members are able to convey information about their specific
terms of cooperation, in order to shape their social environment in ways that
meaningfully respond to their structure of preferences and goals. One’s failure
to perform social environment shaping actions, that reflect one’s structure of
110
preferences and goals, results in one’s failure to shape her specific terms of co-
operation in ways that meaningfully respond to her structure of preferences and
goals. Systematic failure to perform sound social environment shaping actions
may generate states of affairs in which one ceases to see her community as an
enterprise from which she stands to gain, thus undermining its stability.
In order to further illustrate this problem, let us consider the following sce-
narios:
Betty asks Bob to co-author a paper. Betty would indifferently use
a TeX editor or a Word processing software, and asks Bob about his
preferred solution. Bob hates TeX, and has never really learned how
to use it. However, Bob feels pressured by an ongoing social norm in
his department. In fact, everyone uses TeX, and those who do not
are subject to mockery. Therefore, he chooses TeX.
Some members of the community of Broomhill like Michael Buble.
However, such a preference must be hidden, as a large proportion
of members of Broomhill would regard it as shameful. In fact, only
foolish people could possibly enjoy listening to such a disengaged
music genre. Michael Buble organises a concert in Broomhill, but
those who appreciate him feel pressured not to go, as their prefer-
ence could be easily unmasked. Perhaps, they could go to the next
concert, which is scheduled in July, when Broomhills’ intellectuals
will be on vacation. However, nobody shows up to Buble’s concert
and he never comes back to Broomhill.
In these scenarios, we are presented with two instances of one’s failure to
convey information that reflects one’s structure of preferences and goals, and
which, in turn, results in one’s failure to shape her specific terms of cooperation
in ways that meaningfully respond to one’s structure of preferences and goals.
In the first case, Bob chooses to write the paper on a TeX editor, despite the
possibility of a better option at hand. His performative utterance in answering
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Betty generates a specific term of cooperation which Bob does not really appre-
ciate. In the second case, members of Broomhill fail to convey signals, through
the price system, that would bring Michael Buble back for a concert in July.
Clearly, specific instances in which one complies with a norm, despite id-
iosyncratic preferences, do not undermine one’s ability to shape her social envi-
ronment in ways that meaningfully respond to her preferences and goals. Yet,
many instances, encompassing various aspects of one’s life, may bring about
states of affairs in which one systematically fails to define specific terms of co-
operation in ways that one finds acceptable. This, I suggest, may result in one’s
failure to see her community as a cooperative enterprise from which she stands
to gain, thus undermining its stability (5).
One may plausibly object that social norms, by virtue of being only weakly
coercive, do not prevent members of the community from exercising their social
environment shaping rights in ways that meaningfully respond to their structure
of preferences and goals, but merely increase the costs for doing so. Therefore,
if, for instance, we choose to refrain from exercising our right to free speech
on the ground of informal sanctions, we do so insofar as we fail to grasp the
relevance that the exercise of our right to free speech has in shaping our social
environment. As such, my argument is defective as it only applies to people
that are not fully rational.
This argument has some merits: in fact, social norms do not bring about
distributions of rights in which I am contractually bound and, thus, unable to
exercise my right to free speech at later stages. Moreover, such an objection
does not rest upon an overly demanding account of rationality. In fact, I may
come to realise, through a process of trial and error, that failure to exercise my
right to free speech has crucial consequences on my ability convey information
that would allow me to shape the social environment by making it adapt to my
preferences and goals. Once I acknowledge it, I can always exercise my right to
free speech at later stages, as failure to exercise it in the past does not bind me
not to exercise it in the future.
However, such an argument overlooks how pervasive the role of norms is and
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how hard is to convey information that could free us from informal sanctions.
In this regard, two counter objections can be offered: first, our compliance with
specific norms is often shaped by pressing needs; second, when norms are well-
established, our sound exercise of social environment shaping rights does not
produce meaningful changes.
For instance, in Barilla and Dolce and Gabbana’s stories, their compliance
with the norm is shaped by the pressing need of protecting their businesses
and is also driven by the fact that their controversial speeches would not either
produce any substantive change in their social environment, nor bring about
states of affairs in which their right to hold controversial positions will not be
affected by informal sanctions.
One may also object that social norms, by virtue of being the result of count-
less individual interactions, embed, in themselves, knowledge that is dispersed
among individuals. As such, they already shape specific terms of cooperation
in ways that meaningfully respond to our structures of preferences and goals.
However, such an objection fails to distinguish descriptive norms, taking place
in scenarios where agents’ preferences are perfectly aligned, from norms guiding
our behaviours in mixed motives scenarios. In fact, in pure coordination games,
solutions perfectly embed knowledge that is dispersed among agents; in mixed
motives games, on the other hand, norms compliance comes at the cost of sacri-
ficing one’s other aims. These aims are not conveyed to other agents and, thus,
we fail in shaping our specific terms of cooperation according to our structure
of preferences and goals.
Social norms, thus, posit a threat to an order’s ability to be continuously
shaped by its members. And this particular problem brings with it the risk of
undermining a community’s instrumentalist character, as some members of the
community may fail to see their communities as a cooperative enterprise from
which they stand to gain.
As such, social norms call for a further desideratum that sound institutional
arrangements, underpinned by a theory of spontaneous order, should aim to
satisfy, which is that of preventing or limiting the emergence of norms that
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impede adaptation, or to dismantle those which are already in play.
Although the present work does not deal with how institutional arrange-
ments could aptly respond to weakly coercive rules, sustained by social sanc-
tions, it may point to a flourishing literature on soft paternalistic policies, such
as nudging. In particular, it may point to the works of theorists such as Cass
Sunstein and Richard Thaler, whose aim is to design institutional provisions
that help us in overcoming undesirable patterns without resorting to the threat
or use of force.69
A Second Asymmetry Objection
In the previous chapter, I have highlighted a plausible objection to the possibility
of introducing my amendment to Hayek’s account of the spontaneous order. In
particular, it might seem that, although I argument in favour of the Hayekian
account of the spontaneous order on the ground of its ability in creating the
conditions for cooperation without requiring fine-grained institutions that would
need local and dispersed knowledge to be designed, I imply the planner’s ability
to collect such knowledge in designing institutions that can prevent derivative
distributions of rights that would compromise a community’s instrumentalist
character.
In response to such an objection, I have argued that the proposed amend-
ment does not require fully detailed knowledge of the fellow members of the
community’s preferences and goals because it does not aim at achieving spe-
cific outcomes. In particular, following Hayek’s distinction between general and
fine-grained explanations, I have been trying to show that detailed knowledge
of members of the community’s preferences and goals is required when one at-
tempts to design institutions aimed at specific outcomes, whereas general aims
can be pursued by means of general policies (e.g. redistribution of rights, pre-
venting kinds of transactions, etc.).
In this chapter, though, I have introduced a second amendment that could
69In particular, see Thaler and Sunstein (2008), and Sunstein (2014).
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posit further difficulties. In fact, I have suggested that centralised political
authorities should design and devise institutions in order to dismantle or prevent
the emergence of norms that would compromise the instrumentalist character
of cooperative enterprises. This seems far more demanding than imagining a
set of rules that would redistribute rights in a way that continuously allows
individuals to shape their social environment according to their structure of
preferences and goals. In fact, informal institutions such as social norms emerge
from a complex interactions between people’s beliefs, preferences, behaviours,
environment and formal institutions. Hence, one may plausibly object that
preventing their emergence requires the fine-grained knowledge that I deemed
as unnecessary in the previous chapter.
Once again, I wish to start responding to this objection by suggesting that
complex problems do not always require complicated solutions. In fact, the more
our solutions are complicated, the more they are sensitive to our mistakes in di-
agnosing, in a fine-grained way, what the problem is. However, one may suggest
that the further layer of complexity embedded in social norms precludes the
possibility of simple solutions, and that tackling norms unequivocally requires
fully detailed knowledge of all factors involved.
In this respect, let me offer the following example: suppose Betty owns a
very large firm, with thousands of employees. Over the past few years she has
developed an IT solution that allows them to work remotely in order to improve
their work-life balance. In fact, many employees have complained about the
long working hours in the office and how this aspect dramatically affects their
families. However, she soon realises that, despite her efforts, a large amount of
employees still maintain the same working patterns whilst complaining about
it.
Betty’s employees do not suffer from bipolar personality disorder. In fact,
they are simply subject to a social norm that pervades their workplace: they
observe other people staying long hours in the office, and they think that other
people think they should do it as well. The persistence of such a norm could be
driven by all sorts of factors: for instance, some older employees may informally
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sanction colleagues who work remotely because they used to spend long hours
in the office in their whole career and wish to perpetrate the same ordeal to
younger employees, or, perhaps, some employees might think that, by following
older colleagues working patterns, they will more likely progress in their career
paths. However, Betty is faced with the problem of improving work-life balance
in her firm, and such a problem cannot be merely resolved by means of creating
the opportunity to work remotely. In fact, creating such an opportunity has
changed very little in terms of working patterns.
Here, once again, Betty can tackle the problem in two very different ways:
she could either try to collect fine-grained information from her employees (e.g.
by asking why they continue to spend such long hours, who sanctions them,
whether they think their career path is affected by working remotely, etc.) and
tailor her solution to such information (e.g. by approaching sanctioners, or by
reassuring employees about their career paths), or try to find a solution that
would tackle the norm in a very general way: for instance, she could set as a
default position for employees to work remotely, and suggest that their presence
in the office is required only for important meetings.
Changing the default position has a number of advantages. In fact, it allows
Betty to change both empirical and normative expectations at the very same
time. More importantly, though, it does not require fine-grained knowledge of
all the factors involved in the perpetuation of the norm. In fact, whether the
norm is sustained by peer pressure, or by beliefs surrounding career paths, the
updated default position is able to dismantle it regardless of the factors involved.
This example, I suggest, clarifies that although norms are, indeed, complex
matter, and that diagnosing their causes if often a prohibitive enterprise, chang-
ing them does not necessarily require fine-grained knowledge, unless one wishes
to achieve specific outcomes.70
However, there is a further difficulty with norms that must be highlighted.
Namely, while derivative distributions of rights, that would compromise the in-
70Other examples of norms’ diagnosis, measurement and change are nicely offered by Bic-
chieri (2016).
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strumentalist character of a cooperative enterprise, can be tackled by reference
to people’s general preference for keeping their ability to shape their social en-
vironment according to their structure of preferences and goals, social norms
cannot be addressed in such a generic fashion because they apply to subgroups
of communities. As such, even though they may not require fine-grained knowl-
edge of people’s structures of preferences, they do require a certain in-depth
investigation in order to diagnose them.
Although such a difficulty makes changing or dismantling norms much more
challenging than tackling formal institutions, there is no principled epistemolog-
ical argument, from an Hayekian standpoint, that would warrant the impossi-
bility of addressing them. In fact, Hayek’s epistemological standpoint addresses
the impossibility to provide fully detailed explanations for complex problems,
and, as a consequence, to tackle them in fine-grained ways.
Conclusion
Concluding let us summarise the main points that I have addressed within the
present chapter. First, I outlined three main ways in which social norms shape
our social orders: norms regulating non-public behaviours, norms defining the
substantive contents of rights underpinned by formal laws, and norms shaping
our compliance with formal institutions.
Second, I illustrated how norms peculiarly act on our choice scenarios. In
particular, we have seen that informal sanctions increase the costs for pursuing
certain courses of actions, possibly altering our preference ranking over the
available options.
Third, we have illustrated how social norms may significantly affect our abil-
ity to shape the communities we inhabit, preventing us from conveying informa-
tion that would allow us to define specific terms of cooperation that meaningfully
respond to our structures of preferences and goals. This particular problem, we
have seen, calls for a further desideratum on theories of the spontaneous order,
which is that of preventing the emergence of norms that would dramatically
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limit our ability to shape our social environment.
Therefore, we have set two main desiderata that a sound theory of the spon-
taneous order should aim to satisfy:
(1) To prevent the emergence of distributions of rights under which
some members of the community are prevented from exercising their
social environment shaping rights.
(2) To prevent the emergence of social norms that would prevent
some members of the community from exercising their social envi-
ronment shaping rights.
In the next chapter, I shall attempt to show that a theory of the spontaneous
order that meets these two desiderata could plausibly be justified in a contrac-
tarian fashion. In fact, it requires a rather minimal agreement on institutional
arrangements that leave in the hand of members of the community the ability
to shape their specific terms of cooperation.
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Preferences For Flexibility and The
Spontaneous Order
Introduction
In the previous chapters, I offered one main critique of Hayek’s account of
the spontaneous order. Particularly, I have attempted to show that derivative
distributions of rights, emerging from individual transactions, and social norms,
arising from individual interactions, may generate states of affairs in which some
members of the community lose their ability to shape their social environment
by making it adapt to their structure of preferences and goals, thus undermining
the instrumentalist character of the community.
These problems seem to call for amendments to Hayek’s proposed institu-
tional arrangements which would allow for preserving social orders’ ability to be
continuously shaped by members of the community, in ways that meaningfully
respond to their structures of preferences and goals, in an effort to maintain our
communities as cooperative enterprises from which everyone stands to gain. In
particular, they seem to call for two main desiderata:
(1) To prevent the emergence of distributions of rights under which
some members of the community are prevented from exercising their
social environment shaping rights.
(2) To prevent the emergence of social norms that would prevent
some members of the community from exercising their social envi-
ronment shaping rights.
However, such desiderata seem to call for further justifications, as transac-
tions carried out within our communities are fully voluntary. In fact, one may
object that derivative distributions of rights bringing about states of affairs in
which some members are prevented from making their social environment adapt
to their structure of preferences and goals are emergently justified, in that they
are the expression of members’ consent.
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In the first part of the chapter, I deal with such an objection in the attempt
to show that emergent justification cannot play any plausible justificatory role
with regard to unintended derivative distributions of rights brought about by
fully voluntary interactions. In fact, I shall argue, the justificatory power of
consent is limited to particular transactions and their foreseeable results.
In the second part, I attempt to demonstrate that the two desiderata can be
justified in a contractarian fashion. Particularly, I shall attempt to show that
members of the community, who are uncertain about their future structures of
preferences and goals, could form preferences for flexibility, which are prefer-
ences for institutional arrangements that do not lay out, ex-ante, their specific
terms of cooperation. Rather, they would have reasons to endorse institutional
arrangements that leave in their hands the ability to continuously renegotiate
their terms of cooperation according to changes in their structure of preferences
and goals.
Preferences for flexibility are construed entirely in an instrumentalist fashion.
In fact, I shall attempt to show, members of the community have instrumental
reasons to make the sort of abstractions required in order to exhibit preferences
for flexibility. My argument, in a nutshell, is that the dynamic character of our
structure of preferences and goals calls for abstracting from our current set of
specific goals when making choices that have long and wide-ranging effects on
our lives.
Social Environment Shaping Rights
In the previous chapters, I have framed Hayek’s Lockean account of the sponta-
neous order as embedding the constitutive aim of creating the best conditions for
all members of the community to pursue their own goals, on the basis of their
own knowledge. In this regard, Hayek’s proposed institutional arrangements
are supposed to sustain compliance with a community’s rules in an entirely in-
strumentalist fashion. In fact, members of the community are allegedly made
able to shape their specific terms of cooperation, through the exercise of their
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social environment shaping rights protected by the set of rights underpinned
by the Lockean triad, and thus able to shape their community as cooperative
enterprises from which they stand to gain.
The instrumentalist character is not supposed to play any justificatory role.
In fact, it cannot either.71 Its relevance stems from the fact that consequentialist
theories, not merely aiming at defining a standard of rightness, leave us wanting
of an outline of basic institutional arrangements and of convincing explanations
for how compliance with such arrangements is to be sustained. Particularly,
explanations of this sort should focus on what kinds of reasons members of a
community possess to comply with a certain system of rules.
In this regard, the two critiques that I have proposed within chapters 2 and
3 tackle precisely the ability of the Lockean account of the spontaneous order
to sustain compliance with its rules in an instrumentalist fashion.
These two critiques, we have seen, focus on specific kinds of rights, to which
I referred as social environment shaping rights. The peculiarity of these rights
rests on the role they play in equipping us with the ability to convey certain
information to our fellow members of our community. Particularly, by exercising
these rights we are able to let others know on what terms we are willing to
cooperate. Consider the example concerning economic transactions which I
have previously offered. In an institutional context in which economic rights are
widely protected, prices emerge out of a large amount of voluntary interactions
among economic actors. Whenever we are in the market for an iPad worth £800,
by conveying information to other market players, through the price system,
we shape market players’ strategic choices, whose aim is to respond to our
preferences and goals.
To provide a more intuitive example that captures the social environment
shaping power of actions protected by economic rights, let us think about crowd-
funding platforms such as Kickstarter or Indiegogo. There, prospective manu-
facturers present projects that potential customers are asked to back up, through
pledges. Specifically, on the one hand of the platform, prospective manufactur-
71See, in particular, Piper (1986).
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ers show demo versions of their products, illustrating their capabilities; on the
other, customers are able to evaluate them and, eventually, pledge to buy the
item when available. Such a platform is cooperation enhancing in many ways.
In fact, it allows manufacturers to know whether their products meet customers’
needs and desires, and whether the proposed price point generates enough de-
mand in order to sustain mass production of a particular item. More relevantly
to our discussion, platforms of this kind provide customers with a certain ability
to shape the market, as their pledges determine a product’s entry on the market,
its pricing point and the quantity produced.
The social environment shaping feature of certain rights, I have claimed,
plays a crucial role in sustaining a community’s instrumentalist character. This
is due, I suggest, to the dynamism of our structure of preferences and goals.
In order to illustrate this particular aspect, let us turn back to the Dore vs
Bakewell analogy, which I proposed within the first chapter. Recall that Dore
is a relatively simple social order, where members of the community have rela-
tively stable preferences and goals such that eventual changes may be perfectly
predicted by the planner. Such predictability makes the social environment
shaping features of rights ultimately useless, as members of the community do
not need to convey information about their terms of cooperation. In fact, the
planner is already able to collect preferences and goals and to design institu-
tional arrangements which reflect people’s specific terms for cooperating. In
Bakewell, on the other hand, such a possibility is precluded. In fact, we have
seen that the dynamic structure of preferences and goals of the members of the
community makes the planner unable to design and devise systems of rules that
reflect people’s terms for cooperating. In such a scenario, cooperation depends
on the ability of members of the community to convey information to the other
members about their specific terms for cooperation, and such an ability rests
on the exercise of social environment shaping rights.
Unfortunately, there is no meaningful way to identify the set of social envi-
ronment shaping rights in more detail. This is because, I suggest, most rights
allegedly protect actions that could potentially serve as a means to convey infor-
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mation about one’s terms for cooperation, but also protect actions which would
not really serve the purpose of shaping our social environment. For instance,
aside from examples concerning economic rights, we have seen that our right to
free speech may be used to express and convey information which are needed to
find common grounds for cooperating; at the same time, our discourses may be
already happening in a context of common grounds, and thus lacking the social
environment shaping aspect.
Often, when we act within the boundaries of the protected sphere defined
by Hayek’s proposed institutional arrangements, we perform social environment
shaping actions, without really aiming to. In fact, when we are in the market
for an iPad, we are not enticed by our ability to affect market players’ strategic
choices, nor we care about it. In this regard, most social environment shaping
actions are undertaken in a rather unintentional way.
Such an unintentional character of the exercise of social environment shaping
rights helps us in clarifying the rationale of the two critiques I have previously
offered. In fact, members of the community exercising these rights may not
perceive the role that such actions play in conveying information about their
terms of cooperation, and this explains why members of a community may be
keen on selling rights or portions of these rights in exchange for some other
goods or rights that do not grant the same social environment shaping feature.
It may also explain why they may waive the exercise of these rights on the
ground of informal sanctions that they perceive as too burdensome. Moreover,
since the boundaries of our inability to convey information about our terms of
cooperation are ultimately blurry, members of the community may be unable
to discern when waiving or selling a particular right would bring about one’s
inability to shape their specific terms of cooperation in ways that meaningfully
respond to our structure of preferences and goals.
123
Emergent Justifications
The role that social environment shaping rights play or should play in theories
of the spontaneous order is of profound relevance. This is due to the partic-
ular emphasis that such theories posit on adaptations to rapid change in the
environment.72 The importance of adaptation is also implicit in the search for
institutional arrangements that possess an instrumentalist character. In fact,
we have seen that when institutional arrangements are unable to respond to
changes in our structure of preferences and goals, we may not find profitable to
continue playing our cooperative strategy. Particularly, if the chances of satisfy-
ing our own goals are not enhanced, or are reduced, by playing the cooperative
strategy, a community loses its instrumentalist character, generating grounds
for defection and resulting instability.
Within the previous chapters, we have seen that states of affairs in which
some members of the community are prevented from shaping their social en-
vironment, thus undermining a community’s instrumentalist character, can be
brought about unintentionally. Particularly, they may emerge as large-scale
consequences of individual transactions and interactions. In this regard, I have
proposed to incorporate limitations to our transactions involving social environ-
ment shaping rights in order to prevent such states of affairs from emerging.
One, however, may object that distributions of rights arising from voluntary
transactions require stronger justificatory grounds to be either prevented or
amended. In fact, they are emergently justified, by virtue of arising through
actual consent. Particularly, according to this objection, distributions of rights,
brought about by individual transactions to which members of the community
consent to, are, in themselves, expression of actual consent.
I take such an objection to carry two different implications: on the one hand,
72In this regard, it is worth re-quoting Hayek (1945):”If we can agree that the economic
problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances
of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people
who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of
the resources immediately available to meet them. We cannot expect that this problem will
be solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board which, after integrating
all knowledge, issues its orders”, p. 524.
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actual consent within individual transactions yields a strong justificatory power
which transfers to distributions of rights arising from such transactions; on the
other, derivative distributions of rights spontaneously emerge from individual
transactions that members of the community want to bring about; as such, we
should not worry about the lack of instrumentalist character within emerging
states of affairs, as they are the result of transactions that members of the
community wish to bring about, and it is unlikely that they would intentionally
commit to distributions of rights that would prevent them from shaping their
specific terms of cooperation.
In this regard, let me start by considering what emergent justifications of in-
stitutional arrangements may look like. Particularly, let me start by illustrating
a popular version of the concept of emergent justification that we can extract
from Nozick (1974):
It is not clear how those holding alternative conceptions of dis-
tributive justice can reject the entitlement conception of justice in
holdings. For suppose a distribution favoured by one of these non-
entitlement conceptions is realized. Let us suppose it is your favorite
one and let us call this distribution D1; perhaps everyone has an
equal share, perhaps shares vary in accordance with some dimen-
sion you treasure. Now suppose that Wilt Chamberlain is greatly in
demand by basketball teams, being a great gate attraction. (Also
suppose contracts run for a year, with players being free agents.)
He signs the following sort of contract with a team: In each home
game, twenty-five cents from the price of each ticket of admission
goes to him. (We ignore the question of whether he is ”gouging” the
owners, letting them look for themselves.) The season starts, and
people cheerfully attend his team’s games; they buy their tickets,
each time dropping a separate twenty-five cents of their admission
price into a special box with Chamberlain’s name on it. They are ex-
cited about seeing him play; it is worth the total admission price to
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them. Let us suppose that in one season one million persons attend
his home games, and Wilt Chamberlain winds up with $250,000, a
much larger sum than the average income and larger even than any-
one else has. Is he entitled to this income? Is this new distribution
D2 unjust? If so, why? [...] If D1 was a just distribution, and people
voluntarily moved from it to D2, transferring parts of their shares
they were given under D1 (what was it for if not to do something
with?), isn’t D2 also just? (Nozick, 1974, pp. 160-161).
Essentially, Nozick’s argument can be read as claiming that, given an initial
distribution of rights that members of a community consider as just, derivative
distributions emerging from fully just transactions will also be just. In fact,
derivative distributions of rights are said to be emergently justified, in that they
emerge from an initial just distribution, through transactions possessing a cer-
tain property P (i. e. being fully just). As a consequence, any attempt to keep
or restore the initial distribution would be either preventing just transactions
or requiring further transactions which may not be fully just.
In Chamberlain’s story, just transactions are fully voluntary transactions.
This is to say that derivative distributions of rights arising from transactions are
emergently justified as long as there is actual consent from the parties involved
in such transactions. In this regard, to keep the initial distribution would require
preventing members of a community from consenting to particular transactions,
and restoring the initial distribution would command further transactions to
which members of a community may not be willing to consent. David Schmidtz
nicely captures the strong justificatory force yielded by consent:
Actual consent has justificatory force over and beyond the teleolog-
ical force of the reasons people have for consenting. Freely given
consent is intrinsically a kind of authorization; by consenting, one
gives others a right to expect from oneself that which one has con-
sented to do, to give, or whatever.’ Nor is actual consent particularly
rare or difficult to secure within a range of typical human endeavors.
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To give an example not directly relevant to the creation of govern-
ments, we observe consent on a small scale whenever we observe an
ordinary exchange of goods between two people. What do we ordi-
narily think of as justifying such exchanges? There are two answers.
We could argue that the exchange’s results further the participants’
goals (better than their alternatives). For epistemic reasons if noth-
ing else, however, we usually are more inclined to focus on whether
the process of negotiation and exchange is unforced, not fraudulent,
and so on. In other words, when the process accords with these and
any other constraints applying to it, it fully realizes the justificatory
force latent in actual consent. The first approach is teleological,
looking to the exchange’s outcome. The second is emergent, looking
for compliance with constraints on the process by which the outcome
arises. (Schmidtz, 1990, pp. 97-98).
According to Schmidtz, actual consent seems to yield two main justificatory
features. First, there is a general presumption that fully voluntary transactions
are mutually advantageous, in that rational persons who engage in a transaction
do so in order to enhance the chances to satisfy their goals; second, outcomes
of these transactions are obtained by complying with the constraints expressed
by a certain property P, which is the property of being fully voluntary.
However, Schmidtz notices, there is one main question arising from emergent
justifications of distributions of rights emerging from actual consent. Namely, to
what extent the strong justificatory force that actual consent carries within in-
dividual transactions is transferable to large-scale distributions of rights emerg-
ing from such specific transactions.73 In fact, large-scale distribution of rights,
emerge from what Schmidtz refers to as an invisible hand processes, where indi-
vidual consent is limited to particular transactions, and cannot possibly entail
73See Schmidtz (1990):”The problem is that what people consent to are individual trans-
actions, rather than to the order that spontaneously emerges from them. In other words,
that an outcome arose by consent does not entail that people consented to it. (Analogously,
people are willingly doing what produces the greenhouse effect, but that does not mean they
are consenting to its production)” p. 100.
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consent to large-scale consequences of such transactions.
Particularly, following Cohen (1977), there are two main aspects to illustrate.
The first is concerned with the extent to which participants to a just transaction
are able to foresee the large-scale consequences on the distribution of rights that
such transactions would yield. For instance, in Chamberlain’s story, those who
buy the tickets are driven by the desire to watch Wilt Chamberlain play, and
such an outcome is brought about by the particular transaction. However, it is
not clear that, by buying a ticket, we consent to something more than watching
Wilt Chamberlain play. In fact, it is not obvious that derivative distributions of
property rights emerging from that particular transactions are something which
we are able to foresee and willing to consent to.
Second, even if participants to a just transaction are able to foresee the
particular consequences that such a transaction would yield over the larger
distribution of rights, such distribution is also brought about by other people’s
transactions over which they have no control. In fact, in Chamberlain’s story,
Wilt’s privileged position, in terms of the distribution of property rights, arises
from countless transactions over which singular participants have no bearing.
In this regard, even under the assumption that each participant engages with
specific transactions with the ability to predict the effects that each transaction
has over the larger distribution of rights and, thus consents only to those that
would produce sound outcomes, these specific instances of consent do not express
consent over the distribution of rights arising from all transactions.
In fact, suppose Alf, Betty and Wilt start with an initial endowment of £1.
Alf and Betty are extremely eager to watch Wilt play and willing to pay fifty
cents each. Such transactions carry a strong justificatory force as Alf and Betty
engage in them with the prospect of bettering their lives; moreover, both are
able to foresee the particular effect on the larger distribution of rights emerging
from their singular transactions and agree to it. Particularly, Alf consents to
making Wilt richer of fifty cents, and the same applies to Betty. However, it is
not clear that singular transactions, taking place under the assumption of Alf
and Betty’s ability to foresee the large-scale consequences on the distribution of
128
rights of each transaction, express also their consent to the distributive outcome
arising from both transactions. Alf may be consenting to make Wilt richer of
fifty cents but his consent is limited to the distributive outcome which that
particular transaction yields. In fact, he may find a distributive outcome in
which Wilt’s endowment amounts to £2 unacceptable, and the same applies to
Betty.
In such a scenario, the distributive outcome would be emergently justified as
it arises from fully voluntary transactions. However, actual consent to singular
transactions and to the outcome that singular transactions generate, does not
carry any justificatory power when dealing with large scale consequences of all
transactions. Clearly, Alf and Betty may be content with the overall distributive
outcome of both transactions, but, if they are, they are so by accident, and not
through a process of deliberation that sees them as multilaterally consenting to
the outcome.
Considerations emerging from Wilt Chamberlain’s example, help us in elu-
cidating the critiques that I have offered within the previous chapters. In fact,
it should be now clear that consent to particular transactions cannot imply a
consent to derivative distributions of rights. Consent to small-scale transactions
does not merely fail in justifying unforeseeable outcomes generated by singular
transactions, but also fail in justifying outcomes generated by all sorts of trans-
actions, over which we have no control. This, once again, helps us in explaining
why members of a community who are motivated to keep their ability to convey
information about their terms of cooperation may still consent to particular
transactions involving social environment shaping rights, and also why states of
affairs in which they lose such an ability may be brought about without their
consent. We may also notice that similar implications apply to the critique
offered in the third chapter. In fact, our choice not to exercise social environ-
ment shaping rights, on the ground of informal sanctions, does not, in itself,
constitute an instance of consent to states of affairs generated by such a choice.
Moreover, one may argue, our choice not to exercise social environment shaping
rights, may be driven by informal sanctions which would make our decision to
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waive the exercise of a particular right as less than fully voluntary.
This brings us to the conclusion that actual consent to small-scale transac-
tions plays no justificatory role at all with respect to derivative distributions
of rights. In fact, on the one hand, the justificatory power of actual consent
cannot be transferred to derivative distributions of rights; on the other, there is
no guarantee that consent to individual transactions shall generate large-scale
distributive patterns that would preserve the instrumentalist character of our
communities. In fact, even if members of the community share an interest in
preserving it, large-scale distributive patterns cannot be said to be the result of
their actual consent.
If the sort of invisible hand emergent justification Nozick seeks to provide in
Chamberlain’s example fails in delivering any justification to large-scale emerg-
ing distributive patterns, Schmidtz invites us to consider another alternative.
Particularly, he asks to consider the possibility of contractarian versions of emer-
gent justifications:
Consider contractarianism as a theory about how emergent justifica-
tion might work. In a contractarian bargaining process, members of
a large group seek a collective agreement. Consent to the agreement
is taken as a sign that the agreement is mutually advantageous. It is
by no means a guarantee, however. (At least, it does not guarantee
ex post advantage, which is presumably what bargainers really care
about.) People enter the agreement without the benefit of hindsight.
Nor does actual consent presuppose rationality in the idealized way
that hypothetical consent does. But actual consent carries emer-
gent force regardless, so long as, for example, failures of foresight
are not due to fraud. [. . . ] Contractarian accounts of the state’s
emergence are distinguishable, at least in a rough sense, from invis-
ible hand accounts. In contractarian models, intentional collective
actions leads to an intended and mutually agreeable result. In invis-
ible hand models, bargaining occurs among shifting and relatively
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small subsets of the collective. The larger scheme of stable society
evolves through a series of relatively small-scale exchanges and is an
unintended result of such exchanges. There are various agreements
between individuals, but there is nothing resembling an agreement
to create the emerging social order. The social order emerges spon-
taneously. (Schmidtz, 1990, pp. 98-99).
Contractarian bargaining procedures, I shall argue, offer us a valuable frame-
work to cast our concerns about emerging distributions of rights that may un-
dermine the instrumentalist character of our communities. However, before I
get to this point, I wish to contend, contrary to Schmidtz, that contractarian
accounts too may prove ineffective in justifying larger schemes spontaneously
emerging from individuals’ transactions, once the set of rules bargainers agree
upon is made to work. In fact, bargainers’ collective action, alone, solves only
one part of the problem connected to invisible hand emergent justifications.
Particularly, it only responds to our worry about large-scale consequences be-
ing brought about by individual transactions which are not under everyone’s
control. However, it leaves open the problem of justifying unforeseeable larger
schemes arising from individual interactions, allowed by the set of rules on which
bargainers have converged.
In order to show this, let us consider two different bargaining solutions. In
the first, Alf, Betty and Wilt converge on a certain distribution of rights; in the
second, they further stipulate that certain patterns, eventually arising out from
their interactions, allowed by the initial distribution of rights, will be ruled out,
either by means of preventing them from engaging in certain transactions or by
restoring a certain distribution of rights after such transactions occur. These
two agreements differ in one main crucial respect; namely, the first solution is
exclusively concerned with setting constraints on what counts as a legitimate
transaction, whereas the second engages also with patterns eventually arising
from such transactions. Although such a difference seems to rest merely upon
the extension of the object of the agreement, it is also a difference in kind. In
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fact, by looking at patterns, bargainers transform the emergent justification of
the procedure into a sort of teleological justification. Particularly, they define a
set of states of affairs that a certain distribution of rights may justifiably bring
about, and rule out a set of illegitimate patterns.
This brings with it interesting differences with respect to the extension of
the justification provided by actual consent within the bargaining procedure.
Specifically, while the first solution can hardly be said to justify unintended
patterns arising from Alf, Betty and Wilt’s transactions, allowed by the distri-
bution of rights they have agreed to, the second, extends its justificatory scope
to states of affairs arising from such transactions. In this regard, the more the
agreement of the bargaining procedure leaves the door open for derivative and
unintended distributive patterns over which members of the community have no
meaningful control, the less actual consent can transfer its justificatory power to
states of affairs eventually arising from individual transactions. In fact, consent
consistently applies to the object of the agreement, but its justificatory power
does not equally apply to derivative distributive patterns over which Alf, Betty
and Wilt have no control.
Contractarian accounts, I suggest, are rather peculiar justificatory devices,
as they, de facto, handle to bargainers to the task of outlining the structure
of justification of social orders, whether emergent or teleological. In fact, they
may be looked at as two stages justificatory devices: a first stage, which defines
the properties that bargaining procedures should possess (e.g. how consent is to
be exercised, how bargainers come to an agreement, etc.), and which eventually
determines the emergent character of the agreement, and a second stage which
hands to bargainers the decision about the structure of their agreement, which
could take either an emergent or a teleological form.
The problem lies in that if the structure of the agreement takes an emergent
form, like in Alf, Betty and Wilt’s first solution, unless patterns arising from
their interactions are entirely foreseeable, the justificatory power of the agree-
ment cannot be meaningfully transferred to such patterns. On the other hand,
if patterns are entirely foreseeable, the structure of the agreement comes to take
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a teleological form, for Alf, Betty and Wilt, by agreeing to a set of rules that
can only bring about a certain set of patterns, also agree on which patterns can
be brought about and which have to be ruled out.
In this regard, one may wonder to what extent Alf, Betty and Wilt’s second
solution is an instance of emergent justification. Surely, it emerges from bargain-
ers’ actual consent and, most importantly, is the result of bargainers’ collective
action, which answers to parts of our concerns about invisible hand accounts
of emergent justification (i.e. large-scale consequences are brought about by a
collective action involving all agents simultaneously, rather than emerging from
individual transactions). However, what provides extended justificatory scope
to their agreement is the fact that it assumes a teleological form; for if it did
not, states of affairs unintentionally brought about by their interactions, allowed
by the scheme of rules they have converged upon, would hardly be justified by
their agreement. This, I think, carries interesting implications with respect to
the reach of emergent justifications, for it shows that if we seek to justify larger
schemes emerging from individual transactions, contractarian accounts, in prin-
ciple, are unable to respond to our worries, unless the bargainers’ agreement
takes a teleological form. I find such an aspect of particular relevance for the
purpose of the present work, as it shows that if we are to provide a contractar-
ian justification of a theory of the spontaneous order, the mere agreement on
a Lockean distribution of rights is unable to justify derivative distributions of
rights in which some members of the community are prevented from exercising
social environment shaping rights that allow them to convey information about
their terms of cooperation. In fact, such a state of affairs might be unintention-
ally brought about through an invisible hand process, which fails to provide any
substantive justification to derivative distributions of rights.
Contractarianism: Abstraction and Instrumentalism
In the previous chapters, I have highlighted the instrumentalist character that
Hayek ascribes to the Lockean distribution of rights. In particular, we have seen
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that the protected sphere of action these rights grant to us, allegedly allows
members of a community to shape their specific terms of cooperation, and, in
turn, equip them with reason to comply with the community’s rules, as members
see their community as an enterprise from which they stand to gain.
These aspects provide the Lockean account of the spontaneous order with
a contractarian nuance. In fact, if institutional arrangements purported by the
theory equip members of the community with instrumental reasons to comply
with them, then such an arrangement could be said to represent a plausible
solution to a bargaining procedure where agents come to define terms of co-
operation. On a more general level, we could notice that all instrumentalist
theories could be backed up by a contractarian justification, as they represent,
at least, plausible solutions to a bargaining procedure.
Moreover, Hayek’s arguments highlighting the uniquely suited position of
the Lockean distribution of rights in enhancing members of the community’s
chances to satisfy their own goals on the basis of their local knowledge, may
suggest that Hayek envisages his proposed institutional arrangements as the
best solution to a contractarian bargaining procedure among agents exhibiting
widely different standpoints. However, Sugden notices, contractarian theories
need not be that ambitious. Particularly, he argues:
A more modest form of contractarianism is possible, which does not
seek to design the institutions of a whole society according to wholly
external standards of rationality. Rather, the object is to evaluate
possible changes in the institutions of an existing society, using a
criterion of agreement that is defined relative to the knowledge and
the conventions that prevail in that society. Thus the question is
not, ”Is this society one that we would have chosen in some state
of nature?” Rather; it is: ”Given where we are, can we agree to
continue to live by these existing rules; or if not, can we agree to
any changes?” (Sugden, 1993, p. 421).
Sugden further claims that this less ambitious form of contractarianism also
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captures Hayek’s theory of the spontaneous order which he finds to represent
an ”agreement among individuals within an ongoing social order, rather than
among rational agents who stand outside any particular society”. (Sugden,
1993, p. 393).
One way to articulate Sugden’s claim is to argue that Hayek’s theory of
the spontaneous order is not captured by a one-shot bargaining procedure
where members of a community get to agree on institutional arrangements
but rather by hypothetical and infinitely repeated bargaining procedures tak-
ing place within an initial position that resembles members of the community’s
actual position and from which they continuously negotiate better terms of
cooperation. According to this view, hypothetical agreements should be seen
as sequential coordination games in which members of the community identify
changes to their terms of cooperation that would represent Pareto-improvements
and decide to converge on them. The problem with such an interpretation is
that changes to members of the community’s terms of cooperation, within the
spontaneous order, do not really take place through bargaining procedures, but
rather through an invisible hand process shaped by the individual exercise of
social environment shaping rights (e.g. right to transact, rights of expression).
States of affairs arising from invisible hand processes, then, can hardly be seen
as solutions to coordination games as members of the community do not really
get to agree on them.
In this regard, another way to cast Sugden’s point is to argue that con-
tractarian agreements on institutional arrangements need not to be backed up
by external standards of rationality, and that, as such, a contractarian justifi-
cation of Hayek’s theory of the spontaneous order could be provided without
resorting to idealised bargainers that stand outside the ongoing social order.
According to such a view, actual members of a community, from their actual
standpoints, could potentially converge on the institutional arrangements pur-
ported by Hayek’s theory of the spontaneous order.
The approach I have just highlighted is the one that I wish to follow in
arguing in favour of an amended version of the Lockean account of the spon-
135
taneous order, which includes the two desiderata that I have outlined within
the previous chapters. Before I get to this point, however, I need to clarify a
few aspects. Particularly, I need to articulate more on the distinction between
approaches to social contract embodying external standards of rationality and
on why, alongside with Sugden, I take external standards of rationality as ulti-
mately unable to serve the purpose of justifying institutional arrangements that
possess an instrumentalist character.
In this regard, let me start by briefly outlining the idea of employing external
standards of rationality within social contract theories. In order to do this, I
suggest, we may start by looking at the ways in which theorists model agents
within bargaining procedures, and, in particular, at the ways in which they
model agents’ moral motivations. This aspect, indeed, constitutes the turning
point that allows us to distinguish between Kantian approaches, such as those
undertaken by Thomas Scanlon and John Rawls, and Hobbesian accounts, de-
veloped by theorists such as David Gauthier and Jan Narveson.74
The Kantian tradition, which is usually referred to as contractualism, frames
social contract agreements as taking place among agents who find themselves al-
ready in a moral domain. Particularly, contractualist theorists follow two main
routes: the first consists in imagining bargaining scenarios in which agents have
already internalised a certain moral principle (e. g. the principle of moral equal-
ity), the second consists in designing bargaining scenarios in which agents are
required to abstract from a range of information specific to their own identities,
such as to assume a standpoint that is ultimately different from the one they
would exhibit in light of their own particular circumstances.
The first route, within the Kantian tradition, is the one developed by Scan-
lon, whose contractualist account is based on the concept of reasonableness,
rather than mere instrumental rationality, where reasonableness is meant to
capture our respect for others as morally free and equal persons. Particularly,
Scanlon outlines a framework of justification according to which rightness and
74In particular, I have in mind Scanlon (1998) and Rawls (1971) on the one hand, and
Gauthier (1986) and Narveson (1988) and (2001), on the other.
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wrongness of principles are grounded on the concept of reasonable rejectability:
In the contractualist analysis of right and wrong, what is presup-
posed first and foremost is the aim of finding principles that others
who share this aim could not reasonably reject. This aim then brings
other reasons in its train. Given this aim, for example, it would be
unreasonable to give the interests of others no weight in deciding
which principles to accept. (Scanlon, 1998, p. 192).
Scanlon’s principle of reasonable rejectability, as a tool to adjudicate the
soundness of other principles, follows one’s internalisation of the principle of
moral equality. In particular, Scanlon suggests that we all, qua member of
humanity, should recognise that other agents possess the same moral worth and
that, as such, our deliberation procedures in assessing rightness and wrongness
of principles, must capture the fact of our equal moral worth. The device of
reasonable rejectability, thus emerges from our search for justificatory devices
that best capture the fact of equal moral worth.
Such a contractualist framework of justification, thus presupposes that agents,
who come to a bargaining procedure already care about formulating principles
that other could not reasonably reject. And agents care precisely because they
have internalised the principle of equal moral worth, which, in turn, would equip
them with instrumental reasons to choose the device of reasonable rejectability
in assessing rightness and wrongness of other principles.75
The obvious limit with Scanlon’s account consists in that the internalisation
of the principle of moral worth, which should provide bargainers with instrumen-
tal reasons to care about other people’s standpoints, does not obtain through
instrumental reasons. In fact, agents’ ability to internalise the principle of moral
worth is contingent on three main aspects: first, on our ability to grasp it; sec-
ond, on our ability to identify the reason-giving force of moral judgments; third,
75It is important to notice that Scanlon is not really concerned with social contract bar-
gaining procedures, nor his form of contractualism is directed at generating decisions on in-
stitutional arrangements. In fact, the theory is mostly concerned with moral principles rather
than political decisions. However, the ways in which he frames the contractualist framework
is helpful in illustrating the concept of external standards of rationality.
137
on our ability to see the priority of the reason-giving force of moral demands
over other considerations (e.g. one’s reason to promote his well-being).
Therefore, if agents fail in one of those enterprises, they enter the bargaining
scenario without instrumental reasons for endorsing the principle of reasonable
rejectability as the main adjudicatory device in assessing the rightness or wrong-
ness of other principles. If they do, the outcome of the bargaining procedure is
ultimately indeterminate, as agents would disagree about the optimal adjudi-
catory device and, in turn, on which principles would be ultimately right and
wrong.
If, on the other hand, bargainers are demanded to assess the rightness and
wrongness of principles through the device of reasonable rejectability, despite
not having internalised the principle of moral worth, their choices will lack
normative force once they bargaining procedure is over. In fact, agents will lack
instrumental reasons to comply with principles chosen through the device of
reasonable rejectability precisely because they fail to internalise the principle of
moral worth.
In this regard, if one is to assess Scanlon’s theory from an instrumentalist
standpoint, one is faced with a dilemma: in fact, either the outcome of the
bargaining procedure is indeterminate, in that bargainers strongly disagree on
the appropriateness of the device of reasonable rejectability in assessing the
rightness and wrongness of principles, insofar as they disagree on the normative
relevance of the principle of moral worth, or principles chosen through the device
of reasonable rejectability will lack normative force once the procedure is over,
as agents would fail to form instrumental reasons to comply with them.
The second path, within the contractualist tradition, is the one traced by
Rawls, whose account of the original position surely represents the most influen-
tial design of a social contract bargaining procedure. Rawls asks us to imagine
a hypothetical situation in which agents come to agree on a set of rules or
principles defining their terms of cooperation.76 The peculiarity of the original
76Particularly, Rawls writes: ”It is clear, that the original position is a purely hypothet-
ical situation. Nothing resembling it need ever take place, although we can by deliberately
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position lies in that agents are required to abstract from a range of information
specific to their own identity and their position within their existing society.
More specifically:
No one knows his place in society, his class position or social status;
nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets
and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again,
does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his
rational plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology
such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism.
More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular
circumstance of their own society. That is, they do not know its
economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture
it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have
no information as to which generation they belong. (Rawls, 1999, p.
118).
Agents within the original position find themselves behind a veil of igno-
rance that shapes their instrumental reasons for converging on the two princi-
ples of justice Rawls’ highlights.77 Particularly, although Rawls models agents’
psychology as mutually disinterested, the exclusion of a range of information
concerning agents’ own identities and positions within existing societies from
the choice scenario, deliver us a bargaining solution that captures an account of
justice as fairness. In fact, Rawls clarifies:
The original position is defined in such a way that it is a status quo
in which any agreements reached are fair. It is a state of affairs in
which the parties are equally represented as moral persons and the
outcome is not conditioned by arbitrary contingencies or the relative
balance of social forces. Thus justice as fairness is able to use the
following the constraints it expresses simulate the reflection of the parties” Rawls (1999, p.
104).
77Rawls (1999), p. 52.
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idea of pure procedural justice from the beginning. (Rawls, 1999, p.
104).
The main benefit coming from Rawls’ original position, compared to Scan-
lon’s account, consist in that it aptly responds to problems connected to moral
and political disagreement within the bargaining procedure. In fact, while Scan-
lon’s account leaves the door open for disagreement insofar as bargainers may
fail to internalise the principle of moral equality, which in turn equips them with
instrumental reasons to choose the principle of reasonable rejectability as the
main justificatory device, Rawls, by making bargainers abstract from arbitrary
contingencies, is able to frame a bargaining scenario in which agents exhibit
similar standpoints.
All agents, regardless of their moral motivations, stemming from arbitrary
contingencies, will be able to converge on the two principles of justice once the
veil of ignorance is made to work. In fact, through abstraction, all bargainers
come to possess the very same structure of preferences and goals and their
agreement is, thus, secured.
Therefore, differently from Scanlon, Rawls seems not to presuppose that
agents have internalised the principle of moral equality once the veil of igno-
rance is made to work. In fact, parties to the bargaining procedure are supposed
to ’discover’ the principles of justice through the bargaining procedure. Con-
vergence on the two principles of justice he envisages, indeed, does not allegedly
emerge from a moral commitment to the idea of moral equality, but rather con-
stitutes a Nash equilibrium reached by parties who are mutually disinterested.
However, abstraction comes at a cost. In particular, there are two main
worries linked to employing abstractions in modeling agents within a bargain-
ing scenario: first, there is a concern with respect to the doubly hypothetical
character of the outcome; second, there is a worry about the meaningfulness of
choices made by abstracting from morally arbitrary features. The first worry,
introduced by Dworkin (1975), suggests that the result of a hypothetical bar-
gaining procedure, among hypothetical agents, could hardly be said to be bind-
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ing. In fact, there is no reason to suppose that we would assign any normative
force to a contract hypothetically signed by other agents, on our behalf, with-
out our authorisation.78 The second worry, on the other hand, questions agents’
ability to make meaningful choices behind thick veils of ignorance such as the
one Rawls introduces in framing his bargaining scenario. This latter objection is
twofold: on the one hand, it is claimed, persons are unable to entirely abstract
from some of their peculiar features and, thus, unable to come to the bargaining
procedure entirely untied from their conception of the good; on the other, even if
agents could succeed in abstracting from morally arbitrary features, the choices
they make would lack meaningfulness, in that they would leave aside consid-
erations that are incredibly relevant to their choice about social institutions.
Particularly, Sandel argues:
The original position achieves too much detachment from human
circumstances, that the initial situation it describes is too abstract
to yield the principles Rawls says it would, or for that matter, any
determinate principles at all. Such an objection would most likely
take issue with the veil of ignorance on the grounds that it excludes
morally relevant information, information necessary to generate any
meaningful results. It would argue that the notion of the person
embedded in the original position is too formal and abstract, too
78Particularly, Dworkin claims that an ”hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of
an actual contract; it is no contract at all” (Dworkin, 1975, p. 18). However, it is important
to notice that such a critique partially misses the target with respect to Rawls’ intent with the
original position. In fact, as Freeman argues, the original position is not intended to secure
an agreement that binds us, but rather to make us reflect on fair terms of cooperation among
free and equal persons:”The original position (like social contract doctrine generally) is not
intended to bind us to any promise we might make. Rather its purpose is to clarify what
we now think and are committed to believe, assuming that we conceive of ourselves as free
and equal citizens and have a willingness to cooperate with others as equals on grounds of
mutual respect. The conception of justice the parties would adopt identifies, Rawls believes,
the conception of justice that we regard - here and now - as fair and supported by the best
reasons (PL, 26). Rawls presumes that as members of a democratic society we in fact think
of ourselves as free and equal citizens, and that we are drawn to affirm the idea of a well-
ordered society as an ideal of fair social cooperation among free and equal people like ourselves.
These are ”ideas of practical reason” implicit in the political consciousness of members of a
democratic society (see PL, 107, 110). The point of a social contract in the original position is
to clarify the implications of these ideas and democratic ideals we endorse”. (Freeman, 2007,
p. 344.
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detached from contingency to account for the requisite motivations.
Where the first objection complains that the thin theory of the good
too thick to be fair, the second contends that the veil of ignorance
is too opaque to yield a determinate solution. (Sandel, 1982, pp.
27-28).
Sandel’s claim is of particular interest as it seems to suggest that either there
is no place for rational decision making behind thick veils of ignorance, or that
rational decision making would lead to results that lack meaning, as bargainers
lack orientation from the sort of things that mostly matter to their lives: namely,
their conception of the good, alongside with the goals that it makes salient to
them. In order to capture Sandel’s critique, we may imagine a choice scenario
in which are to pick between two alternative routes but we lack an ultimate
purpose to reach either destinations. Surely, there may be objective grounds
to evaluate the two options. For instance, one route may be shorter than the
other, or presenting less obstacles; however, such objective assessments would
still lack meaningful guidance with respect to our destination.
Rawls has an answer to Sandel’s point, which takes the form of a list of goods,
the primary goods, that rational persons are supposed to want whatever their
goals are.79 The list is meant to provide guidance to members of a community
in choosing the basic structure of their cooperative enterprise.80
79Particularly, Rawls specifies the list as follows: ”First, the basic liberties as given by a list,
for example: freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; freedom of association; and the
freedom defined by the liberty and integrity of the person, as well as by the rule of law; and
finally the political liberties. Second, freedom of movement and choice of occupation against
a background of diverse opportunities; Third, powers and prerogatives of offices and position
of responsibility, particularly those in the main political and economic institutions; Fourth,
income and wealth; and Finally, the social basis of self respect”. (Rawls, 1982, p. 362).
80In particular, he suggests: ”Therefore how can they reach a sensible decision [on the
principles of justice]? One might reply that the rationality of a person’s choice does not depend
upon how much he knows, but only upon how well he reasons from whatever information he
has, however incomplete. Our decision is perfectly rational provided that we face up to our
circumstances and do the best we can. Thus the parties can in fact make a rational decision,
and surely some of the alternative conceptions of justice are better than others. Nevertheless,
the thin theory of the good which the parties are assumed to accept shows that they should
try to secure their liberty and self-respect, and that, in order to advance their aims, whatever
these are, they normally require more rather than less of the other primary goods. In entering
into the original agreement, then, the parties suppose that their conceptions of the good have
a certain structure, and this is sufficient to enable them to choose principles on a rational
basis”. (Rawls, 1999, p. 349).
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However, one might suggest that Sandel’s objection is somehow robust to
Rawls’ response. In fact, whether or not Rawls’ list of primary goods equips
bargainers with sufficient information to converge on a set of principles of justice,
once the bargaining solution is achieved, agents start to evaluate their choice
under the light of their own actual circumstances. In particular, they evaluate
principles of justice in the light of their own actual conception of the good, of
their own talents, of their own relative position in society, and may question the
meaningfulness of their choices taken behind the veil of ignorance.
For instance, suppose bargainers are to deliberate about how to distribute
property rights on a currently unowned piece of land. When bargainers abstract
away from arbitrary contingencies, their choice is guided by Rawls’ list of pri-
mary goods. Particularly, they are to rationally deliberate on a distribution of
property rights of the land that maximises their fair share of primary goods.
Once the decision is taken, though, Betty realises that the distributive principle
she picked behind the veil of ignorance does not reflect her actual instrumental
reasons. Suppose, indeed, she has personal motives for claiming the property of
a particular piece of that land, which has been assigned to another member of
the community. Particularly, suppose she has sentimental attachment to it or
that she has a personal project that can only take place in that particular part of
the land. These personal motives are exactly the sort of arbitrary contingencies
that the veil of ignorance requires us to strip away. Yet, they are an important
source of instrumental reasons for deliberation. Betty, indeed, may perceive
that instrumental reasons that apply to her behind the veil of ignorance, differ
from instrumental reasons that apply to her under the light of arbitrary contin-
gencies. In fact, were she able to take into account her sentimental attachments
or her personal projects, she would have picked a different distributive principle.
Rawls attempts to respond to this problem by resorting to idea of strains of
commitment to the principles chosen behind the veil of ignorance. Particularly,
he argues that the requirement of strict compliance is already embedded within
the bargaining scenario. In fact, he claims:
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Agents are rational in that they will not enter into agreements they
know they cannot keep, or can do so only with great difficulty. Along
with other considerations, they count the strains of commitment.
Thus, in assessing conceptions of justice the persons are to assume
that the one they adopt will be strictly complied with. (Rawls, 1999,
p. 129).
Parties to the bargaining procedure are thus supposed to work out the basic
structure of their terms of cooperation so as to assure that they converge on
principles that shall generate universal support, such that the agreement is not
reached in vain.
However, one might wonder how are agents to evaluate their strains of com-
mitment given that they do not have access to the arbitrary contingencies that
give rise to their instrumental reasons. In this regard, Rawls argues that strains
of commitment do not come from evaluating the two principles under the light
of arbitrary contingencies, for arbitrary contingencies are irrelevant from the
standpoint of justice. Particularly, he claims that the aim of the veil of igno-
rance is ’to rule out those principles that it would be rational to propose for
acceptance, however little the chance of success, only if one knew certain things
that are irrelevant from the standpoint of justice’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 17).
This answer, though, poses obvious limits if one is to assess Rawls’ theory
from an instrumentalist standpoint. In fact, if agents are to evaluate their
commitment to the principles of justice, from the standpoint of justice, the veil
of ignorance becomes morally loaded, for one needs to internalise the demands of
justice in order to enter the bargaining procedure and to place herself behind the
veil of ignorance. In fact, one may internalise different demands and object that
the level of abstraction Rawls demands to bargainers is ultimately unwarranted.
In this regard, the advantages of Rawls’ original position over Scanlon’s con-
tractualism are only apparent. For the sort of moral and political disagreement
that the original position is able to accommodate is reintroduced in the form
of disagreement about the demands of justice one is to internalise in order to
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place herself behind the veil of ignorance. More specifically, people who in-
ternalise different demands of justice, shaped by one’s own conception of the
good, will propose different bargaining scenarios, incorporating different levels
of abstraction, or perhaps no abstraction at all.
This poses a sort of trilemma: in fact, if bargainers are forced to abstract,
they may find hard to pick principles they will strictly comply with, under the
light of instrumental reasons provided by arbitrary contingencies (as they do not
have access to them); if bargainers are to evaluate their strains of commitment
under the light of instrumental reasons provided by arbitrary contingencies,
they may find it hard to agree on a common set of principles; if abstraction
is undertaken on a voluntary basis, bargainers, who fail to internalise Rawls’
intuitions about justice as fairness, shall disagree on the level of abstraction
required by the bargaining procedure about the basic structure of their terms
of cooperation.
There is, indeed, an important trade-off between the thickness of the veil of
ignorance we posit on bargainers, in modelling social contract bargaining sce-
narios, and the normative relevance of the outcome of the bargaining procedure
to actual persons. Particularly, the more we demand actual members of the
community to abstract from their arbitrary contingencies, the more we design
impersonal reasons that guide their choice in deliberating about the basic struc-
ture of our society, either in the form of primary goods or by assuming their
internalisation of the principle of moral equality, the less the outcome of the
bargaining procedure will carry normative relevance to them, from their own
actual standpoint.
It is this concern toward thick veils of ignorance that drives theorists in the
Hobbesian tradition, such as Gauthier and Narveson, to develop contractarian
accounts that attempt to ground the possibility of an agreement on instrumental
rationality. Particularly, Gauthier attempts to offer:
A contractarian rationale for distinguishing what one may and may
not do. Moral principles are introduced as the object of fully volun-
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tary ex ante agreement among rational persons. Such an agreement
is hypothetical, in supposing a pre-moral context for the adoption of
moral rules and practices. But the parties to agreement are real, de-
terminate individuals, distinguished by their capacities, situations,
and concerns. In so far as they would agree to constrain on their
choices, restraining the pursuit of their interests, they acknowledge
a distinction between what they may and may not do. As rational
persons understanding the structure of their interactions, they rec-
ognize a place for mutual constraint, and so for a moral dimension.
(Gauthier, 1986, p. 9).
Theorists in the Hobbesian tradition, thus, seek to construe contractarian
justificatory frameworks that do not require abstraction from one’s arbitrary
contingencies. In fact, their attempt is to find unique solutions to bargaining
scenarios in which bargainers are not required to internalise moral principles,
whose normative relevance they fail to grasp. Agents, indeed, come to the
bargaining procedure with their own instrumental reasons, shaped by their own
structures of preferences and goals, guiding their choice over their terms of
cooperation.
The underlying assumption of theorists such as Gauthier and Narveson is
that agents are instrumentally motivated to find an agreement over cooperation-
enhancing platforms, as without such an agreement they would be worse-off from
their own personal standpoint.81 Therefore, moral and political disagreement
do not undermine the possibility of a contractarian agreement, provided that
the terms of cooperation give each and every member instrumental reasons to
comply with them. Which is to say, under the condition that members of the
community see their cooperative enterprise as an enterprise from which they
stand to gain.
This approach is the one I intend to follow in order to provide a contractarian
81See Narveson (1988), when he claims that our instrumental reasons to find a cooperation
enhancing agreement are due to the fact that ’we are vulnerable to the depredation of others,
and second because we can all benefit from cooperation’, p. 148.
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justification of the amended version of the Lockean account of the spontaneous
order. Unlike Gauthier and Narveson, though, I attempt to model agents as
engaging in some sort of abstraction from their structure of preferences and
goals when dealing with contractarian bargaining scenarios. However, differ-
ently from Rawls, I attempt to show that agents have instrumental reasons to
abstract. Particularly, I suggest that agents see the sort of abstraction I out-
line as ultimately serving their interests in maintaining their ability to shape
their social environment in ways that adapt to the dynamic character of their
preferences and goals over their lifetime.
Preferences For Flexibility
What emerges from the previous section is that in framing our bargaining sce-
nario we must be careful in considering trade-offs connected to abstraction.
Particularly, we must make sure that the veil of ignorance we posit on our bar-
gainers, in order to secure the possibility of an agreement, does not undermine
the normative relevance (to actual persons) of solutions to the bargaining pro-
cedure. In this section, I wish to show that there is some plausible level of
abstraction that would meet such a desideratum. Moreover, I argue, such a
proposal has one crucial advantage: namely, it can be justified in an instrumen-
talist fashion, that is to say that rational persons have instrumental reasons for
employing this level of abstractions when making certain kinds of choices, in-
cluding choices about basic institutional settings of our communities. In fact, I
wish to suggest, we employ this level of abstraction when facing many important
choices within our lives.
In order to illustrate this point, let me start by considering a choice scenario
concerning educational choices for our children. When we are to pick among
different schools for our children often we lack specific goals. We may have a
vision of them twenty years from now, but such a vision is ultimately blurry;
our goal is to see them fully realised and happy but we are unable to tell what is
going to take for them to flourish. For instance, they may flourish as astronauts,
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academic philosophers or chefs, but we lack solid grounds to predict it and, thus,
are unable to tie our educational choice to a precise pattern. Surely, we may
have a job in mind for them, but if we attempt to think about their educational
choices under the light of their inclinations, our decision would probably be
aiming at maximising their opportunities, leaving to them the chance to shape
their lives in due course.
The same applies to our own educational choices. Particularly, when we
approach college, we may still be uncertain about what sorts of career path we
wish for ourselves. We are mature enough to have a general life plan, or to have
a set of preferences and goals that rules out certain options and make others
salient, but, ultimately, we may come to this choice with the awareness that,
whatever specific inclination we have here and now, our structure of preferences
and goals is dynamic and that, as such, making educational choices that tie us
to present inclinations could drive our life pattern to very undesirable directions.
To show this particular aspect, imagine Betty is passionate about acting and
that she is offered a position at a great acting academy in Bakewell. At the
same time, she has successfully applied for a prestigious Law School in Dore.
The choice scenario that Betty faces is quite challenging as she knows that her
structure of preferences and goals, here and now, would make her choose the
acting academy over the law school but, at the very same time, she recognises
that such a choice would dramatically restrict her life path. Were she ever
going to change her mind about being an actress, the skills gained at the acting
academy would hardly be transferable to other careers and her position on
other job markets would be disadvantageous compared to the prospects of a law
degree. Moreover, although she has a preference for the acting academy, she is
able to grasp the relevance of an education in law, in that she sees the good
that such an educational pattern would bring to her. In Agnes Callard’s words,
Betty also exhibits an ’aspiration’ toward being a law school student as she
can grasp the relevance of the values associated with that path.82 She may not
82See Callard (2018), in which she develop a truly fascinating account of what an aspiration
is. In particular, she captures the idea of aspiration as a cognitive state in which we grasp the
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entirely like what she knows about being a law student and a lawyer afterwards,
and that is part of the reasons why she still prefers the acting academy, but she
also knows that by cultivating the values of which she grasps the relevance, she
may come to appreciate her life as a law student, and associated career paths,
more fully.
The first interesting aspect of Betty’s scenario is that the choice she faces
cannot be made by merely taking into consideration the specific goals she has
here and now, as she knows that educational choices are long-ranging, in that
they are to accommodate for changes in our structure of preferences and goals in
the distant future. In fact, choosing our education is not like choosing courses at
the restaurant: there, we have a precise layout of the available options and the
eventual uncertainty linked to dishes we have never tasted is of minor impor-
tance, as our choice is not supposed to accommodate for changes in our tastes in
the future. In fact, choosing courses at the restaurant merely restricts our op-
portunity set for that particular meal. There is no need to be forward-looking as
that particular choice will not affect our future choices. It is this particular need
to accommodate for future and yet partially unknown goals that makes Betty’s
choice so problematic. In fact, on the one hand she possesses a clear preference
for the acting academy, on the other she is aware of the dynamic character of
her structure of preferences and goals. Since the educational choice is supposed
to have long ranging effects, in that it shall affect her future opportunities, she
has to find a way to account for them.
What makes choices concerning educational paths peculiar, though, is not
merely their long-ranging nature but also their wide-ranging implications. In
fact, we may imagine scenarios in which choices with long-ranging effects only
marginally affect our set of opportunities. Suppose, indeed, Betty is asked to
choose a brand of jeans she will be committed to wear for the rest of her life.
Surely, her preferences may change in due course, such that she may regret hav-
ing chosen one brand over the other, but her decision would only negligibly affect
her life. This is due not merely to the triviality of the object of Betty’s choice,
relevance of some particular enterprise even though we are unable to fully assess its merits.
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but also to the fact that such a decision concerns a hermetically sealed com-
partment of her life, which would hardly generate repercussions on meaningful
facets. Educational paths, on the other hand, do not merely define our oppor-
tunity set with respect to a crucial compartment of our life, but rather affect
other meaningful aspects (e.g. they provide us with tools to fulfill many different
tasks, not strictly related to the career path we have chosen for ourselves; they
largely define our social circle, etc.). Long and wide-ranging choices, I suggest,
should be seen as multi-purpose tools, in that they are not merely supposed to
accommodate for changes in our structure of preferences within one particular
aspect, but rather within several and prima facie unrelated meaningful facets of
our lives.
In order to further illustrate the concept of multi-purpose tool, we may
think about choosing computers. Particularly, imagine Betty is passionate about
design and that, as such, she is naturally inclined toward buying an iPad Pro.
In fact, the Apple Pencil, the high pixel-density and 120Hz refresh rate screen
would provide an ideal set up for her drawings. The other option meeting her
budget constraint is an uglier and thicker ThinkPad, with lower pixel density
and less design capabilities. On the pros side, though, the ThinkPad is largely
upgradable, has a much more powerful CPU, and an operating system, alongside
with its software ecosystem, which allows for a wide variety of tasks. What
should Betty choose? The answer to such a question turns on whether the device
Betty is in the market for, is supposed to be her main device; which is to say,
whether that computer is supposed to fulfil more than design-related tasks. For
instance, were Betty to use her computer also for general educational purposes,
she may find the iPad Pro as mostly unsuited to tasks such as word-processing
or programming. The problem lies in that, if Betty is partially unaware about
the sort of tasks she will be required to fulfill, her choice cannot be merely tied
to her passion for design, as choosing an iPad would prevent her from getting
some work done with respect to tasks that are not design-related.
Unlike computers, educational paths possess a third peculiar feature which
consists in their being largely, though not entirely, one-way routes. In fact,
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computers can be easily tried, returned, swapped or replaced; educational paths,
on the other hand, cannot. Surely, we may imagine Betty giving a shot to the
acting academy and realising after a few months that she will be better off by
taking some other route, or deciding to go back to education after obtaining her
degree at the acting academy. However, costs associated with such decisions
are by no means negligible and, often, our first choice is one we are likely to
stick with for our entire life. This particular aspect invites deeper reflections
on our choice scenario, as we may be happy to commit ourselves entirely to a
particular activity under the condition that its effects, although wide and long-
ranging, can be reverted as we please, or that we will still be able to commit
to completely different kinds of activities afterwards, and quite often we make
one-way decisions under the false assumption that they are reversible.
The one-way nature, alongside with the long and wide-ranging character,
of Betty’s choice scenario define its complexity, and make us wonder how is it
possible to choose educational paths on the basis of information we can only
partially grasp. In this regard, I suggest that a plausible answer is offered by
the idea of flexibility.
Kreps (1979), in particular, captures our problem as follows:
In many problems of individual choice, the choice is made in more
than one stage. At early stages, the individual makes decisions which
will constrain the choices that are feasible later. In effect, these early
choices amount to choice of a subset of items from which subsequent
choice will be made. This paper concerns choice among such oppor-
tunity sets, where the individual has a ”desire for flexibility” which is
”irrational” if the individual knows what his subsequent preferences
will be.
A simple example is that of making reservations at a restaurant.
Imagine that the only way that restaurants vary is in the menu of
meals which they will serve. The individual is assumed to know
the menus at all restaurants that he might select. Eventually, the
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individual will choose a meal, but his initial choice is of a restau-
rant/menu from which he will later choose his meal. Let Z be the
set of possible meals, with generic element z. Let X be the set of all
conceivable menus, with generic element x. That is, X is the set of
nonempty subsets of Z. Initial choice is the selection of one x from
some subset of X (the set of available menus), and subsequent choice
is the selection of one z from the x chosen. For simplicity, assume
that Z is finite [...] Suppose that the individual prefers a menu con-
taining only steak to one containing only chicken. But he strictly
prefers a menu with both steak and chicken to either of the first
two, because it gives him greater flexibility [. . . ] Why should any-
one desire such flexibility? The individual choosing a menu would
likely make some statement about being uncertain about something
or other. For some reason, he is unsure about what will be his mood
on the evening in question. Perhaps he is unsure about what he
will have had for dinner on the previous evening. Perhaps he cannot
explain why he is uncertain about his future mood, but he claims to
be unsure of it nonetheless. This rationalization is naturally termed
”uncertainty about future tastes. (Kreps, 1979, p. 7).83
Essentially, in Kreps, the need to accommodate for the uncertainty about fu-
ture tastes equates to Betty’s need to accommodate for changes in her structure
of preferences and goals in the distant future. Preferences for flexibility, within
Kreps’ choice scenario, result in an agent’s choice that includes both available
options as she is uncertain about her future tastes. In particular, I suggest,
we may look at Kreps’ agent as attempting to abstract from her current tastes
in an effort to choose the menu that would likely accommodate for changes in
her structure of tastes in the future. Similarly, Betty may attempt to abstract
from her current structure of preferences and goals in an effort to choose an
educational path that would also accommodate for changes in her structure
83For similar accounts concerning preferences for flexibility, see Koopmans (1962), Stigler
and Becker (1977).
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of preferences and goals. In particular, she may find the prospect of the Law
School as more flexible than that of the Acting Academy, as it would open up
much more career paths which are likely to enlarge her set of opportunities in
ways that would accommodate for changes in her future structure of preferences
and goals, without entirely preventing her from cultivating her current passion
for acting.
One peculiarity of Betty’s scenario lies in that, differently from Kreps’, there
are associated trade-offs. Particularly, while Kreps’ agent is able to choose
menus that contain both steak and chicken, Betty’s alternative paths shall
constrain her opportunities in one direction or the other. In fact, the Act-
ing Academy is likely to maximise her chances to pursue an acting career path,
at the costs of narrowing down her set of opportunities with respect to other
career paths; whereas the Law School would enlarge the set of opportunities
paving the way for countless career paths while reducing her chances to become
a professional actress. Another peculiarity consists in that while Kreps’ agent is
inflexible with respect to alternative opportunity sets (i.e. steak, chicken, steak
and chicken), Betty’s uncertainty about career paths is different in degrees. This
is, in part, because the relationship between Betty’s educational choice and ca-
reer paths is less straightforward than the one between menus and food, and, in
part, due to the fact that Kreps’ agent has perfect knowledge of how her tastes
may change in the future, whereas the same does not apply to Betty, whose
salient opportunity sets are the result of sequential process of discovery, which
may occur at later stages within her educational path.
This latter peculiarity, I argue, provides Betty with even more reasons to
abstract from her current structure of preferences and goals and choose the Law
School, as she is largely unable to assess the ways in which such a structure
may evolve in the future. In fact, the acting academy seems to require a full
commitment over a single career path at the very outset, whereas the Law
School would make Betty able to procrastinate her decision about career paths
to further stages, where she will have a fuller understanding of her structure
of preferences and goals and of their evolutionary patterns. This particular
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aspect clarifies that preferences for flexibility are primarily a function of one’s
uncertainty about future goals, which is to say that more uncertainty about
one’s future tastes calls for more abstraction from one’s current set of goals and
for more flexible choices, especially if paths to achieve the current set of goals
are to narrow down one’s opportunity set to one’s current preferences.
At this point, one may wonder what exactly the concept of flexibility cap-
tures. Particularly, one may ask whether it is merely supposed to express one’s
risk aversion toward non-ideal circumstances, or if there is more on the table
other than mere risk assessment. In this regard, I wish to highlight that prefer-
ences for flexibility are not the result of a minimax strategy, in that they are not
meant to make us choose strategies that will maximise our payoffs under the
worst case scenario. Specifically, Betty’s motivation for choosing the Law School
over the Acting Academy is not aimed at, say, securing the best salary, under
conditions in which she fails to be among the top 10% students at either the
Acting Academy or the Law School. In fact, preferences for flexibility are meant
to highlight our preference for keeping our ability to shape our life plans in due
course, by making it adapt to the changing structure of our preferences and
goals. Particularly, preferences for flexibility are the expression of our rational
desire to continuously shape our lives according to values, preferences and goals
that we come to have within our entire existence, rather than being constrained
by past choices that cannot adequately account for the sort of persons we are
and we will be in the distant future. In this regard, I wish to emphasise that
preferences for flexibility are not merely preferences for patterns that open us
as many opportunities to satisfy goals compatible with our broader life plans.
In fact, the primary aim is to preserve our ability to adapt our lives to changing
preferences and goals.84
There are two main worries arising from the idea of flexibility. First, it
84There is, however, a rather unconventional way to frame preferences for flexibility as risk
minimising strategies. Particularly, we may plausibly interpret Betty’s choice as ultimately
driven by her preference to minimise the risk that opportunities emerging from her educational
path will fail to match Betty’s evolving structure of preferences and goals. As such, the Law
School, by virtue of opening much more career paths, without preventing her from cultivating
her passion for acting, would be the minimax strategy.
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may seem that we come to exhibit preferences for flexibility only insofar as we
irrationally privilege the satisfaction of future goals over present ones. Second, it
may seem that flexibility demands us to forgo on meaningful projects in order to
preserve our ability to satisfy future goals that have little normative significance
to us, when the choice scenario takes place. These two worries, albeit similar,
highlight two different aspects: on the one hand, there is a concern related
to irrational rates of temporal discounting, as one may plausibly object that
Betty’s choice to go to the Law School is the result of a process of deliberation
that posits too much weight on the satisfaction of future goals; on the other,
rates of the temporal discounting that privilege the satisfaction of future, and
partially unknown, goals pose problems with respect to the meaningfulness of
flexible choices; in fact, one may point out that Betty’s reasons to go to the
Acting Academy are highlighted by a meaningful goal, that of becoming an
actress, that carries stronger normative significance to her compared to future,
and partially unknown, goals that demand her to go to the Law School, when
the choice scenario takes place. Therefore, one may join Sandel in claiming that
the sort of abstraction required by flexibility demands too much detachment in
that it asks us to forgo on projects we find of value.
In order to answer these worries, let me first point out that preferences for
flexibility are not the result of a process of deliberation that assumes rates of
temporal discounting, but rather the other way around. In fact, what drives
Betty’s choice to go to the Law School is not the satisfaction of future, and
partially unknown, goals but rather her present desire to preserve her ability to
shape her life according to preferences and needs she comes to possess over her
entire existence. Although such a preference for flexibility implicitly embodies
the satisfaction of future goals, it is not a future preference. However, someone
may object that the mere fact that rates of temporal discounting emerge from
preferences for flexibility partially begs the question. For if preferences for
flexibility end up by demanding us to posit too much weight on future goals, it
may not be rational to develop them. A successful answer, thus, has to further
elaborate on how preferences for flexibility emerge and what kind of demands
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they posit on us.
In this regard, let me answer by illustrating that preferences for flexibility do
not demand the same level of abstraction on all persons. In fact, we have seen
that they are a function of one’s uncertainty which, I suggest, is also a function
of one’s complexity, where complexity can be highlighted by one’s aspirations.
For instance, in Betty’s choice scenario, we assumed that she is able to grasp
the relevance of values associated with being a law student and related career’s
paths and is also able to see that these values may come to possess a more central
role as she goes on with her life path. In this regard, preferences for flexibility
demand different levels of abstraction according to the strength, extension and
variability range of one’s aspirations.
To show this, imagine a scenario in which Betty lacks the sort of imaginative
power required to develop aspirations, aside from her passion for acting. Par-
ticularly, assume that Betty’s goal of becoming an actress is the only reason for
undertaking an educational path. Here, clearly, Betty fails in exhibiting prefer-
ences for flexibility with respect to her educational choice. She may still exhibit
them with respect to other aspects of her life (e. g. where to live, marriage
choices, parental choices, etc.), but flexibility plays no role in choosing her ed-
ucational path as she is unable to grasp the relevance of values associated with
other career paths.
Essentially, Betty sees herself as able to shape her life according to her goals
and needs only from within that particular framework. In this regard, one may
argue that preferences for flexibility, far from being too demanding, have a too
limited reach in making us abstract. For if we fail to exhibit aspirations we also
lack incentives to abstract. However, such a conclusion rests on implausible
claims about persons’ complexity. Particularly, it rests on assumptions high-
lighting our inability to grasp values associated with opportunities and patterns
that are not strictly related to our present preferences and goals.
There is another interesting objection to the idea of flexibility that does not
involve demeaning assumptions concerning persons’ complexity. Particularly,
one may point out that flexibility is still too demanding if it requires us to forgo
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on our main aspirations on the ground of less fully developed aspirations. For
instance, in the first scenario, Betty’s preferences for flexibility demand her to
choose the Law School over the acting academy, despite the fact that the acting
career is her most developed aspiration. In this regard, flexibility would demand
us to forgo on project whose meaningfulness is much more salient to us when
the choice scenario takes place.
However, such an objection rests on the assumption that our main aspira-
tions require full commitment on our part. Particularly, it assumes that we
cannot cultivate values associated with less fully developed aspirations without
sacrificing our ability to cultivate values and reach goals associated to our main
aspirations. In the first choice scenario, though, going to the Law School does
not necessarily prevent Betty from cultivating her aspiration toward an acting
career, as she could still manage to devote some of her time to that particu-
lar aspiration. On a similar note, we may highlight recent tendencies, among
young tennis players, to undertake an educational paths not necessarily related
to the tennis profession, alongside with their career path as professional tennis
players. Although these tendencies seem to capture more risk-averse attitudes
with respect to the possibility of failure rather than our preference for flexibility,
they clarify that even demanding career paths do not prevent us from cultivat-
ing values that lie outside our main aspirations. In fact, cultivating less fully
developed aspirations could also add something or reinforce the strength of our
commitment to our main aspirations.
However, the objection still stands for there may be cases in which there
is an important trade-off between cultivating less fully developed aspirations
and cultivating our main aspirations. Particularly, there may be cases in which
cultivating less developed aspirations would significantly reduce our chances to
satisfy goals connected to our main aspirations. The question, then, is what
flexibility would demand. Predictably, the answer is: it depends. It depends
on the strength of our main aspirations, on the strength of less fully developed
aspirations, on the terms of the trade-offs, and on how restricting associated
patterns are.
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For instance, in Betty’s choice scenario, she may be willing to further investi-
gate the strength of her main aspiration and compare it with less fully developed
aspirations; she may also analyse to what extent the Law School would reduce
her chances to pursue an acting career, and evaluate how restrictive the two
educational paths are in relation to other possible careers she may find of value.
In this regard, I should like to stress that, although Betty may be willing to
evaluate these aspects from a risk assessment perspective, this is not what pref-
erences for flexibility are meant to highlight. Particularly, our preferences for
flexibility are not meant to capture the rationality of choosing strategies that
accommodate for non-ideal scenarios. In fact, preferences for flexibility high-
light our present and meaningful desire to be able to shape our life according
to goals and needs we come to possess over the course of our existence. In this
regard, they invite us to carefully consider what sorts of persons we are likely
to be in the distant future, in order to make sure not to undertake paths that
would prevent us from shaping our life in due course.
Clearly, preferences for flexibility should not be taken as granted. In fact, we
may fail both in grasping the nature of the choice scenario we face, by neglecting
its one way character or its long and wide-ranging effects, and in assessing how
volatile our current set of preferences and goals is. Particularly, we may fail in
evaluating the paths we choose for ourselves under the light of a larger domain,
which is the domain of our entire existence. Such a level of abstraction is by no
means easy to achieve as, to paraphrase Augustine, our hands are full. In fact,
we are often entirely absorbed by specific projects and goals to the point that we
lose the ability to look at our choices by taking into account the kinds of persons
we will be in the future. Nonetheless, to show preferences for flexibility is to
show a full understanding of the dynamic character of our values, preferences
and goals, a character over which we have only marginal control. In fact, I argue,
rational persons have instrumental reasons to reach this level of abstraction in
making choices that profoundly affect their life plans. As by abstracting from
our current set of goals we converge on options that would equip us with the
ability to continuously renegotiate what we do, in the attempt of reconciling it
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with who we are.
Preferences for Flexibility, Social Environment Shaping Rights
and Bargaining Procedures
The sort of abstraction implied by preferences for flexibility, thus, does not
undermine the possibility of making rational and meaningful choices. There
are, indeed, various cases in which we have instrumental reasons to reach this
level of abstraction. In fact, choices that have profound effects on our lives
demand us to put our current set of goals and preferences under deeper scrutiny
and that we consider the sort of persons we may be in the distant future.
The case for flexibility, I aim to show, is even more intuitive within contrac-
tarian bargaining scenarios, where we come to define the basic set of institutions
that shall govern the interactions among members of a community. It is more
evident because, by defining the terms of our cooperation, basic institutional
arrangements also shape the kind of opportunities that members of the com-
munity shall have in many different aspects of their lives. Bargaining scenarios,
indeed, possess the very same features of Betty’s scenario: they are one-way
decisions and their effects are both long and wide-ranging. Moreover, since
their effects are pervasive within many different aspects our lives, they call for
abstraction from one’s specific goals in these various facets. In fact, rational
agents, approaching the bargaining table, recognise that their terms of cooper-
ation cannot be shaped by current sets of preferences and goals, if, by doing
so, they prevent institutional adaptability to the structure of goals they may
come to possess at future stages of their lives. Particularly, they have reasons
to converge on cooperation-enhancing platforms that leave constantly open the
possibility for further renegotiation. That is to say that they have reasons
to endorse a basic institutional arrangement that continuously allows them to
shape their social environment by making it adapt to their dynamic structure of
preferences and goals. More specifically, they have reasons to pick institutional
arrangements that would allow them to satisfy preferences and goals that fall
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within the set of aspirations carrying values they can grasp the relevance of.
Clearly, the level of abstraction implied by preferences for flexibility may
not solve all the problems connected to disagreement among bargainers. In
fact, the veil of ignorance agents posit on themselves is not thick enough to
make them possess the very same set of preferences and goals. In this regard,
it is still possible to imagine situations in which bargainers’ sets of aspirations
are radically different, to the point that there is no set of institutions able to
accommodate them. This particular fact, clarifies that preferences for flexibility
are inconclusive with respect to the possibility of a universal agreement on a
single set of social institutions.
In particular, there are two difficulties I wish to highlight. The first is com-
mon to all orthodox rational choice contractarian accounts and concerns peo-
ple’s moral beliefs over just distributive principles. Particularly, contractarian
accounts tend to construe distributive principle as arising from bargaining sce-
narios as a function of people’s structure of preferences and goals. This means
that rational agents are supposed to choose distributive principles that maximise
their chance of satisfying their individual preferences and goals. In this regard,
they cannot accommodate for widely diverse moral beliefs over just distributive
principles that are not formed instrumentally. This means that members of the
community who, for instance, share deontic beliefs over equal distribution of
resources, regardless of how such a distribution is going to affect one’s chances
to satisfy goals and preferences, cannot possibly be content with a contractarian
bargaining procedure. This is because these members are willing to sacrifice the
benefits of cooperation on the altar of their moral beliefs over just distributions.
The second difficulty, on the other hand, is peculiar to the theory I have
offered and concerns the fact that preferences for flexibility are also a function of
members of the community’s age. In this regard, one may plausibly object that
older societies would be less prone to converge on institutional arrangements
that leave the door open for continuous adaptation. The answer to such an
objection is twofold: on the one hand, I suggest, our close ties with future
generations equip us with reasons to design institutional arrangements that
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would allow them to shape their social environment, in the same way in which
we attempt to make educational choices for our children that would allow them
to flourish in their own peculiar way; on the other hand, I wish to suggest that
we should not underestimate our interest in keeping our ability to shape our
social environment even at a later stage of our life. Surely, members of the
community who approach the end of their existence are less inclined to abstract
from their specific goals as they can predict that their structure of preferences
and goals will be less subject to dynamic changes; yet, changes in our structure
of preferences and goals do not pre-alert us with deadlines. We may encounter
them at different stages of our lives without any ability to predict when they
would take place and what would trigger them. In this regard, preferences for
flexibility, although less pronounced as the time passes, are always rationally
formed.
However, despite these difficulties, such a thin veil of ignorance modelled
by preferences for flexibility brings with it great benefits. Particularly, we do
not have reasons to worry that the result of the bargaining procedure shall lack
normative relevance to actual agents. In fact, agents choose to abstract from
their specific goals on the ground of instrumental reasons. This means that
there is no rational ground for evaluating the result of the bargaining procedure
in light of their specific goals, as they are ultimately irrelevant to their choice.
The question, then, shifts to the Lockean account of the spontaneous order.
More specifically, we are now to evaluate whether institutional arrangements
purported by the Lockean distribution of rights would encounter the endorse-
ment of agents exhibiting preferences for flexibility. In this regard, the answer
rests on the plausibility of Hayek’s claim with respect to the unique ability
of the Lockean distribution of rights in bringing about cooperation-enhancing
platforms where members can continuously update their terms of cooperation.
Particularly, if we are persuaded by Hayek’s argument, a Lockean distribution
of rights would certainly be a plausible bargaining solution. In fact, such an
institutional arrangement would capture the need for adaptability that agents
exhibiting preferences for flexibility would share. However, what preferences for
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flexibility clarify, is that members of the community have reasons to maintain
their ability to shape their social environment overtime, as this allows them to
renegotiate their terms of cooperation in the light of changes in their structure
of preferences and goals.
In this regard, they have reasons to incorporate the two desiderata I have
been offering. Particularly:
(1) they have reasons to endorse limitations to their right to transact
in order to prevent states of affairs in which they lack the ability to
shape their social environment.
(2) they have reasons to prevent the emergence of (or to dismantle)
social norms that would generate states of affairs in which they lack
the ability to shape their social environment.
In fact, these two amendments would resolve problems connected to un-
intended derivative distributions of rights arising from individual interactions
allowed by the Lockean triad. Particularly, members of the community, who
exhibit preferences for flexibility, would have instrumental reasons to accept
limitations to their ability to transact, if such limitations are posited in order
to prevent the emergence of states of affairs in which some members would
lack the possibility of conveying information that would allow them to continu-
ously shape their specific terms of cooperation in ways that would meaningfully
respond to their structure of preferences and goals.
In this regard, I suggest, agents exhibiting preferences for flexibility would
attribute particular relevance to the peculiar role that the distribution of social
environment shaping rights plays within our communities. In fact, they would
have reasons to ensure that such a distribution makes all (or nearly all) members
of the community able to continuously convey information about their terms
of cooperation, as this would grant to the basic institutional arrangement an
instrumentalist character. In fact, members of the community have:
(3) an interest in their community remaining a cooperative enterprise
from which they stand to gain.
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(4) an interest in that all (or nearly all) members find the community
as a cooperative enterprise from which they stand to gain.
While (3) is intuitive, (4), as we have seen within the previous chapters, is
attributed to the fact that when members of the community fail to see their
cooperative endeavour as an enterprise from which they stand to gain, they lack
instrumental reasons to comply with the basic structure, thus, undermining the
stability of the community.
This particular aspect implicitly calls for a sufficientarian interpretation of
the distribution of social environment shaping rights, where the basic threshold
is to be identified according to the amount of rights that equips members with
the ability of conveying information about their terms of cooperation. For if the
basic threshold is not met, (4) is not met either.
In this regard, one may wonder why bargainers would call for a sufficien-
tarian distribution of social environment shaping rights, rather than for a more
demanding distribution (e. g. an equal distribution). The answer to such a ques-
tion lies in the trade-off between our ability to shape our social environment and
limitations to our right to transact (including redistributions of rights). In fact,
our right to transact is, in itself, a means to shape our social environment in
ways that make it adapt to our structure of preferences and goals. Therefore,
limitations to our right to transact are also limitations to our ability to shape our
social environments. A sufficientarian account, in this regard, captures the fact
that bargainers have reasons to pose limitations to their right to transact only
insofar these limitations are needed to preserve the stability of the community.
Conclusion
Concluding, let me summarise the two main achievements of this chapter. First,
I have attempted to show that emergent justifications lack justificatory force in
dealing with derivative distributions of rights. Particularly, I have shown that
the justificatory power of actual consent within individual transactions cannot
be easily transferred to large-scale consequences generated by such transactions.
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This, we have seen, has crucial implication for our own purposes, as it does not
rule out the possibility of positing amendments to the Lockean distribution of
rights that would limit our right to transact in order to prevent the emergence of
states of affairs in which some members of the community are unable to shape
their social environment by making it adapt to their structure of preferences
and goals.
Second, I have shown that such limitations can be justified in a contrac-
tarian fashion. Particularly, I have highlighted a bargaining scenario in which
agents come to define the basic institutional arrangements of their community,
exhibiting preferences for flexibility. These preferences emerge from the fact
that bargainers have reasons to abstract from their current set of preferences
and goals, as basic institutional arrangements are supposed to regulate their in-
teractions overtime, thus, including stages of their lives in which their structure
of preferences and goal will be subject to change. Preferences for flexibility, in
this regard, capture need for institutional arrangements that allows for contin-
uous renegotiations of members of the community’s terms of cooperation. In
fact, the dynamic nature of their structure of preferences and goals calls for
cooperation-enhancing platforms in which members of the community are able
to shape their social environment.
In the next chapter, I shall deal with persistent disagreement. That is with
the sort of disagreement agent would still exhibit after preferences for flexi-
bility are elicited. Persistent disagreement, I shall suggest, requires that we
think about cooperation not merely within the community, but also at a meta-
community level. In fact, if one cares about designing institutional arrange-
ments that are able to accommodate for a wide variety of standpoints, our
political theorising should deal with designing institutional arrangements, at
the meta-community level, that would create the conditions for the emergence
of communities that aptly suit people’s structures of preferences and goals.
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Preferences For Flexibility and The Framework
For Utopia
Introduction
In the previous chapter I suggested that the amended theory of the spontaneous
order allows us to respond to some pressing challenges related the fact of di-
versity. In particular, I have claimed that preferences for flexibility provide an
interesting tool to secure convergence on institutional arrangements even when
people’s preferences and goals are, at a first glance, incompatible.
This particular effect obtains when individuals are uncertain about their
future aims. In fact, uncertainty invites them to abstract from their current
set of preferences and goals when coming to the bargaining table. In particular,
individuals’ uncertainty elicits Kreps’ preferences for flexibility in designing their
preferred institutional arrangements, and, thus facilitates coordination within
social contract bargaining scenarios.
In this chapter, I attempt to deal with persistent disagreement, that is with
the sort of disagreement, stemming from non-compossibility of preferences, goals
and conceptions of the good, that cannot be accommodated by the emergence
of preferences for flexibility.
If we take diversity seriously, and if we care about accommodating disagree-
ment stemming from non-compossibility of goals, our political theorising cannot
be restricted to the domain of designing institutional arrangements at the com-
munity level, but should rather look at how institutions operate at the meta-
community level. The underlying idea is that, since there is no single community
able to accommodate for all sorts of disagreement, we should be looking for insti-
tutional settings that would allow us to create as many communities as possible
in order to successfully respond to our preferences, goals and conceptions of the
good.
This is exactly Nozick’s aim in delineating the framework for utopia, where
he attempts to justify the minimal state as the institutional arrangement that
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best approximates the possible-worlds model. In this chapter, I put Nozick’s
theory under scrutiny and attempt to show that the minimal state faces two
main challenges in the route to approximate the possible-worlds model: first,
collective action problems stand in the way of creating new communities; second,
informal sanctions, underpinned by social norms, may increase the costs for
creating new cooperative enterprises or joining already existing ones. Such
challenges, I attempt to show, invite amendments to Nozick’s theory that seems
to point toward institutional arrangements, at the meta-community level, more
demanding than the minimal state.
The chapter is organised as follows: within the first section, I illustrate how
preferences for flexibility help us in accommodating some sort of disagreement;
within the second section, I show how certain kinds of disagreement, stemming
from non-compossibility of preferences and goals, will still persist within plural-
istic societies; within the third section, I propose Nozick’s discussion of utopia
as an appealing framework in order to respond to the fact of diversity; within
the fourth section, I put under scrutiny Nozick’s claim according to which the
minimal state represents the institutional arrangement that best approximates
the idea of utopia; within the fifth section, I propose certain amendments to
Nozick’s theory.
Agreement Through Preferences For Flexibility
Within the previous chapter, I have highlighted the idea of preferences for
flexibility and illustrated how flexibility provides instrumental reasons for ab-
stracting from specific preferences and goals when facing one-way, long and
wide-ranging choice scenarios, such as decisions about the basic institutional
arrangements of our social orders. Particularly, I have attempted to show that
bargainers’ uncertainty about future preferences and aims invites them to ab-
stract from their current sets of goals and to come to the bargaining table by
considering a wider range of goals that they predict could come to be salient in
the future.
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The core idea behind the concept of flexibility is that we have reasons to
choose institutional arrangements that would allow us to design our lives in due
course, according to preferences and aims we come to possess within our entire
life path. As such, institutional arrangements should not be tied to narrow sets
of preferences and goals that are salient to us when the bargaining procedure
takes place if, by tying our choice to such a set, we are prevented from (or we
increase the costs for) pursuing goals that will come to be salient in the future.
Let us briefly turn to Kreps (1979) in order to summarise the main argument.
Suppose Betty is asked to choose among three different menus for tomorrow’s
dinner: i contains only steak, ii contains only chicken, and iii contains both
steak and chicken. Betty strictly prefers steak over chicken, and, as such, she
strictly prefers i and iii over ii, but is indifferent between i and iii as both
contain steak. If we introduce additional costs attached to iii (e.g. iii is pricier
or, say, the quality of the steak is inferior compared to i), Betty would strictly
prefer i over iii. However, if Betty is uncertain about her mood tomorrow,
and her mood may affect her preference toward either steak or chicken, her
preference ordering may substantially change as she develops preferences for
flexibility. In fact, let m be a variable capturing her mood tomorrow, such that,
if ms, she would strictly prefer to eat steak and, if mc, she would rather have
chicken. Assume further that Betty is able to assign probabilities about her
mood tomorrow, such that ms shall occur with probability p and mc with 1−p.
If there are no further costs attached to iii, Betty would strictly prefer iii over
i, as iii will satisfy her preference for either steak or chicken with probability 1.
If, on the other hand, we attach further costs to iii, Betty’s preference ordering
between i and iii shall ultimately rest on the amount of costs attached to iii
and to the distribution of probabilities about her future mood. Particularly, the
more she is uncertain, the more such an uncertainty will offset the eventual costs
attached to iii, as it calls for deferring her choice between steak and chicken
to tomorrow, when she will be clear about her mood. The sort of abstraction
elicited by preferences for flexibility, thus, rests on our uncertainty about future
preferences. In fact, the more we are uncertain about our future preferences,
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the more we wish to abstract from goals that are salient to us when the choice
scenario takes place, and rather consider larger sets which include goals that
may be salient in the future.
Preferences for flexibility, I suggest, identically apply to choices concerning
institutional arrangements (IA), under the assumption that agents choose IAs
on the ground of the opportunities they provide in order to achieve goals and
aims that are of value to agents. In fact, suppose Betty is asked to express her
preference among IA1, IA2 and IA3. Assume further that each institutional
arrangement provides different sorts of opportunities to satisfy different goals.
For instance, imagine that IA1 provides opportunities to satisfy x, IA2 provides
opportunities to satisfy y, and IA3 fosters her chances to satisfy x and y. If
Betty shows interest only in x, she would rank IAs as follows: IA1 ∼ IA3 > IA2.
If we attach some costs to IA3 (e.g. it provides opportunities to satisfy x and
y, but less opportunities to satisfy x, compared to IA1), then, Betty would
strictly prefer IA1 over IA3. However, if Betty is uncertain about the relevance
of y, in that it may become a salient goal in the future, such an uncertainty
may offset the costs associated with IA3 and shape her preference ranking as
follows: IA3 > IA1 > IA2. Betty’s uncertainty, once again, invites her to
abstract from the salience of x and to choose institutional arrangements by
considering goals that are less salient when the choice scenario takes place, but
that may be of relevance at later stages. Furthermore, the sort of flexibility-
driven abstraction that is at stake, changes her preference ranking, making IA3
her preferred institutional arrangement.
One interesting implication of preferences for flexibility is that they help
us in achieving coordination among agents exhibiting seemingly incompatible
preferences, when such preferences are compossible. In order to show this,
we may turn back to our example concerning menus, and transform it into a
mixed motives game played by Alf and Betty, where Betty strictly prefers steak
over chicken and Alf strictly prefers chicken over steak. In such a game, even
assuming players’ preference for coordination, the incompatibility of their tastes
may prevent them from coordinating. Such a problem, though, is solved if Alf
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and Betty have reasons to abstract from their current preferences on the ground
of their uncertainty about future tastes.
In order to show this, imagine Alf and Betty are to choose among three
different restaurants for tomorrow’s dinner. Restaurants’ menus, we have seen,
may be aptly characterised as sets, such that i = (steak), ii = (chicken) and
iii = (steak, chicken). If there are no costs attached to iii, Alf’s preference
ranking would look as follows: ii ∼ iii > i, whereas Betty’s is: i ∼ iii > ii. If
they show a preference for coordination, they will likely converge on iii, without
the need of flexibility-driven abstraction; however, if we attach costs to iii (e.g.
iii is pricier or the quality of steak and chicken is inferior compared respectively
to i and ii), their preference for coordination may not be enough in securing
actual coordination. In fact, let us assume that Alf obtains 3 utils from ii, 2
util from iii and zero from i. Betty, on the other hand, obtains 3 utils from i,
2 from iii and 0 from ii. Assume further that their preference for coordination
is valued 1 util, when satisfied, and zero, if not satisfied.
Alf
i ii iii
i (4, 1) (3, 3) (3, 2)
Betty ii (0, 0) (1, 4) (0, 2)
iii (2, 0) (2, 3) (3, 3)
In such a game, coordination cannot be achieved. In fact, Betty’s dominant
strategy is to choose i, whereas Alf’s dominant strategy is to choose ii. As such,
(i, ii) is a strict Nash equilibrium.85
However, uncertainty about future tastes may change the structure of the
payoffs and make Alf and Betty converge on iii. Such a possibility rests on
the degree of uncertainty Alf and Betty possess, that is on how Alf and Betty
distribute probabilities about their future mood. In order to show this, let m be
the variable identifying Alf and Betty’s mood tomorrow, where ms identifies the
mood for steak and mc the mood for chicken. Assume, for the sake of simplicity,
that if Alf’s ms is realised, his structure of the payoffs is identical to that of
85The first entry in each combination represents the payoff to Betty and the second entry
gives the payoff to Alf.
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Betty above highlighted, whereas if Betty’s ms is realised, her payoffs’ structure
is equivalent to that of Alf above highlighted. Hence, we have four possible
combinations depending on Alf and Betty’s mood.
Alf mc
i ii iii
i (4, 1) (3, 3) (3, 2)
Betty ms ii (0, 0) (1, 4) (0, 2)
iii (2, 0) (2, 3) (3, 3)
Alf ms
i ii iii
i (1, 4) (0, 0) (0, 2)
Betty mc ii (3, 3) (4, 1) (3, 2)
iii (2, 3) (2, 0) (3, 3)
Alf mc
i ii iii
i (1, 1) (0, 3) (0, 2)
Betty mc ii (3, 0) (4, 4) (3, 2)
iii (2, 0) (2, 3) (3, 3)
Alf ms
i ii iii
i (4, 4) (3, 0) (3, 2)
Betty ms ii (0, 3) (1, 1) (0, 2)
iii (2, 3) (2, 0) (3, 3)
Suppose now that Alf and Betty are able to attribute probabilities on whether
ms and mc may occur, such that p(ms) + p(mc) = 1. For instance, assume that
Betty believes that mc shall occur with probability 0.6 and ms with 0.4, whereas
Alf believes that mc will occur with probability 0.4 and ms with 0.6. Here’s the
distribution of expected payoffs:
Essentially, uncertainty about future tastes has transformed the original un-
cooperative game into a coordination game with three Nash equilibria (i, i; ii, ii;
iii, iii), and in which (iii, iii) offers the Pareto-optimal outcome.
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Alf
i ii iii
i (4.4; 5.6) (2.4; 2.4) (2.4; 4)
Betty ii (3, 6; 3.6) (5.6; 4.4) (3.6; 4)
iii (4; 3.6) (4; 2.4) (6; 6)
Similarly, preferences for flexibility can accommodate for some sort of dis-
agreement within social contract bargaining scenarios. In fact, although agents
may exhibit quite diverse sets of goals, underpinning different institutional ar-
rangements, convergence on a common institutional setting can be secured if
agents’ uncertainty about future aims invites them to abstract from their cur-
rent preferences and goals and to consider a larger set when coming to the
bargaining table. Larger sets of goals, indeed, would foster the chances of an
overlapping consensus among bargainers, thus accommodating for some sort of
disagreement among different options.
The Persistence of Disagreement
Preferences for flexibility, though, cannot eliminate all sorts of disagreement.
Two types of scenarios, in particular, seem to be of help in explaining the per-
sistence of disagreement. The first concerns situations in which agents are rather
certain about their future preferences (or believe to be so), such that larger sets
of goals, eventually elicited by preferences for flexibility, fail to emerge.86 The
second concerns situations in which agents’ larger sets of goals, elicited by pref-
erences for flexibility, are broadly non-compossible, such that no institutional
arrangement would be satisfactory from everyone’s standpoints.87
The theory of the spontaneous order, with the amendments I have presented
throughout the present work, does not say anything illuminating about the pos-
86For instance, imagine Alf and Betty are quite certain about their future tastes for tomor-
row night: Alf will like to eat steak and Betty will be leaning toward chicken. If, as postulated
above, there are costs associated with the larger menu, coordination is not an equilibrium as
Alf and Betty would be better off by unilaterally deviating.
87Particularly, imagine a situation in which Alf and Betty are uncertain about their future
tastes tomorrow; however, their uncertainty does not generate room for an overlapping con-
sensus over a single menu, as there simply is no menu able to accommodate for their sets of
preferences.
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sibility of accommodating for non-compossible goals, as its main focus is to lay
out how institutions should be designed in order to allow for continuous rene-
gotiation in a context where members of the community’s preferences and goals
are dynamic but compossible. In fact, we have seen that the scope of the theory
is to foster adaptation to changes in members of the community’s structure of
preferences and goals in order to preserve the instrumentalist character of our
communities. However, such an aim is of little significance in a context char-
acterised by widespread non-compossibility of goals, as we face an antecedent
challenge, which is to find an institutional arrangement that is able to make our
community a cooperative enterprise in the first place, that is an enterprise from
which everybody stands to gain.
The problem of disagreement stemming from non-compossibility of diverse
conceptions of the good is captured by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and
Utopia:
Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Taylor, Bertrand Russell, Thomas Mer-
ton, Yogi Berra, Allen Ginsburg, Harry Wolfson, Thoreau, Casey
Stengel, The Lubavitcher Rebbe, Picasso, Moses, Einstein, Hugh
Heffner, Socrates, Henry Ford, Lenny Bruce, Baba Ram Dass, Gan-
dhi, Sir Edmund Hillary, Raymond Lubitz, Buddha, Frank Sinatra,
Columbus, Freud, Norman Mailer, Ayn Rand, Baron Rothschild,
Ted Williams, Thomas Edison, H. L. Mencken, Thomas Jefferson,
Ralph Ellison, Bobby Fischer, Emma Goldman, Peter Kropotkin,
you, and your parents. Is there really one kind of life which is best
for each of these people? Imagine all of them living in any utopia
you’ve ever seen described in detail. Try to describe the society
which would be best for all of these persons to live in. Would it be
agricultural or urban? Of great material luxury or of austerity with
basic needs satisfied? What would relations between the sexes be
like? Would there be any institution similar to marriage? Would it
be monogamous? Would children be raised by their parents? Would
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there be private property? Would there be a serene secure life or one
with adventures, challenges, dangers, and opportunities for heroism?
Would there be one, many, any religion? How important would it
be in people’s lives? Would people view their life as importantly
centered about private concerns or about public action and issues
of public policy? Would they be single-mindedly devoted to partic-
ular kinds of accomplishments and work or jacks-of-all-trades and
pleasures or would they concentrate on full and satisfying leisure
activities? Would children be raised permissively, strictly? What
would their education concentrate upon? Will sports be important
in people’s lives (as spectators, participants)? Will art? Will sen-
sual pleasures or intellectual activities predominate? Or what? Will
there be fashions in clothing? Will great pains be taken to beautify
appearance? What will the attitude toward death be? Would tech-
nology and gadgets play an important role in the society? And so
on. (Nozick, 1974, pp. 310-311).
Nozick frames the problem of disagreement ultimately as a concern about
sub-optimal institutional arrangements. In fact, his worry is that a unique set
of institutions would require too many compromises given the fact of diversity.
Particularly, Nozick’s problem is that a unique set of political institutions would
fail in representing the best institutional setting from the standpoints of many
individuals exhibiting widely different conceptions of the good and resulting
utility functions. However, the challenges posed by ineradicable disagreement
go beyond the problem of sub-optimality. In fact, individuals exhibiting sets
of goals which are largely non-compossible may not be merely worried about
living in a community whose social and political institutions fail to best advance
their conceptions of the good, but rather struggle to see their community as
an enterprise from which they stand to gain. As such, they may fail to see
reasons to comply with the community’s cooperative scheme, thus undermining
its instrumentalist character. In this regard, the challenges posited by diversity
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and disagreement do not merely tackle sub-optimality but may rather undermine
the possibility of securing a basic agreement under a unique set of political
institutions.
This particular aspect clarifies that any political theorising that wishes to
take diversity seriously should be oriented toward a model of cooperation em-
bodying multiple social contracts underpinning diverse sets of political institu-
tions, rather than focusing on a unique set allegedly able to accommodate for
everyone’s conception of the good. However, simply arguing in favour of models
of cooperation embodying multiple communities underpinned by diverse social
contracts cannot possibly count as an adequate response to the problem of di-
versity. An adequate account, indeed, has to illustrate how communities would
be created and specify the ways in which they would be able to respond to
challenges posed by widespread diversity.
Interestingly, the sort of disagreement we have laid out so far seem to deal
exclusively with static preferences. In fact, following Kreps’ example on uncer-
tainty about future tastes, we have observed that, given people’s widespread
diversity in terms of preferences and goals, and given the non-compossibility of
certain sets of goals, our model of cooperation has to embody multiple commu-
nities. However, such a static account of disagreement is not the only source
of concerns about models of cooperation envisaging a unique set of institu-
tions. In fact, disagreement may not be merely exogenous, in that it stems
from incompatible preferences that institutional arrangements are supposed to
accommodate once and for all, but can also result from changes in the dynamic
structure of people’s preferences and goals. This is to say that members of a
community, who are able to reach an agreement about the set of institutions
that is supposed to regulate their interactions overtime, may come to be un-
satisfied about the terms of their agreement when their structure of preferences
and goals changes.
The amended version of the spontaneous order attempts to respond to this
particular problem by inviting convergence on distributions of rights that al-
low for continuous renegotiation of the terms of the agreement, by preserving
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a certain distribution of social-environment shaping rights. Yet, members of
the community’s goals and preferences may come to be widely diverse after the
agreement is reached, such that institutions cannot be modified so as to accom-
modate for such a diversity. Therefore, the need for a model of cooperation
embodying multiple social contracts emerges not merely in order to respond to
a static account of disagreement, but also in order to respond to disagreement
stemming from changes in the dynamic structures of people’s preferences and
goals.
In fact, a community’s stability cannot be taken for granted once the agree-
ment on a set of institutions is reached, even under the condition that its mem-
bers maintain the power to exercise their social-environment shaping rights in
order to continuously renegotiate their terms of cooperation, according to the
dynamic structure of their preferences and goals. Instability, indeed, may spon-
taneously emerge at later stages if members of the community come to possess
sets of preferences and goals that are broadly non-compossible. As such, the
attempt to shape our social environment through a continuous process of rene-
gotiation may always leave some members of the community outside the coop-
erative scheme, in that they fail to see the community as an enterprise from
which they stand to gain.
In order to illustrate this particular problem, let us turn back to Alf and
Betty’s coordination game. Let us assume that their uncertainty about future
tastes, as spelled out in the example above offered, made them converge on
the third menu. However, suppose that after the agreement is reached, Betty
realises she will not be willing to eat chicken tomorrow. Her uncertainty about
future tastes is now between steak and hummus. Similarly, Alf comes to know
that he will not be willing to eat steaks, as his uncertainty is now between
chicken and sushi. If there is no menu able to accommodate for their tastes,
their attempt to find a plausible coordination point by communicating to each
other their updated preferences is ultimately useless. In fact, their preferences
about what to eat tomorrow are simply non-compossible, such that there are
no coordination points that would be mutually advantageous.
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Here, Alf and Betty’s exercise of social environment shaping rights in order
to renegotiate their terms of coordination is ultimately helpless as any proposed
point of coordination would be unsatisfactory. In fact, either Alf or Betty would
have little to gain from coordinating, and their agreement, thus, comes to lose
its instrumentalist character. This particular aspect clarifies that the amended
theory of the spontaneous order is supposed to work within communities where
the dynamic structure of preferences and goals of its members is broadly com-
possible. When such a condition does not obtain, preferences for flexibility
are unable respond meaningfully to the problem of disagreement. Crucially,
non-compossibility may emerge after the agreement is reached as there is no
guarantee that members of the community’s sets of goals and preferences shall
evolve toward compossible directions.
In this regard, any attempt to theorise about a model of cooperation em-
bodying multiple communities, underpinning diverse sets of political institu-
tions, has to deal also with disagreement endogenously emerging from the dy-
namic structure of people’s preferences and goals. This is to say that a static
model envisaging multiple social contracts laid out on the basis of revealed and
existing preferences will not do the job, as preferences and goals are subject
to a process of continuous scrutiny and change. Therefore, the model should
account for the sort of dynamic disagreement spontaneously emerging from the
evolving structure of people’s preferences and goals.
The Framework For Utopia
The project of a political theory taking diversity seriously is one that many
authors have undertaken.88 Two rather similar approaches are particularly rel-
evant to the present work. One has been developed by Chandran Kukathas in
The Liberal Archipelago and the other is Nozick’s framework for utopia devel-
oped in Anarchy, State and Utopia, in the search for an alternative justificatory
framework for the minimal state. The relevance of these approaches for the
88Among the others, see Kukathas (2003), Nozick (1974), Rawls (1971, 1993), Kymlica
(1995), Walzer (1995).
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present work consists in that both start from quite similar premises. First, in
both accounts diversity is taken as an ineradicable fact and not as a value worth
pursuing. This is not to deny that diversity could, in principle, possess some
instrumental value,89 but to assert merely that there is nothing inherently valu-
able in the fact of diversity, such that social institutions should be in any way
required to promote it. Second, and strictly linked to this first point, diver-
sity is taken as a constraint in designing institutional arrangements that would
allow for peaceful cooperation or coexistence among persons.90 Third, both
approaches aim to design institutional arrangements, at the meta-community
level, by attempting to maximise the fittingness of communities with people’s
conceptions of the good. This is to say that both Nozick and Kukathas attempt
to secure a state of affairs in which there are enough communities that would
constitute the best possible match with people’s preferences and goals. Fourth,
both Nozick and Kukathas believe that communities cannot be designed in an
apriori fashion, as theorists and planners are not in the position to collect per-
sons’ preferences, goals and conception of the good; as such, any institutional
arrangement, at the meta-community level, has to rely on filtering devices, such
as individual consent, in order to allow for the emergence of communities that
would constitute the best possible matches with people’s preferences.
Nozick’s framework for utopia, in particular, lays out a rather analytic ac-
count of the criteria that a set of institutions should aim to maximise at the
meta-community level. Although the model is built with the aim of exploring
an alternative justificatory framework for the minimal state,91 its criteria, I aim
89For instance, many authors have showed that diverse perspectives help us in resolving
complex problems (Page 2010, Muldoon 2016), or have convincingly shown that experiments
in living may lead to richer ways of life yielding more human flourishing (Muldoon 2016).
90Kukathas (2003), for instance, takes diversity as a source of a problem liberalism attempts
to resolve:”Liberalism is not, as Galston has argued, about the protection of diversity. If the
description of liberal society offered here is defensible, diversity is not a value of any particular
importance. Diversity is, in fact, not the value liberalism pursues but the source of the problem
to which it offers a solution. That problem is the problem of how individuals can be free in
circumstances of conflict over the question of how people should live?”, p. 29.
91See Nozick (1974):”But doesn’t the idea, or ideal, of the minimal state lack luster? Can
it thrill the heart or inspire people to struggle or sacrifice? Would anyone man barricades
under its banner? It seems pale and feeble in comparison with, to pick the polar extreme,
the hopes and dreams of utopian theorists. Whatever its virtues, it appears clear that the
minimal state is no utopia. We would expect then that an investigation into utopian theory
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to show later in the chapter, could point toward different directions.
Let us start our investigation by introducing Nozick’s model with a definition
of utopia. A utopian world is the best possible world such that no better world
can be imagined. Hence, improvements, within a utopian world, cannot take
place: if we live in a utopian world, we could not possibly imagine a change in
one of its features that would make us better off. The bestness of a world is not
to be judged from any particular conception of the good,92 but rather from each
individual standpoint. Different people would rank worlds differently and, as
such, diversity gives rise to a utopian model that is constituted by sub-utopias,
that is by various communities where members exhibiting similar criteria for
judging worlds would come to cooperate and flourish.
In order to capture the idea of utopia, Nozick proposes us an analogy with
the possible-worlds model. In the model, infinite worlds and individuals can be
created and each individual can, in turn, create her own utopian world and its
members by simply imagining them. Each individual, with her own imaginative
power, can thus generate political institutions that would best fit with their own
preferences, goals and conception of the good, such that no improvements could
be imagined.93 Crucially, for these worlds to qualify as utopian, they have to
be stable, where stability can be defined as a world’s property such that ”none
of their inhabitants can imagine any world they consider to be stable and of
which they would rather be an inhabitant” (Bader 2011, p. 257). Hence, worlds
in which some members can imagine other worlds that would better advance
their own conceptions of the good, by virtue of being unstable, cannot possibly
qualify as utopian.
The possible-worlds model is meta-utopian if and only if all worlds it contains
should more than serve to highlight the defects and shortcomings of the minimal state as the
end of political philosophy. Such an investigation also promises to be intrinsically interesting.
Let us then pursue the theory of utopia to where it leads”, p. 297.
92see Nozick (1974), p. 309 and p. 333.
93In order to make the model meaningful, one main condition applies:”The world cannot
be imagined so that it logically follows that (1) its inhabitants (or one of them) most (or nth
most) want to live in it or (2) its inhabitants (or one of them) most (or nth most) want to live
in a world with certain (kind of) person, and will do whatever he says, and so on”. (Nozick,
1974, p. 303).
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are utopian. Since individuals are allowed to create infinite worlds and join the
ones that best fit with their preferences, the possible-worlds model qualifies as
meta-utopian.
The possible-world model is supposed orient our investigation toward the
best possible institutional arrangement, at the meta-community level, within
the real world. Particularly, given that the fact of diversity prevents us from
designing a unique utopian community that would suit everyone’s preferences,
we are to imagine an institutional arrangement, at the meta-community level,
that would best approximate the model. Such an institutional arrangement
would constitute the framework for utopia, as it would bring about a state of
affairs in which ”people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and
attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal community but
where no one can impose his own utopian vision upon others” (Nozick, 1974, p.
312).
Clearly, the possible-worlds model and the real world show important dis-
analogies. Bader (2017), in particular, identifies two: transaction costs and
coercion. The challenge posed by transaction costs is explained with reference
to the fact that we cannot create communities and their inhabitants, within
the real world, in the same way in which we do within the model. Creating a
community and gathering other people in order to make them join is costly and
the required information is often not at our disposal. Similarly, it is costly to
find already existing communities that would constitute a better fit with our
own conception of the good. Hence, within the real world, individuals shall
converge on communities that would not correspond to their ideal ones as those
are either not existent and too costly to create, or because the costs of finding
a better match, among already existing communities, would overweight the ex-
pected benefits. The challenge posed by coercion, on the other hand, consists
in that, unlike the possible-worlds model, in the real world some communities
are stable not because their members are unwilling to search for more fitting
communities or cannot find a better fit, but rather because they are coerced
into staying. As such, the real world exhibits a large amount of falsely stable
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communities, in that stability is driven by coercion.
However, according to Nozick, such discrepancies do not undermine the nor-
mative relevance of the model. In fact, even under the consideration of these
disanalogies, realising the institutional framework that best approximates the
model would constitute the best possible scenario:
Our consideration of alternative arguments for the framework,
and discussion of objections to it, will make a case for (but not estab-
lish) the proposition that it would be better to realize the framework
than to realize alternatives even more divergent from the possible-
worlds model than it. We should note here that some of the ways the
framework diverges from the possible-worlds model, though making
the framework less desirable than the possible-worlds model, leave
it more desirable than any other actually realizable situation. For
example, in the actual o ration of the framework there will be only
a limited number of communities, so that for many people, no one
community will exactly match their values and the weighting they
give them. Under the framework, each individual chooses to live in
the actual community which (putting it roughly) comes closest to
realizing what is most important to him. But the problem about
no community exactly fitting someone’s values arises only because
people disagree about their values and their weighting. (If there
were no disagreement, there would be enough other people to pop-
ulate the exactly desired community.) So there will be no way to
satisfy all of the values of more than one person, if only one set of
values can be satisfied. Other persons will have their values more or
less closely satisfied. But if there is a diverse range of communities,
then (putting it roughly) more persons will be able to come closer to
how they wish to live, than if there is only one kind of community.
(Nozick, 1974, p. 308-309).
One main question arises about how are we to evaluate and compare insti-
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tutional arrangements, at the meta-community level, in order to establish their
betterness in approximating the model. In this regard, two elements seem to
play a major role in assessing institutional arrangements: fittingness and the
number of communities that would be created under different sets of institu-
tions. I refer to fittingness as a thick concept capturing the coincidence between
the sets of goals/conceptions of the good individuals possess and the ones that
the institutional structure of a certain community would facilitate in attaining.
The significance of the number of communities, on the other hand, is derivative
as it rests on the fact that there is no single set of institutions that would con-
stitute a plausible match with everyone’s conceptions of the good or that best
satisfies everyone’s preferences/goals. In other words, in a world characterised
by incompatible conceptions of the good, the more communities, the better.
Clearly, for the number of communities to play a significant role, communi-
ties have to be fitting and differently so from one another. This is crucial insofar
as communities with a low degree of fittingness would be unstable in the same
way imagined worlds would be, in that their inhabitants would prefer to join
another existing association or to create another one. Identical communities, on
the other hand, would not count as relevant options. In fact, given that moving
from one community to another is not costless, members of a community would
prefer remaining in their own community rather than moving to another one
offering the same degree of fittingness.
In this regard, one might object that the relevance of the number of commu-
nities is somewhat parasitic to fittingness and difference. In fact, a state of affairs
containing n communities with low degree of fittingness would hardly be defined
as a better approximation of the possible-worlds model compared to a scenario
in which there is a single highly fitting community. However, counterexamples
of this sort make sense only in a context characterised by low heterogeneity of
goals. When individual goals reach a certain degree of incompatibility, indeed,
the idea of a single highly fitting community becomes implausible as it is hard
to find overlapping sets of goals among deeply diverse perspectives. This means
that to approximate the possible-worlds model in a context of high heterogeneity
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of goals, requires increasingly high numbers of fitting communities.
The relevance of the number of communities is also explicitly made clear by
Nozick:
For example, in the actual operation of the framework there will
be only a limited number of communities, so that for many people,
no one community will exactly match their values and the weighting
they give them. Under the framework each individual chooses to live
in the actual community which (putting it roughly) comes closest to
realizing what is most important to him. But the problem about
no community exactly fitting someone’s values arises only because
people disagree about their values and their weighting. (If there were
no disagreement, there would be enough other people to populate
the exactly desired community.) So there will be no way to satisfy
all the values of more than one person, if only one set of values
can be satisfied. Other persons will have their values more or less
closely satisfied. But if there is a diverse range of communities, then
(putting it roughly) more persons will be able to come closer to
how they wish to live, than if there is only one kind of community.
(Nozick, 1974, p. 309).
In this regard, it seems that plausible candidates as institutional arrange-
ments that would count as realising the framework for utopia would have to be
assessed by looking at their ability in maximising these two operationalised fea-
tures. Hence, the institutional arrangement that would realise the framework
for utopia is the one that is able to allow for the creation of as many fitting
communities as possible.
The Minimal State as a Meta-Utopia
Nozick’s aim is to show that the minimal state could be justified as the frame-
work for utopia, that is as the basic set of institutions that would maximise
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our chances to create as many fitting communities as possible. Therefore, the
minimal state, more than an institutional arrangement that is meant to work
within a community, would represent a basic set of institutions that is meant
to apply at the meta-community level. Such a set, thus, is meant to define an
initial position from which persons could voluntarily depart by creating new
communities and joining already existing ones that would constitute a better
fit with their sets of preferences and goals. The normative value of the minimal
state, under the justificatory idea of utopia, rests on its ability in creating the
conditions for the emergence of countless communities that would aptly respond
to the challenges posed by people’s diversity.
As Bader (2017) notices, there are three main claims emerging from Nozick’s
discussion of the minimal state under the justificatory idea of utopia.
1. the minimal state is inspiring because it is a meta-utopia that
counts as realisation of Nozick’s possible-worlds model of utopia.
2. the minimal state is the common ground of all possible utopian
conceptions and as such can be universally endorsed.
3. the minimal state is the best means for approximating utopia.
Claim (1) and (3) are evidently linked, in that (1) asserts the normative
standing of the institutional setting that best approximates the possible-worlds
model, and (3) affirms that such an institutional arrangement is to be found
in Nozick’s account of minimal state. Claim (2), on the other hand, seems to
spell out another justificatory feature of the minimal state. According to it,
the minimal state seems to possess a certain normative standing not merely by
virtue of best approximating the possible-worlds model, within the real world,
but also by virtue of the fact that it allegedly constitutes a common ground of
all utopian conceptions, in that it defines the maximal institutional structure
from which each and every individual could depart in order to form their own
utopian world.94
94In fact, Bader (2017) argues: ”Any institutional structure that is more extensive than
the minimal state will fail to be neutral and will privilege certain views of utopia. Any
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In this regard, it is unclear whether such a feature is meant to provide an
alternative justificatory framework for the minimal state, or whether it is sup-
posed to pose a constraint on plausible candidate institutional arrangements
that satisfy (3). In particular, it is unclear whether an eventual institutional
setting that satisfies (3) but fails in satisfying (2) could be considered justified.
However, before we get to this particular problem, I suggest that we start by
analysing (3), as our aim is to look for an institutional arrangement, at the
meta-community level, that would be able to accommodate for as many prefer-
ences and goals as possible, through the creation of various communities, in the
attempt to secure the conditions for cooperation given the fact of diversity.95
As such, Nozick’s account of utopia seems promising, in that the institutional
setting that best approximates the possible-worlds model, seems exactly the
sort of arrangement we are looking for.
As we have seen, claim (3) purports that the minimal state ultimately rep-
resents such an institutional arrangement. In fact, the underlying thought is
that the distribution of rights operating within the minimal state allows for the
creation of a fertile soil where the opportunities of creating new fitting commu-
nities and experimenting various ways of living would be maximised. Nozick’s
argument in support of (3) can be framed as follows:
(i) The possible-worlds model cannot be meaningfully approximated by de-
signing communities in an apriori fashion, as this would require a certain amount
of knowledge that theorists and planners cannot plausibly possess.
(ii) In order to approximate the possible-worlds model we need filtering
devices that are able to use knowledge dispersed among individuals.
(iii) Individual consent constitutes such a filtering device.
restrictions on what associations can be like will ensure that there will be some people who
do not consider their association to be the best possible association, but would rather be
members of an association that would not be subject to those restrictions. This means that
any more extensive state cannot in principle be the best for each of us but can only be the
best for those adhering to the utopias that are thus privileged. More-than-minimal states will
thus only be accidentally compatible with utopia, namely only in those situations in which
no one should wish to be a member of an association that is subject to the restrictions of a
more-than-minimal state”, pp. 267-268.
95I shall return on (2) at the end of the chapter.
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(iiii) The minimal state protects the bundle of rights connected to individual
consent and is, thus, the best means to approximate the possible-worlds model.
The reader will be familiar with (i), as it is borrowed from Hayek’s reflection
on the knowledge problem, which we have previously highlighted. In fact, the
underlying idea is that any attempt to design complex social orders, on the basis
of people’s preferences, goals and conceptions of the good, requires knowledge
that is dispersed among individuals and that cannot be plausibly collected by
theorists or planners:
Given the enormous complexity of man, his many desires, aspira-
tions, impulses, talents, mistakes, loves, sillinesses, given the thick-
ness of his intertwined and interrelated levels, facets, relationships
(compare the thinness of the social scientists’ description of man to
that of novelist), and given the complexity of interpersonal institu-
tions and relationships, and the complexity of coordination of the
actions of many people, it is enormous unlikely that, even if there
were one ideal pattern for society, it could be arrived at in this a
priori (relative to current knowledge) fashion. And even supposing
that some great genius did come along with the blueprint, who could
have confidence that it would work out well? (Nozick, 1974, p. 313).
Hence, any community devised by human planners would likely turn out as
defective.
In this regard, Nozick argues that, under conditions of limited knowledge,
any plausible attempt to design institutional arrangement aiming to maximise
fittingness, at the meta-community level, has to rely on filtering devices that are
able to use the required local knowledge (ii). Filtering devices have two tasks to
perform: on the one hand, they must rule out unfitting options from a large set
of alternatives;96 on the other, they should propose new candidate institutional
96See, Nozick (1974): ”Filter devices involve a process which eliminates (filters out) many
from a large set of alternatives. The two key determinants of the end result(s) are the particular
nature of the filtering out process (and what qualities it selects against) and the particular
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arrangements that could be tried out, and eventually adopted or dismissed.97
Nozick’s idea is that filtering devices, in order to arrive at a desired end product
of which we do not know exactly the nature (e. g. fitting communities), are
easier to design than the actual community. In fact, the amount of knowledge
required to design a filtering device is much less compared to that required in
designing a community able to accommodate for various preferences, goals and
conceptions of the good.
Only specific persons know in full details their present specific and more
general aims and, as such, we are in need to devise a filtering mechanism that
is able to use such dispersed knowledge in ruling out certain alternatives and
proposing new plausible candidates.
Nozick identifies such a filtering mechanism in individual consent (iii). In
fact, the idea is that only individuals can meaningfully filter out unfitting op-
tions and propose plausible candidate institutional arrangements in an apriori
fashion.98 However, the filtering processes operating through individual consent
should not merely concern the ’design’ phase, but should rather extend to actual
experiments in living. In fact, his claim is that apriori designs, although devised
at the individual level, through the use of local knowledge, cannot determine
at the very outset which proposals are successful, as institutional arrangements
must be also tried out.99 Therefore, we need an institutional arrangement, at
nature of the set of alternatives it operates upon (and how this set is generated). Filtering
processes are especially appropriate for designers having limited knowledge who do not know
precisely the nature of a desired end product”, p. 314.
97See, Nozick (1974):”Furthermore, if the filtering process is of the type that involves a
variable method of generating new candidates, so that their qualities improves as the quality
of the members remaining after previous filtering operations improves, and it also involves
a variable filter that becomes more selective as the quality of the candidates sent into it
improves (that is, it rejects some candidates which previously had passed successfully through
the filter), then one legitimately may expect that the merits of what will remain after long
and continued operation of the process will be very high indeed”, p. 314.
98See Nozick (1974):”Any group of people may devise a pattern and attempt to persuade
others to participate in the adventure of a community in that pattern. Visionaries and crack-
pots, maniacs and saints, monks and libertines, capitalists and communists and participatory
democrats, proponents of phalanxes (Fourier), palaces of labor (Flora Tristan), villages of
unity and cooperation (Owen), mutualist communities (Proudhon), time stores (Josiah War-
ren), Bruderhof, kibbutzim, kundalini yoga ashrams, and so forth, may all have their try at
building their vision and setting an alluring example” p. 316.
99See Nozick (1974):”But one cannot determine in advance which people will come up with
the best ideas, and all ideas must tried out (and not merely simulated on a computer) to see
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the meta-community level, that allows us to try out proposed alternatives. Such
an institutional setting, Nozick suggests, is the minimal state (iiii), where:
People try out living in various communities, and they leave or
slightly modify the ones they don’t like (find defective). Some com-
munities will be abandoned, others will struggle along, others will
split, others will flourish, gain members, and be duplicated else-
where. Each community must win and hold the voluntary adherence
of its members. No pattern is imposed on everyone, and the result
will be one pattern if and only if everyone voluntarily chooses to live
in accordance with that pattern of community. (Nozick, 1974, p.
316).
The claim is that the distribution of rights operating within the minimal
state, activates the filtering processes involved by one’s exercise of consent. As
such, the end result(s) obtained through the filtering processes is a state of af-
fairs at which individuals arrive by means of their decisions, which are based on
their own local knowledge. Each person considers a wide range of possible al-
ternative settings and filters some out; individuals choose to experiment certain
communities, some of which will be abandoned or progressively improved. The
end result is, in Nozick’s mind, an archipelago of communities whose fittingness
is secured by such filtering processes.
Is the Minimal State the best means to approximate Utopia?
The question is whether the minimal state would actually constitute the insti-
tutional arrangement, at the meta-community level, that best approximates the
possible-worlds model. In order to support such a claim, one has to show that
the distribution of rights operating within the minimal state would outperform
other distributions in maximising the chances for the creation of various fitting
how they will work. And some ideas will come only as we are ((post facto) trying to describe
what patterns have evolved from the spontaneous coordination of the actions of many people”,
pp. 315-316.
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communities. This is to say that the filtering processes activated by the dis-
tribution of rights purported by the minimal state would be better than other
filtering devices that may be purported by different institutional arrangements.
At a first glance, Nozick’s story seems perfectly plausible: individuals start
from an institutional arrangement constituted by the minimal state; they are
free to propose and try out various institutional arrangements that adopt dif-
ferent distributions of rights; after trying them out they could either reconsider
their choices and try new adventures, or continue living within them. Although
distribution of rights, within certain communities, may be such that individual
consent no longer operates as a filtering process in order to improve the com-
munity from within, individuals always possess a right to exit, such that if they
come to be unsatisfied with the institutional arrangement operating within their
communities, they can always leave.
This would ideally answer the concerns that I have presented within the
previous chapters about the need for a sufficientarian distribution of social-
environment shaping rights and with regard to norms that impede adaptation
to members of the community’s changing structure of preferences and goals.
In fact, the right of exit equips everyone with the possibility of abandoning the
community if they come to realise that they have nothing to gain from complying
with its cooperative scheme.100
However, I suggest, one main obstacle should make us carefully consider
Nozick’s theory. It concerns a crucial disanalogy between the possible-worlds
model and the real world, that is the existence of transaction costs. As we have
noted earlier, one cannot create a community with the same ease of the possible-
worlds model, where individuals can create a world by simply imagining it. Nor
one can leave a community and join another existing one in the same way in
which one joins an already existing world. Creating a community carries costs:
100Surely, communities in which consent still operates as a filtering device and where social-
environment shaping rights are distributed such that adaptation to changing preferences and
goals is fostered, would be more stable as members would be able to continuously renegotiate
their terms of cooperation; but this may not be worrisome as members who do not stand to
gain from participating to the cooperative enterprise may seek to try other communities.
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in fact, the design process requires efforts, gathering and persuading people to
embark in a new cooperative enterprise does not come for free either, and trying
out new cooperative arrangements is always risky, for one knows that no matter
how appealing a certain idea is, it must always be tried out in order to evaluate
its potential. Similarly, abandoning a community and joining an already existing
one cannot be regarded as a cost-free process: fitting communities have to be
identified and the searching process requires knowledge that may be hard to
obtain.
Such worries do not necessarily undermine the validity of the theory, as Noz-
ick’s minimal state could still represent the best approximation of the possible-
worlds model. However, the real challenge is not merely constituted by the
existence of transaction costs, but rather by the emergence of patterns, caused
by transaction costs, which severely limit the possibility of creating new com-
munities.
This particular problem is highlighted by the fact that the creation of a new
community is perfectly captured by a public good game. In fact, as for the
production of public goods, the creation of a community requires joint efforts,
both in the design process, and in the phase of building its structure (e.g. in the
identification and acquisition of the territory, in building its infrastructures, and
so forth); moreover, as for public goods, the communities imagined by Nozick
are supposed to produce benefits that are not excludable to those who did not
contribute in the first place, as communities could be joined at any time.
In public good games, the provision of a certain good requires joint efforts
from its participants. The costs yielded by individual efforts would be out-
weighted by the benefits generated once the good is created; however, the struc-
ture of the game is such that each player has an incentive to forego on the initial
contribution, and, as a result, the good is not created. In fact, imagine n=6
players are equipped with an initial endowment of 10£. Each player may either
invest part or the whole endowment in a common pool that would triple the re-
turns (the multiplier must be greater than one but less than n), or keep it. The
investment’s returns will be equally distributed among the players, irrespective
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of their contributions.
If all players invest their total endowment, the total returns would be of
180£, which would grant to each players an amount of 30£. However, rational
players have an incentive to free-ride on other players’ contributions, as each
invested pound would yield a return of only 50 cents.101 As such, the dominant
strategy of each rational player is to avoid contribution, and the good is not
generated.
Rational choice theory, thus, indicates that the minimal state’s route to
approximate the possible-worlds model is not merely affected by transaction
costs yielded by the creation of new cooperative enterprises, but rather subject
to patterns that would go against the creation of new communities. In fact,
rational individuals would lack any incentive to contribute to the creation of
fitting communities, as their dominant choice is always to free ride. Clearly,
this particular problem could be overcome by making communities excludable,
such that those who did not contribute in the first place would be prevented
from joining the community at a later stage. However, such a solution would
undermine the appeal of the theory from a different angle, as individuals would
be required to create a new community every time they are unsatisfied with
their current institutional setting, instead of searching for better alternatives.
The challenge posed by patterns against the creation of new communities is
rather fatal, as it shows that the status quo (i. e. the minimal state) would be
privileged not merely on the ground of transaction costs or risks connected to
experimenting new cooperative enterprises, but also by the fact that rationality
demands not to invest efforts in the creation of a new community even when
individuals are certain about its returns. This is to say that individuals would
eventually privilege remaining in the minimal state even when a more fitting
option is at hand.102
101The payoffs of free-riders and contributors are obtained as follows: Pf r = (rncc)/N ,
Pc = Pd− c, where r denotes the multiplier, nc the number of contributors, and c the amount
of the contributions.
102The public good game objection, I suggest, already embeds other similar remarks that
could be advanced against Nozick’s theory: for instance, one may argue that, normally, those
who are unsatisfied with their current institutional arrangements are the ones that are left
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Therefore, it seems implausible that the minimal state would represent the
best means toward approximating the possible-worlds model, as spontaneously
arising patterns tend to drive individuals toward staying under the initial institu-
tional setting, regardless of the possibility of creating more fitting communities.
Another, although less dramatic, challenge to the minimal state’s route to-
ward approximating the possible-worlds model is represented by social norms
increasing costs for leaving communities or creating new ones. Particularly, the
worry I wish to highlight is that transaction costs are not merely denoted by
the risks associated with trying out new cooperative enterprises or by the ef-
forts required in order to create a new community or in searching for an already
existing and more fitting option, as costs may also be hiding behind informal
sanctions.
The underlying idea is that a right to exit a community or a right to gather
and persuade other people to create a new cooperative enterprise may also
be affected by informal sanctions directed toward those who undertake such
strategies. As such, even if individuals are not formally coerced into staying
or into abstaining from the attempt to create a new communities, they could
be informally sanctioned when trying to do so. Essentially, even assuming that
patterns affecting the creation of new communities, illustrated by the public
good game, can be overcome, informal sanctions may stand in the way of our
projects, making increasingly costly, and eventually not appealing, the strategy
of embarking into new cooperative enterprises, as costs yielded by informal
sanctions may outweigh the benefits expected by creating or joining more fitting
communities.
The institutional arrangements operating within the minimal state (and
within other eventually existing communities) do not contain any provision
aimed at dismantling (or preventing the emergence of) norms yielding such
poor by the distribution of rights operating within their communities, and, as such, lack the
resources required to build a new community or join an already existing ones. In fact, the
public good objection shows that no matter how resources are distributed, the status quo
would always be privileged as individuals have incentives to forego on efforts required to build
a new community.
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sanctions, although sanctions could severely undermine the possibility of em-
barking into new cooperative enterprises. Such a problem is less fatal to Nozick’s
theory insofar as it is impossible to identify, in an apriori fashion, a pattern
that would drive the emergence of norms going systematically against these
strategies, as the evolution of norms, by virtue of being tightly-coupled to ini-
tial conditions and individual attitudes, is rather unpredictable. However, the
emergence of such norms is still a possibility and would pervasively affect insti-
tutional arrangements attempting to approximate the possible-worlds model if
no provisions are devised.
The More-Than-Minimal State in Approximating Utopia
In the previous section, I argued that the minimal state is a rather unappealing
means toward approximating the possible-worlds model and, thus, the idea of
Utopia. This, we have seen, is not merely due to the existence of transaction
costs, shaping important disanalogies between the model and real world, but
rather to the fact that such costs drive the emergence of patterns that would
strongly privilege the status quo (i. e. the minimal state), even when better op-
tions are at hand. Moreover, the absence of provisions against norms that would
increase the costs for the creation of new communities or for the abandonment
of unfitting ones, poses another obstacle in imagining the minimal state as a fer-
tile soil where new cooperative arrangements would be continuously generated
and where individuals are able to freely move from one community to another,
in the attempt to find a better match.
These particular problems, I suggest, do not undermine the normative stand-
ing of the framework for utopia. In fact, Nozick’s aim of finding the institutional
arrangement, operating at the meta-community level, that best approximates
the possible-worlds model remains appealing. The appeal, I argue, comes from
the fact that our theorising around institutional arrangements at the community
level cannot possibly accommodate for the fact of diversity, as pluralistic soci-
eties will always face problems connected to non-compossibility of people’s pref-
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erences, goals and conceptions of the good. In this regard, political theories that
wish to take diversity seriously and aim to accommodate for non-compossible
conceptions of the good, would look at Nozick’s possible-worlds model as the
ideal scenario to approximate.
The amended version of the theory of the spontaneous order I have proposed
within the previous chapters is by no means an exception, as we have seen that
preferences for flexibility cannot accommodate for persistent and ineradicable
disagreement stemming from non-compossibile preferences and goals. Hence,
the search for a framework for utopia, that is for an institutional arrangements,
at the meta-community level, that best approximates the possible-worlds model,
concerns us inasmuch as it concerns all theories aiming to create the conditions
for cooperation, in a world characterised by ineradicable diversity and disagree-
ment. In this regard, the highlighted challenges that the minimal state faces in
the route of approximating the possible-world model are not meant to rule out
the enterprise of finding the institutional arrangement that best approximates
the model, but rather to offer a few improvements to Nozick’s proposal.
In fact, Nozick’s design of the minimal state as a means toward approxi-
mating the possible-worlds model contains crucial insights that must kept. Two
key aspects, in particular, deserve our attention. First, Nozick offers an apt
critique to theories aiming to leave in the hands of theorists and planners the
task of designing, in full details, fitting communities. In fact, he rightly observes
that theorists and planners lack the local knowledge required to design, in an
apriori fashion, cooperative enterprises that would fit with people’s preferences,
goals and conceptions of the good, and that, as such, any community so devised
would be largely defective. Second, Nozick’s discussion on the necessity of filter-
ing devices in generating fitting communities is, in many ways, illuminating. In
fact, it sheds lights on that devising a filtering device able to drive toward the
creation of fitting communities, through the use of knowledge dispersed among
individuals, is a feasible enterprise that requires much less knowledge than the
process of designing communities from scratch. Moreover, he convincingly ar-
gues that individual consent still represents the best filtering device in bringing
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about an end result (i. e. fitting communities) of which we do not know the pre-
cise nature. Equally important, the idea of employing individual consent as the
main filtering device allows us to respond to disagreement endogenously emerg-
ing from changes in members of the community’s structure of preferences and
goals, and not merely to static disagreement. In fact, the right to exit existing
communities and embarking in new cooperative adventures allows individuals
to continuously find better matches, in light of the dynamic character of their
structure of preferences.
The challenges I have highlighted, though, point toward amendments of the
institutional settings Nozick envisages as the best means toward approximat-
ing utopia. Once again, two desiderata seem to emerge. First, the difficulties
posed by collective action problems, illustrated by the public good game, invite
a distribution of rights able to overcome the incentive to defect in the process
of creating of new communities. Second, the challenge posed by informal sanc-
tions, eventually increasing the costs for generating new cooperative enterprises
or joining others, invites us to design provisions aiming at dismantling (or pre-
venting the emergence of) norms underpinning these sanctions.
Such desiderata seem to depict an institutional arrangement, at the meta-
community level, that goes beyond Nozick’s formulation of the minimal state.
In fact, they seem to call for a more-than-minimal state that, on the one hand,
preserves individual consent as the main filtering device toward the creation
of new communities, and that, on the other, distributes rights in a way that
would overcome the highlighted challenges. In particular, they seem to call for
distributions of rights able to foster our ability to generate new communities,
through the design of incentives that invite us to embark in new and more
fitting cooperative enterprises, when they are at our hand; and for an effort
toward dismantling or preventing the emergence of norms that would affect our
project to continuously look for better institutional arrangements.
The proposal of a more-than-minimal state as the institutional arrange-
ment, operating at the meta-community level, that attempts to approximate
the possible-worlds model, though, faces a plausible objection we have previ-
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ously highlighted. Particularly, Nozick seems to argue that the minimal state is
justified not merely on the ground of its alleged ability in best approximating
utopia, but also on the ground that it constitutes the maximal institutional
structure compatible with the idea of utopia. The underlying idea is that the
minimal state represents the only institutional setting that does not rule out any
possible utopian conception, and that, as such, is the only one that could be
universally endorsed at the meta-community level. More-than-minimal states,
indeed, while allowing for experimentation, would pose restrictions on what
communities should be like, and, as such, cannot be universally endorsed.
In particular, Bader argues that:
Any institutional structure that is more extensive than the min-
imal state will fail to be neutral and will privilege certain views of
utopia. Any restrictions on what associations can be like will ensure
that there will be some people who do not consider their association
to be the best possible association, but would rather be members
of an association that would not be subject to those restrictions.
This means that any more extensive state cannot in principle be the
best for each of us but can only be the best for those adhering to
the utopias that are thus privileged. More-than-minimal states will
thus only be accidentally compatible with utopia, namely only in
those situations in which no one should wish to be a member of an
association that is subject to the restrictions of a more-than-minimal
state. (Bader, 2017, pp. 267-268).
As noted earlier in the chapter, this particular aspect poses an interesting
question about whether we should rule out institutional arrangements that,
although better suited in approximating the possible-worlds model, by virtue of
better enhancing experimentation, cannot be universally endorsed due to posing
restrictions on what communities should be like. In this regard, I suggest, ruling
out more-than-minimal states on such a ground, seems to betray Nozick’s aim
of looking for the institutional arrangements that best approximate utopia, as
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it would restrict the set of options to the minimal state at the very outset.
However, there is another compelling response we could offer in defence of
more-than-minimal states. Particularly, we might object that Nozick’s design
of the minimal state is not immune to the criticism of privileging certain con-
ceptions of utopia over others, as collective action problems seem to indicate
that individuals would rationally be inclined toward the preservation of the sta-
tus quo, given the incentive to defect in building new cooperative enterprises.
Although such a tendency does not, in principle, rule out any conception of
utopia, it severely undermines the emergence of communities that would depart
from the minimal state.
Therefore, ruling out institutional arrangements on the basis of their lack of
neutrality, with respect to other conceptions of utopia, could lead us to rule out
also the minimal state from the set of plausible options, leaving us with nothing
more than anarchy at the meta-community level.
Conclusion
Concluding, let me summarise the two main achievements of the present chapter.
First, I have attempted to show that, since preferences for flexibility are likely
to fail in accommodating for all sorts of preferences and goals, our theorising
cannot be merely focused on what institutional arrangements should look like
within particular communities.
The fact of diversity, indeed, invites us to consider how institutional set-
tings should look like at the meta-community level, in the attempt to facilitate
the creation of cooperative enterprises that would be able to respond to the
challenges posed by diverse and non-compossible preferences and goals.
In this regard, Nozick’s account of utopia provides a framework in order
to cast the terms of our discussion about diversity and disagreement. In fact,
it sets the main desideratum for institutional arrangements operating at the
meta-community level, that is to create the conditions of cooperation, through
maximising the chances for the emergence of various fitting communities.
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Second, I have attempted to show that Nozick’s proposed institutional set-
tings, at the meta-community level, fail in approximating the account of utopia
he has in mind. In fact, although his proposed justificatory framework aptly
allows us to respond to the challenge posed by persistent disagreement, the min-
imal state faces crucial challenges in approximating the possible-worlds model.
In particular, it faces collective action problems that severely constrain people’s
ability to create new communities.
In this regard, I have proposed two main amendments that seem to call
for a more-than-minimal state as the institutional arrangement, at the meta-
community level, that best approximates the possible-worlds model. First, dis-
tributions of rights should generate incentives for the creation of new communi-
ties, in order to overcome collective action problems; second, provisions in order
to dismantle norms underpinning sanctions for the creation of new communities
and for the abandonment of unfitting ones should be devised.
Such two desiderata are not spelled out in full details. However, I believe
that they would constitute a plausible starting point for policy-makers aiming at
designing institutional arrangements, at the meta-community level, that would
create the conditions for the creation of as many fitting communities as possible,
in order to aptly respond to the challenges posed by diversity and resulting
disagreement.
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Conclusion
Perhaps, one good way to start the conclusion of the present work is to reiterate
John Stuart Mill’s quote that accompanied its developments during these years:
An individual Jesuit is to the utmost degree of abasement the slave
of his order though the order itself exists for the collective power
and importance of its members. (Mill, 2002 [1859], p. 95)
In the introduction, I have suggested that this quote nicely embodies the
main assumptions and the main aims of this thesis. In particular, it captures the
idea of starting our theorising about political institutions from the preferences
and goals of our fellow members of our communities, whose participation to
our cooperative enterprises is what ultimately provides meaning to our social
orders, and it captures the aim of theorising about political institutions in an
effort to design terms of cooperation that we all, qua main protagonists of our
communities, would find advantageous.
More than that, I suggest, it captures our astonishment in realising that so-
cial orders, despite existing for and because of their members, continuously fail
in responding to members’ preferences and goals. In fact, they spectacularly
fail in creating the conditions for peaceful cooperation among members who
legitimately uphold different conceptions of the good, who exhibit widely differ-
ent aims, who would embark in widely different enterprises, without necessarily
posing a threat to each other.
Perhaps, our disagreement about what political institutions should look like
is ineradicable, and, as such, social orders’ failure in accommodating for our di-
versity is bound to persist. Perhaps, indeed, our beliefs, our conceptions of the
good life, our preferences and goals, are ultimately non-compossible and under-
pin widely different sets of institutional arrangements, such that a convergence
on a unique system of rules is implausible. This is, we have seen, Nozick’s stand-
point in delineating the framework for Utopia. In fact, Nozick forcefully claims
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that persons, who exhibit a wide variety of preferences, goals and conceptions
of the good cannot plausibly converge on a shared set of institutions that they
regard as utopian. Individuals, he suggests, would describe the fine-grained fea-
tures of their ideal communities in widely different fashions, and theorists are
ultimately unable to design political institutions that would accommodate for
everyone’s standpoint:
Is there really one kind of life which is best for each of these people?
Imagine all of them living in any utopia you’ve ever seen described
in detail. Try to describe the society which would be best for all of
these persons to live in. Would it be agricultural or urban? Of great
material luxury or of austerity with basic needs satisfied? What
would relations between the sexes be like? Would there be any
institution similar to marriage? Would it be monogamous? (Nozick,
1974, p. 310).
If we take Nozick’s claim at face-value, there is no way to respond to the
problem of disagreement stemming from our diversity. In fact, we can hardly
think about Frank Sinatra, Buddha, Socrates and many others living under the
same set of political institutions and being satisfied by the terms of cooperation
that such institutional arrangements design for them, as they would plausibly
answer to Nozick’s fine-grained questions by defining specific features of their
ideal communities which are ultimately non-compossible.
Perhaps, though, most failures of our social orders, in creating the conditions
for peaceful cooperation among widely different persons, rest precisely on that
we theorise about political institutions as if we could design specific terms of
cooperation in ways that would respond to Nozick’s questions. Questions to
which, I suggest, we would be largely unable to answer on our own, in designing
our ideal community. This thought experiment is particularly revealing: what
would our ideal community look like? Would it be adventurous? Would it
be monogamous? Which educational paths would people engage with? Which
sports would people play? My straightforward answer to these questions is: I
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do not know, as I cannot specify in such a fully detailed fashion the constitutive
features of my preferred terms of cooperation. And, perhaps, such rock-solid
uncertainties are shared by most fellow members of our cooperative enterprises.
Furthermore, one might ask, what would our ideal community look like ten years
from now? Would it coincide with the one we attempt to design right now?
Our uncertainty is not limited to what our ideal community would look like,
as it also extends to what our own fine-grained structure of preferences and goals
would be like ten years from now. Would we like to be married? Would we like
our lives to be adventurous? Would we like to play sports? And which sports?
These questions are not redundant, in that our ideal community and our own
structure of preferences may plausibly not coincide. In fact, we can hold on to
our conceptions of the good by leading a life that is consistent with a certain
structure of preferences and, yet, prefer to be surrounded by persons who are
different from us: who would never engage into long lasting relationships, who
would like to play curling and who would like to study astrology.
Unsurprisingly enough, many of us would be unable to predict their own
structure of preferences and goals ten years from now. And if we look backwards,
one can realise that our inability to grasp future identities is well grounded,
as ten years ago we would hardly had predicted the fine-grained structure of
preferences we exhibit here and now. Sure, we have long term ’ground projects’,
to borrow Bernard Williams’ words,103 and our integrity is shaped by acting
consistently with what those projects demand. Yet, our projects do not exist
outside our structure of preferences and goals, and if we hold on to them, in
spite of the dynamic structures of our preferences and goals, it is because they
are general enough to be robust to changes in our own identities, or because we
are able to shape specific instances of these projects in light of the changes to
our own circumstances.
Let me offer two examples in order to illustrate these particular aspects.
When Betty starts her Ph.D. in philosophy she considers it a fundamental
project. In fact, Betty sees it as the obvious route to her academic career.
103Williams and Smart (1973).
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A career to which she is very much committed, as she loves intellectually stimu-
lating environments and can hardly imagine her life without engaging in philo-
sophical discussions with her colleagues. Yet, at some point, Betty becomes
frustrated by what academic life looks like. For instance, she becomes unsatis-
fied by the increasing administrative burdens lying on academics, and fails to
grasp the meaningfulness of criteria shaping one’s success within the academic
environment.
An academic career, though, is by no means the only career path that a
Ph.D. opens up. As such, she finds new reasons to comply with the demands of
her project; reasons which are shaped by her new structure of preferences and
goals, and to which the course of actions required to completing the Ph.D. still
represents an apt response.
Consider now a second example. When Betty starts her Ph.D. she has a spe-
cific project in mind: she wants to lay out how widespread diversity undermines
the possibility of cooperation in our societies. Yet, while writing the thesis, she
realises that her arguments are unsound, as there might be a meaningful way
to define the terms of cooperation that could be endorsed from widely different
standpoints. Hence, she changes specific instances of her project and attempts
to provide different arguments shaped by her updated beliefs.
In both examples, Betty sticks with the Ph.D. program for two different
kinds of reasons. In the former, although her beliefs, preferences and goals,
change with respect to the opportunity of an academic career, she finds the
Ph.D. as a robust path toward pursuing different aims, shaped by her updated
identity. In the latter, she sticks with the Ph.D. because she is able to define
particular instances of her project in due course, thus preserving her ability to
shape the contents of her thesis according to beliefs she comes to possess over
the years.
These two examples reveal two different sorts of uncertainties which require
two different predictive powers. In fact, I suggest, we can partially grasp which
projects would be robust to changes in our structure of preferences, but we are
likely to be largely unable to tell how changes in our own specific circumstances
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would shape particular instances of our projects, such that we can hardly commit
to define such specific instances ex-ante. In fact, when we do, perhaps, we fail
to realise how such a commitment is likely to undermine our integrity, in that
we will be unable to shape specific parts of a project in light of our updated
identity.
These considerations, I suggest, are nicely encapsulated by Soren Kier-
kegaard’s claim according to which ”life can only be understood backwards,
but it must be lived forwards”.104 In fact, we can only look at our fundamental
projects through the lenses of our actual structure of preferences, which shape
them, and perhaps grasp which enterprises would be robust to changes in our
own circumstances. However, our ability to account, ex ante, for how we would
like to shape specific instances of our projects is ultimately precluded to us.
In this regard, a fuller understanding of the fine-grained ideal features of our
own life, and of our ideal community, is one we come to possess only by looking
backwards.
If we look at Nozick’s exercise of assessing the incompatibility of our ideals
of social order, in the light of these considerations, we may fail to grasp its
relevance. In fact, Nozick is able to tell that there is no plausible set of insti-
tutions that would accommodate for Buddha and Frank Sinatra’s structures of
preferences precisely because he looks backwards to their lives, to what they
have achieved, to the sort of enterprises they have engaged with, and to their
underlying beliefs that shaped their reasons for undertaking certain courses of
actions. Yet, our exercise to theorise about institutions that would accommo-
date for our various structures of preferences, is not an exercise we undertake by
looking backwards. In fact, it is rather something we do for the sake of defining
terms of cooperation which are meant to regulate our interactions, in ways that
we find appropriate, right now and in the future. Our intention, qua members
of our community, is not to shape our specific terms of cooperation in light of
what we liked, on the sort of enterprises we engaged with, on our structure of
preferences we used to exhibit, as cooperation is ultimately a forward looking
104Kierkegaard (1980) [1844].
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enterprise.
One way to verify the plausibility of this argument is precisely to ask whether
Buddha and Frank Sinatra, were they living in the same time span, would have
arrived at the same conclusion Nozick draws. How would we know? It is already
hard to assess, ex-post, the incompatibility of the specific features of their ideal
communities, that one should almost certainly give up on the enterprise of
assessing whether they would have found common grounds for cooperation.
Notice that our difficulties in assessing the compatibility of Buddha and Frank
Sinatra’s views of the ideal community, does not merely rest on our inability to
know what it is like to be either Buddha or Frank Sinatra,105 but, rather, on
that Buddha and Sinatra, like us, had to live their lives forward, although they
could only fully understand them by looking backwards. As such, their eventual
terms of cooperation would not have been shaped by a full understanding of what
they desired, or of the enterprise they would have engaged with, or in the light
of the dynamic structures of preferences that accompanied them during their
life paths. Their terms of cooperation would have rather been shaped by their
partial ability to grasp which projects would have been robust to changes in their
structures of preferences, and by their large inability to tell how their dynamic
structures of preferences would have guided them to design specific instances
of their projects. Our difficulties double if we consider that our structures of
preferences are something which we partly shape through our social interactions,
such that Buddha and Frank Sinatra eventually incompatible views should be
assessed also by taking into account that their preferences are not hermetically
sealed from their interactions.
However, what I wish to emphasise is that cooperation is an inherently for-
ward looking enterprise, and that, since our lives can only be (perhaps) fully un-
derstood backwards, our attempt to define, at the very outset, our fine-grained
terms of cooperation is a rather silly enterprise. In fact, we are plausibly able
to define general terms of cooperation that will be consistent with changes in
our structure of preferences and goals, as we can partially grasp which ideals
105Such an argument would rest on Thomas Nagel’s considerations laid down in Nagel (1974).
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of the good life could be meaningfully relevant to us in the future, but we are
largely prevented from laying down in full details, ex-ante, how our dynamic
structure of preferences and goals would shape our preferred specific terms of
cooperation, such as to define a detailed set of rules that would guide us at each
and every step.
These considerations, I suggest, are more or less embedded in Hayek’s ac-
count of complexity, which we have previously outlined. In fact, these two
different kinds of uncertainties are captured by Hayek’s claims concerning our
ability to grasp the general functioning of how a complex system works, and, per-
haps, to isolate which general constitutive features bring about specific outcomes
within the system, thus making us able to predict the emergence of general pat-
terns; and our inability to provide a fully detailed account of how a complex
systems works, thus preventing us from outlining meaningful predictions on the
emergence of specific outcomes.
In this regard, we may aptly see Hayek’s theory of the spontaneous order
as a response to the high degree of complexity of our social orders, which gives
rise to his claim on the impossibility of central planning, and to the need for a
set of institutions able to use knowledge that is dispersed among widely diverse
individuals. Yet, unlike Hayek, I wish to stress that the complexity of our
social orders is not merely determined by our inability to collect all people’s
specific preferences and goals, but also by people’s uncertainty about how their
structures of preferences and goals will evolve in the future. In fact, our inability
to account for the fine-grained evolution of our structures of preferences and
goals adds up to the complexity of our social orders.
Such an uncertainty, I suggest, grounds the rationality of forming preferences
for flexibility when facing a social contract bargaining scenario and, in turn,
grounds the rationality of the two desiderata I have added to the amended
version of Hayek’s theory of the spontaneous order. In this regard, if we do
not take members of the community’s preferences as fixed, our choice about
institutional arrangements cannot be merely driven by considerations on how
are we to design and devise institutional arrangements able to use knowledge
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that is dispersed among various individuals in our society. In fact, we should
also account for the fact that individual preferences and aims are subject to
a process of continuous change, and that distributions of rights emerging from
their decentralised interactions, may bring about states of affairs in which some
members of the community are ultimately unable to shape their specific terms
of cooperation according to their dynamic structure of preferences.
The idea of preserving the instrumentalist character of our social orders, by
correcting distributions of rights that bring about such states of affairs, stems
precisely from the consideration that institutional arrangements are not merely
supposed to bring about distributive outcomes on the basis of a snapshot which
captures our preferences, here and now, but rather to create the best conditions
for us to lead a life according to preferences and needs which will continuously
unveil during our life paths, and which we are prevented from predicting ex
ante. In fact, distributive outcomes of all our interactions do not merely fail in
carrying the same justificatory power of individual interactions, as they are also
a function of interactions over which we have no control; but they also bring
about states of affairs capturing our structures of preferences and goals at a
given time in the past, which may not be satisfactory from our own updated
standpoint.
In a similar fashion, the idea of converging on policies that could plausibly
prevent the emergence of social norms, which increase the costs for pursuing our
preferred and legitimate courses of actions, stems from the fact that informal
sanctions may stand in the way of our ability to continuously shape our social
environment by undertaking social environment shaping actions. Social norms,
in this regard, are precisely like derivative distributions of rights: they emerge
from a wide variety of interactions over which we have no control, and even
if they could somehow capture and synthesise our structure of preferences and
goals, they would do it with references to given times in the past. As such, I
suggest, we have instrumental reasons to dismantle them, or to prevent their
emergence, insofar as our cooperative enterprises are ultimately supposed to be
forward-looking.
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The most relevant message that this thesis wishes to convey consists in that
our inability to predict the fine-grained evolution of our structures of preferences
and goals invites us to think about institutional arrangements by abstracting
from our current set of preferences and goals, and to come to the social contract
bargaining table by considering a wider range of aims, whose relevance may
unveil to us during our life path. This is precisely the idea behind the concept of
preferences for flexibility: since we are bound to a certain degree of uncertainty
concerning the sort of enterprises we may be willing to engage with in the future,
we have instrumental reasons not to tie our choice about political institutions to
fine-grained goals and preferences which are subject to a process of continuous
evolution. Preferences for flexibility, thus, are elicited by our rational desire to
be able to shape our specific terms of cooperation in due course, in light of our
uncertainty about our future identities.
Perhaps, if we take seriously our uncertainty about how our structures of
preferences and goals will unveil, and if we consistently imagine bargaining
scenarios in which we all assume such a standpoint, most, though not all, of our
disagreement will suddenly disappear. In fact, preferences for flexibility would
allow for a wider overlapping consensus on a minimal agreement. An agreement
which will mostly concern institutional arrangements that would equip us with
the ability to shape our social environment in due course, without unwarranted
constraints shaped by previous fine-grained preferences and aims.
If we are persuaded by the fact that forming preferences for flexibility is
ultimately rational, the amended version of the spontaneous order that I have
proposed in this thesis will appear as a plausible solution to a social contract
bargaining scenario. In fact, if bargainers are uncertain about their future aims,
they have reasons to converge on institutional arrangements which define a large
protected sphere of actions that would allow them to shape their specific terms
of cooperation in due course. In this regard, the protection of Lockean rights,
which Hayek envisages as the best cooperative institutional arrangement, would
equip individuals with the possibility of exercising social environment shaping
rights (e. g. economic rights, rights of expression, etc.), which would allow them
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to define their specific terms of cooperation according to the evolution of their
structure of preferences and goals.
However, inasmuch as bargainers, who form preferences for flexibility, would
plausibly endorse institutional arrangements defining a large protected sphere
of actions, they would also endorse policies that would prevent or correct the
emergence of states of affairs in which some members of a community are unable
to shape their specific terms of cooperation in due course, according to their
structures of preferences and goals. In particular, bargainers would have reasons
to endorse a sufficientarian distribution of social environment shaping rights, in
order to make sure that nearly all members of the community continue to see
their cooperative venture as an enterprise from which they continuously stand
to gain.
The considerations on preferences for flexibility, I suggest, define an inter-
mediate position between Derek Parfit, Christine Korsgaard and David Brink’s
arguments for altruism, and rational egoism.106 The position is intermediate in
that the sort of uncertainty about our future-selves, which I describe, is thick
enough to make us care about people’s interests as long as such interests could
become ours, but not so pervasive to form reasons to weigh all possible interests
equally. In fact, I suggest, we may partially grasp which enterprises would be
robust to evolution in our structure of preferences, such that we might, ex-ante,
rule out certain interests.
In order to illustrate such a difference, let us quote Brink:
If [...] the separateness or diversity of persons is not so fundamen-
tal [...] Insofar as distinct individuals are psychologically connected
and continuous, each can and should view the other as one who ex-
tends her own interests in the same sort of way that her own future
self extends her own interests. [...]This means that each should re-
gard the good of those to whom she stands in such relationships as
106In particular, my understanding of the altruistic position is largely drawn from Parfit
(1984), Korsgaard (1989), Brink (1997), whereas I draw from Shaver (1999) for the rational
egoist position.
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a constituent part of her overall good, just as she should regard the
good of her own future self as a constituent part of her overall good.
[...]Interpersonal connections and continuity can be found among in-
timates who interact on a regular basis and help shape each other’s
mental life; in such relationships, the experiences, beliefs, desires,
ideals, and actions of each depend in significant part upon those of
the others. (Brink, 1997, pp. 141-143).
Following Parfit and Korsgaard, Brink suggests that if it is an empirical fact
that our psychological connections with our future-selves are so weak to the
point that the idea of separateness of persons fails to be significant, we have
reasons to care about other persons inasmuch as we care about us. This, in
turn, would equip us with reasons for weighting all interests equally. However,
I find such a claim implausible. The implausibility does not rest on empirical
considerations about psychological connections, over which I am largely igno-
rant, but rather on our inability to think about our lives as ultimately led by
different persons at different time spans. Perhaps, Parfit, Korsgaard and Brink
empirical assumptions are broadly correct; perhaps, indeed, our future-selves
really are, as a matter of fact, strangers to us, but one main problem stands in
our way: namely, we are largely unable to assess what is it to think as if our
relation to our future-selves is identical to that we have to other persons. In
fact, we think about our future-selves through the lenses we possess, here and
now, and, as such, we are unable to know what is it to be someone else (or a
bat).
Preferences for flexibility, in this regard, are not meant to highlight our
complete uncertainty about our future-selves. Perhaps we have no empirical
grounds to believe that we have some special connections to our future-selves,
and, strictly linked to this aspect, we may have no empirical grounds to believe
that the lenses through which we look at our world right now, would make
sense to us in the future. However, we cannot get rid of our lenses in the same
way in which we get rid of specific goals in eliciting preferences for flexibility.
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Therefore, our flexible standpoints in an eventual bargaining scenario would not
be perspective-less, and we would always have reasons to exclude some interests
and some specific goals from the set of the available options. Perhaps, our
inability to get rid of our lenses shall drive us to make mistakes in our general
prediction of what shall make sense to us in the future, but there is no other
meaningful standpoint from which to assess our terms of cooperation.
This particular fact is what drives the discussion on institutional arrange-
ments at the meta-community level, which closes the thesis. In fact, if prefer-
ences for flexibility cannot make us abstract in the way in which Parfit, Kors-
gaard and Brink think we have reasons to, some disagreement about political
institutions is bound to persist. In this regard, cooperation may not be an en-
terprise we can engage with all together, and under the same set of political
institutions, as some would filter out certain features of our community that
others may find of value.
Let me conclude this thesis by suggesting that preferences for flexibility,
though not exhausting the room for moral and political disagreement, may open
up an interesting research path in contractarian theorising. A path that allows
us to achieve some level of abstraction, which rational individuals have interests
in reaching, while maintaining our authentic lenses in imagining plausible coop-
erative schemes. In this regard, if we are persuaded by the fact that cooperation
is an inherently forward looking enterprise, and if we come to realise that our
structures of preferences and goals is dynamic, preferences for flexibility could
come to respond to many problems connected to moral and political disagree-
ment. They are not the perfect answer, but a plausible and workable starting
point.
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